A few days ago, Tanzania’s Trade minister Charles Mwijage announced that his country would not be signing the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with the European Union.
He argued that the EPA would expose his country to harsh economic conditions in post-Brexit Europe. This followed an earlier announcement by Dr Aziz Mlima, Tanzania’s Permanent Secretary to the East African Community, that his country would not sign the EPA. This came as a shocker to Kenya, especially when Uganda immediately followed suit in rejecting the EPA. As if reading from the same script, Uganda’s and Tanzania’s decision left many wondering if there is more to this. Would this also mean the end of the EAC?
According to WTO rules, countries that form an economic bloc like the EAC cannot make individual agreements with another bloc such as the EU. This generally means that the decision by Tanzania and Uganda has put paid to Kenya’s efforts and those of Rwanda and Burundi to sign the EPA with the EU. This means that Kenya’s horticultural sector may be adversely exposed if it will not enjoy preferential (duty free and quota free) access to the EU, the world’s largest single market.
OBJECTIONS TO THE EPA
There are many people who have objected to the EPAs with Europe, in fact quite a number of NGOs have been active in trying to dissuade governments from signing them, citing the lopsided nature of the agreement. They also say that the EPAs may curtail the development options available to these countries. The EAC countries had initialled the EPA with the EU, but it appears pressure from other sources may have seen Tanzania and Uganda backtrack from signing that deal and Brexit became the convenient scapegoat. Even though British Prime Minister Theresa May has declared that ‘Brexit means Brexit’, it remains to be seen exactly what that will mean because it is clear to everyone that Britain would not fare well without trading with the remainder of the EU. Making such a substantial decision without first understanding how Brexit will affect Britain’s trade relations with its EU counterparts seems, to say the least, myopic.
Not even a month has gone by since Brexit. And yet Tanzania needs the EU more than the EU needs Tanzania. As a country categorized as a ‘least-developed nation’, its options are few and rubbishing a deal that has the potential of locking out its better developed neighbour Kenya is not right. While Tanzania has every right to determine its own future, it must realise that its future is tied to that of its neighbours and no nation can develop in isolation.
Since the revival of the EAC, Tanzania has been the reluctant partner. They’ve slowed down what would have been an economic bloc to reckon with, had things gone the way the initial planners had hoped. As of last year, there should’ve been a monetary union, but that has been pushed aside. With Brexit, it appears that the anticipated closer union in East Africa may just not happen. It is probably now clear to Tanzania that the ‘sufferings’ of the British people in the EU may just be the sufferings of Tanzania should they form the closer union with the rest of East Africa. There are several reasons for Tanzania’s trepidation about regionalism. The ghost of socialism still seems to hang around long after Tanzania officially renounced the ideology. Socialist nations are known to regard with suspicion other nations that do not share the same ideology.
On June 6, 1967, President Jomo Kenyatta rode his newly acquired Mercedes Benz 600 Pullman Limousine into Uganda, to sign the protocol that would form the East African Community on December 1, 1967.
POST-INDEPENDENCE PAN-AFRICANISM
Years before, in 1961, Dr Julius Nyerere was willing to delay Tanganyika’s independence so as to join both Kenya and Uganda in a new dawn of unity in the region. This was the age of great optimism – the age of post-independence Pan-Africanism, against the background of Kwame Nkrumah’s famous words “…our independence is meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of Africa”. Uganda became independent in October 1962, while Kenya and Zanzibar followed in December 1963. In July 1964 Tanganyika and Zanzibar united to produce what is known today as ‘Tanzania’, a name that was chosen from more than 1,000 suggestions sent in locally and abroad. Nyerere had envisioned regional unity under an ‘East African Federation’ (EAF) and invited Kenya and Uganda to join through its energetic Foreign Minister Oscar Kambona. The issue of federation was debated extensively in the Kenya Parliament, which passed the resolution to join by August 15, 1964. However, Prime Minister Jomo Kenyatta, who deeply feared federalism (majimboism) domestically, slowed down progress on this. Joining the EAF was largely an Opposition-led agenda pushed by the ‘majimboist’ Kadu party.
On October 1, 1964, Masinde Muliro, then deputy leader of the Official Opposition, sponsored a no-confidence vote in Jomo Kenyatta for not acting on the House resolution to join the EAF. This would be Kenyatta’s first and only no-confidence vote scare and it was shouted down by angry Kanu members. Kenyatta favoured a more relaxed arrangement, which involved refurbishing the East African Common Services Organisation, EACSO, which eventually became the EAC, which he readily penned into existence in 1967. However, when Uganda and Tanzania began a dalliance with Socialism, then there was a problem. In the era of the Cold War, this direction was a source of great concern to the main protagonists – the USA and the USSR. Kenya also seemed at risk of going down the Socialist path when Vice President Oginga Odinga was sighted at the May Day Parade in Moscow – an honoured guest of Nikita Khrushchev.
ORIGINS OF THE EAC
The EAC was one institution that originated from the desire by the British to integrate the three East African nations to efficiently administer the region. This however was not going to be easy. Kenya had been a settler colony with its racial structures that saw the African being lowest in rank. The Africans in Uganda and Tanganyika fared better but suffered a much lower investment in their economies. In 1929, efforts by Kenya’s Governor Sir Edward Grigg to amalgamate Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania into one super region came to nothing after the Hilton Young Commission on Closer Union failed to support his vision. Future governors however would form the East Africa High Commission in 1948 and later the EACSO, formed in 1961, would bring a collective approach to handling of shared services such as the railways, shipping, civil aviation, communication, research, education, meteorological services and even taxation. The secretariat was established in Nairobi and at independence the impetus to refurbish the EACSO led to the formation of the EAC.
In order to address the development disparities, the East African Development Bank was formed with a capital of $36 million. It gave Uganda and Tanzania greater priority so as to help them catch up with Kenya.
DEATH OF THE EAC
Pundits did not give the EAC much of a life expectancy, and, true to their word, by 1976, the Community was on its deathbed, dying the following year. The cause of death included deep-seated suspicion between the three nations and the perception of Kenya as the net (biggest) beneficiary. To tell the truth, Kenya actually had a considerable stake in the EAC, because it had inherited a large colonial economy with better infrastructure than its neighbours. Nyerere once quipped wryly that one did not need to go to London to see a metropolis – just go to Nairobi! Take, for instance, East African Airways (EAA). The four East African nations jointly owned the EAA, with Kenya having 67.7%, Uganda 22.6%, Tanganyika 9% and Zanzibar 0.7%. The EAA lasted until the EAC was on its knees in 1976. Indeed, Kenya had to wait until all the planes were safely parked at Embakasi, then it conceded to the break-up of the EAC in 1977. Immediately afterwards, the planes were re-branded Kenya Airways – and life went on. The other nations tried but failed in their aviation ventures and, to this day, KQ is the only survivor from that era.
Earlier, Kenya’s decision to bar the EAR&H entering Tanzania and Tanzania’s prevention of Kenya bus companies from plying Tanzanian routes, escalated the tensions. Fuel shortages were immediately experienced in northern Tanzania, which depended on the railway passing through Kenya. Ugandan strongman Idi Amin did not help matters after he openly claimed Kenyan territory and antagonised Tanzania’s President Nyerere for, among other things, harbouring ousted president Milton Obote and militarising the border.
AFTERMATH
In 1984 and also in 1993, the nations came together again with agreements that eased tensions, but not quite. Loss of jobs, economic and other difficulties brought many to agree that regional integration was a necessity. It was not until July 7, 2000, that the EAC was revived in a process largely driven by Kenya’s President Moi and Uganda’s President Museveni. On November 30, 2001, the EA Legislative Assembly sat for the first time since 1977. Even then, the path was fraught with lots of danger. Indeed, erstwhile willing partner Tanzania now became the most unwilling, with fears that free movement of persons within the Community would lead to a swamping of Tanzania by Kenyans whose economic resources would easily outrun those of Tanzanians. Besides, land ownership seemed the most contentious issue, with Tanzania mortally afraid Kenyans would settle there.
WAY FORWARD
Kenya has had a long standing export relationship with Europe that began in colonial times. It is today the world’s largest exporter of black tea and a leading exporter of cut flowers, among other things. The EPA would give these sectors the stability needed for growth. With Uganda and Tanzania declining to sign, it could portend hard times for Kenyan farmers and would be an economic body blow for Kenya. Kenya is still reeling from Uganda’s decision not to pass its oil pipeline through Kenya and Rwanda is also going ahead with its railway through Tanzania. This will significantly lower Kenya’s prospects, especially following the anticipated completion of its own standard gauge railway mid-next year and the commercial exploitation of its own oil in due course. Instability has also lowered Southern Sudan’s attractiveness as an alternative partner for Kenya’s infrastructural development under the SGR, the pipeline and even under the Northern Corridor Transport Improvement Project. Ethiopia seems uncertain too. The decision on the EPA is the latest blow to Kenya, which should now seriously consider what it should do about it. The matter has the potential of threatening the East Africa Community, leading to major economic and social reversals for the five members.
Source: The Star

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