
TMEA evaluation

Strategic Objectives 2 & 3

2D/2E Interim Evaluation: SO2 & SO3

Final report

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List of abbreviations

DAC	Donor Assistance Committee
DEQ	Detailed Evaluation Question
EABC	East Africa Business Council
EAC	East Africa Community
EATTA	East African Tea Trade Association
EPA	Economic Partnership Agreement
EQ	Evaluation Question
FCS	Foundation for Civil Society (Tz)
HEQ	Higher Evaluation Question
ICBT	Informal Cross Border Trade
IFC	International Finance Corporation
KEPSA	Kenya Private Sector Alliance
KTF	Kenya Tourism Federation
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MEAC	Ministry of East African Community (TZ)
MIS	Management information system
NTB	Non-Tariff Barrier
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OPM	Oxford Policy Management
OSBP	One Stop Border Posts
PAR	Project Appraisal Report
REC	Regional Economic Community
SCT	Single Customs Territory
SEATINI	Southern and Eastern African Trade Information and Negotiations Institute
SO	Strategic Objective
SQMT	Standards Quality Metrology and Testing
SWIFT	Rwanda Ministry of Health Programme
TMEA	Trade Mark East Africa
TOC	Theory of Change
TPSF	Tanzanian Private Sector Federation
WS	Workstream
ZFDB	Zanzibar Food and Drugs Board

Executive Summary

1. This report is part of Workstream 2 (WS2) and is the Deliverable 2D 2E–Interim Evaluation for Strategic Objectives SO2 (Enhanced Trading Environment) and SO3 (Improved Business Competitiveness). It is for the independent and external Trade Mark East Africa (TMEA) evaluation and was prepared by the evaluation team consortium led by Oxford Policy Management (OPM).
2. As a demand-led facility, TMEA aligned with country agencies and ministries of East African Cooperation where appropriate and also engaged with civil society organisations under SO3. TMEA supported many national agencies in support of trade enabling activities including trade logistics, OSBPs, NTBs and various National bureau of standards. Most of the support provided to these agencies was a collaborative relationship with TMEA and a number of stakeholders commented on the importance of enabling the recipient organisation to be involved in the design of the activities and selection of experts. This promoted local ownership of the activity, and most of SO2 activities were considered to be relevant to national and regional priorities.
3. TMEA operates as a multi-donor facility with the participation of the Governments of the UK, Finland, Denmark, USA, Canada, Belgium and the Netherlands. TMEA is the main trade enabling facility for these development partners and there is very good cooperation and coordination with other major donors who are not part funders, including the European Union. Evidence from Annual Reviews indicates good cooperation between donors which includes agreement for example by the Programme Investment Committee (PIC) to coordinate the annual review process to be jointly coordinated to reduce the risk of overburdening the process with multiple reviews.
4. In line with the Terms of Reference (see ToRs in Annex 7), the report serves both accountability and learning purposes and contributes to answering the key high-level evaluation question for WS2:
 - ***HEQ1: Has the programme been effective in delivering its outputs and its outcomes, and how has this been affected by the programme’s organisational performance and how could this be improved?***

The overall scope of the report is in line with the design set out in the inception report, except for one key aspect in relation to “outcome-level evaluation” component which is limited to a provisional assessment of outcomes. This work was not undertaken as originally planned which meant that the current report does not include a robust analysis of TMEA’s achievement of its outcome-level targets. Instead, the report is based on a provisional assessment of outcomes, but this was not based on the evaluation methodology (pathway mapping) that was set out in the inception report. This shortcoming will be addressed in the performance evaluation which will trace the pathways of TMEA’s components as described in the theory of change and results chains, examine outcome achievement and attribution or contribution in detail for a sample of these, and draw in a range of perspectives including corporate and private business exporters to strengthen triangulation for the final evaluation conclusions.

5. TMEA has reached the stage where it should now have a critical mass of learning from the experience of institution building with trade enabling organisations as well as direct experience from working with business and civil society. It should now be working towards ensuring that the critical mass of projects that have been undertaken is translated into some evidence-based learning in supporting its future activities. In order to achieve this transition, TMEA needs to improve the accuracy and thoroughness of its data collection and monitoring processes and to have greater validation of the self-reported data. As TMEA becomes more of a learning organisation and less of a project facility, greater attention will need to be given to addressing the sustainability of the interventions undertaken, to prevent institutions- especially under SO2- becoming dependent on TMEA.

1. Project Outputs

6. This assessment of TMEA's results has placed an emphasis on the OECD-DAC criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability, and was undertaken in two stages: A desk analysis was undertaken of 40 projects, 20 of which were then followed up with site visits to interview key project stakeholders.
7. Per the inception report, the sampling strategy was to apply the qualitative research concept of 'heterogeneous sampling', designed to cover a maximum diversity of situations within TMEA programme implementation, to ensure maximum representativeness and allow conclusions to be drawn for the TMEA programme as a whole.
8. In practice, a hybrid approach was adopted to ensure selection of the key projects which TMEA had prioritised for learning as well as adequate representation by budget spend and all countries of TMEA. A final part of the selection was conducted at random, the evaluation team and DFID were satisfied that there was nothing to suggest a biased sample.
9. The team undertook a document review of the sampled projects to prepare for field visits in Tanzania (Dar es Salaam and Arusha), Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi and Kenya. The preparatory desk stage involved a review of the key design documents including the Project Appraisal Reports (PARs), results chains, progress reports and monitoring reports. Field visits were then undertaken in March and April 2017. A considerable time was involved in completing this study which had constrained the scope of our work. In particular, the delayed timeframe limited the scope for 'real-time' interactions with TMEA staff and therefore restricted generating learning during the course of the evaluation.
10. The team assessed the quality of evidence for the visited projects.¹ All projects were given a 4-point RAG rating and scored according to the evaluation criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, gender, learning and sustainability. The detailed evaluation questions from HEQ1 were mapped onto these criteria.

1.1 Strategic Objective 2 (SO2) Findings

11. The projects score well on their **relevance** to the TMEA Theory of Change and Country Strategies, with 16 out of 20 projects performing well (Green) and four receiving amber. The assessment of the evaluators, based on the responses of key stakeholders, was that there was a strong performance of relevance to country needs, but a slightly weaker fit with the overall mandate of TMEA. This conclusion applied to a number of projects that are intervening lower down the TMEA theory of change and providing generic capacity building, rather than specific support to trade facilitation and enabling. Thus, a lot of such capacity building could have been provided by other development partners leaving TMEA a more strategic role on trade issues.
12. **Effectiveness** was scored against four key criteria: (i) achievement of outputs; (ii) ability to overcome capacity constraints; (iii) extent to which the project addressed potential negative impacts, and (iv) effectiveness of capacity building. Projects generally scored well on effectiveness, with 12 out of 20 scoring good (green) and just one project with major concerns (amber-red rating). The overall assessment of the evaluators was that the SO2 projects have been well implemented and the outputs are contributing to the wider outcomes of the TMEA ToC, though it must be recognised that most outputs were not achieved on schedule. The effectiveness score was consistent across all four aspects of this measure.
13. Projects scored less well on **efficiency** and this review concluded that TMEA, in most countries, has had mixed success in supporting projects. Several stakeholders felt TMEA procurement processes were too slow, overly cautious, and subject to delays. However,

¹ Data was also collected from each of the sampled projects for the institutional assessment (2B). This included the stakeholder perspectives of TMEA processes and support, forming a valuable evidence base for that deliverable.

stakeholders generally commented on the very good selection of consultants to undertake the projects and on partners' strong ownership of the projects.

14. Many of the SO2 projects, for example on trade barriers or Single Customs Territory (SCT), do not have a specific **gender** focus, and monitoring data on training and capacity building have not been adequately disaggregated. TMEA have taken steps to mainstream gender in the next strategy and such changes are also to be reflected in new project design and monitoring documents.
15. The projects scored less well on **sustainability and learning**. Projects often appeared overly dependent on TMEA funding, with no firm strategy for moving towards a sustainable funding model. Three projects were rated as Amber-Red primarily for concerns over their monitoring and learning processes, which were inadequate to generate useful learning from the project.
16. The conclusion from the output assessment of the SO2 projects is that the portfolio of projects has performed well. TMEA must take a considerable amount of credit for making significant gains to economic integration in East Africa through support to the East Africa Community (EAC) and national institutions. TMEA has also achieved some major breakthroughs in SO2 especially in areas such as the SCT and reducing Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs). The EAC is the best performing of the Regional Economic Communities (REC) in Africa, and TMEA has played a major role here. Overall, there were some weaknesses in programme design in terms of timelines for achieving sustainable results and the lack of consideration of gender.

1.2 Strategic Objective 3 (SO3) Findings

17. Of the 20 SO3 projects in the sample, ten projects performed well (green) and eight rated amber. No projects that scored low on relevance or where there were any major concerns. The evaluation team found the canvas of business competitiveness for SO3 projects was very broad and, in some cases, covered activities that appeared to be less central to the TMEA mandate. The team wondered whether TMEA was always the most suitable funder of some of these activities.²
18. Projects generally scored well on **effectiveness** with 14 out of 20 scoring green and five scoring amber. There are no projects with any major concerns on outputs achieved. SO3 projects have delivered a range of outputs to support business competitiveness, including technical assistance to support traders and organisational strengthening of civil society organisations and business associations, who have influenced changes in NTB notifications and those economic integration issues that affect their interests.
19. On **efficiency**, civil society organisations (CSOs) supported under SO3 appeared to struggle due to a lack of appropriate internal processes related to risk mitigation and cash flow management. In some cases this led to delays in implementation and delivery of outputs. This necessitated TMEA staff to work with the CSOs in order to strengthen areas of weakness highlighted in the due diligence phase and not identified in the initial project design and appraisal process.
20. Of the projects reviewed, SO3 projects score better than SO2 on **gender** issues, specifically on projects designed to overcome gender barriers (as with women cross border traders). Of particular note was the Transborder Project in Tanzania (Project 1138 in Annex 5) which also addressed the broader gender issue of control over household assets by bringing in participants' husbands. Projects which were not specifically designed to overcome gender barriers, however, did not perform well in this area, with little evidence that gender was considered in design, implementation or monitoring.
21. On **sustainability**, a common feature of the SO3 projects was the lack of absorption capacity of recipient organisations. This implies that many of the activities such as support to cross border traders will not go to scale without further support. This issue also applied to advocacy

² Details on which projects scored less positively and the rationale behind the scoring are included in Annex 5.

activities – many of the civil society organisations appeared to struggle with having appropriate internal processes related to risk mitigation and cash flow management, which led to delays in implementation and delivery of outputs.

22. The conclusion from the output assessment of SO3 is similar to SO2. The portfolio of projects has performed reasonably well and many projects are contributing to the outcomes of greater market access and trade, with some weaknesses on efficiency and sustainability. SO3 projects have delivered a range of different outputs to support business competitiveness, including technical assistance to support traders and organisational strengthening of civil society and professional service organisations. These institutions are beginning to use **their voice effectively** to influence changes in NTB notification and economic integration issues. However, it can be argued that the focus of some SO3 projects is less central to the TMEA mandate.

2. Programme Outcomes

23. As acknowledged above, this report is an initial assessment and will be further refined and completed as part of Phase 2. Notwithstanding the limitations of the analysis mentioned above, and the potential bias of self-reported data, this initial assessment based on TMEA's own Results Framework reporting of progress towards programme outcomes shows that the programme's SO2 outcomes have already been or are likely to be achieved. It is worth noting that there has been no independent validation of outcome progress by the evaluators at this stage, though this is planned for phase 2. The sole exception is in the efforts regarding the harmonisation of standards. No information was available regarding the progress towards the expected approval of Mutual Recognition Agreements. The overall trade integration trend indicator (*Trading Across Borders*) provided by the World Bank Doing Business Study improved for all TMEA beneficiary countries but Tanzania. Overall five out of six SO2 indicator targets were achieved, reflecting good progress towards expected outcomes.
24. Targets for SO3 were achieved in 2016 or were likely to be achieved during the first phase of TMEA's first strategy, with the exception of the gender targets. The TMEA results framework does not provide information regarding income increase of small traders (since this has not been measured). However, anecdotal evidence from the qualitative field work for this evaluation suggests that such an increase did occur.
25. This evaluation has concluded that SO2 activities are consistent with the TMEA Theory of Change (ToC). The criteria for assessing consistency used here questions whether TMEA is doing the right things with the right beneficiaries, to ensure that project outcomes contribute to the wider programme or strategic outcomes. Consistency in this sense is not 100% achieved, since there are some capacity building activities that are less relevant to the 2014 ToC. However, the emphasis of TMEA priorities and the ToC has changed over time, and these projects were consistent with the ToC at the time.
26. ToC consistency is less obvious for SO3, but given that TMEA has a mandate to pay attention to social wellbeing (vulnerable groups and poverty reduction), reaching out with capacity building activities to these small organisations seems to be appropriate.
27. Phase 2 of the evaluation will involve a performance evaluation which will include additional analysis in terms of TMEA's contribution towards the achievement of programme-level intermediate and strategic outcomes. It will examine the main transmission pathways as set out in Annex 6 and test the hypothetical results chains posited by the TMEA Strategy 1 framework. It will draw in other perspectives such as corporates and private business exporters to strengthen the triangulation in support of the final evaluation conclusions on the assessment of programme outcomes.

3. Key Recommendations

28. The following recommendations are all addressed at TMEA, to be considered by the Board and implemented by the Secretariat.
29. **Improve consistency of project documentation:** there were many differences between budgets and indicators contained in the PARs and the quarterly/monitoring reports. It was sometimes unclear whether these differences were due to an inconsistency or as a result of changes that had been made to the programme and results frameworks. There are clear lessons for improvements in TMEA processes. There needs to be a clear anchor and traceability for monitoring reports and clear explanations on changes to budgets, activities and indicators.
30. **Addressing sustainability:** the sustainability of a supported institution or organization may be recognised as weak from the outset and whilst this should not be a barrier for TMEA engagement, there should be a greater ex ante understanding of the consequences of TMEA exit on the organisation and project. This should be established and planned for in the programme document.
31. **Monitoring Reports – improving process and validation:** for an external reader, the TMEA monitoring reports were thin and did not provide sufficient evidence of progress. There was generally insufficient narrative to describe the key issues addressed during the reporting period, reasons for the performance being behind schedule, and key issues to be addressed in the following quarter. Outputs and outcomes were often poorly defined with inappropriate indicators. The quality of the monitoring reports varied between projects and countries; some information in the reports was out of date or inaccurate. There is a need for improvement in the process of ensuring that the reports received by the TMEA country office have been validated, fact checked and quality assured before they are sent to Nairobi.
32. **Strategic focus of SO3:** the canvas of possible interventions in SO3 remains wide. There would be greater influence and achievement from TMEA actions if there were a greater focus on the objective of export competitiveness. For example, TMEA could restrict its focus to trade standards, SCT and NTBs and then become a centre of excellence in these areas which are the core areas of TMEA's mandate.
33. **Addressing project focus on gender:** there is rarely a gender perspective within project design documents, nor any attempt to track gender-disaggregated indicators at a project level. This will require ongoing work by TMEA to enhance its monitoring and data gathering on the engagement and impacts on women of its programmes.

1 Approach and Scope of Work

1.1 Introduction

This report is part of Workstream 2, a component of DFID’s independent evaluation of TMEA, and is an interim evaluation of the projects under (SO 2- Enhanced Trading Environment) and (SO 3 – Improved Business Competitiveness). This component of the evaluation assessed whether TMEA inputs were deployed as intended and whether they delivered the planned TMEA outputs and, to a limited extent, the project-level outcomes, with a fuller assessment of programme-level outcomes coming in phase 2 of the evaluation implementation phase. Further analysis of TMEA impacts on trade and poverty will be conducted as part of subsequent evaluation workstreams, although case-based evidence provided to evaluators does feature in this report, as does TMEA’s own progress reporting data. Although the primary focus was on project-level effectiveness, assessment of the quality of TMEA’s support to institutional structures, and reflections on institutional and project level value for money, are also contained within this report. The intended recipients of the report are TMEA staff including TMEA Council, Senior Management, TMEA technical teams and TMEA Evaluation Committee as well as TMEA government counterparts in respective countries, DFID staff and other donors, Donor Reference Group, and TMEA partners.

This report is in five sections: chapter 1 covers a review of the Theory of Change (ToC) and sets out the methodology and approach to answering the evaluation questions; chapters 2 and 3 respectively reviews the output-level analysis of the SO2 and SO3 portfolio; chapter 4 sets out an assessment of outcomes at a TradeMark programme level, and the final chapter sets out the conclusions and recommendations.

The inception report proposed to map results as a key exercise of the evaluation. The results mapping exercise analyses how progress is being achieved and thus serves to verify the TMEA theory of change with a comparison of the expected with the achieved results. The phase 2 Performance Evaluation will carry out additional analysis in terms of TMEA’s contribution towards the achievement of intermediate and strategic outcomes.

Previously, all TMEA projects were mapped according to their outputs in order to see where and how TMEA is aiming to generate change through its projects – both direct interventions and enabling projects. All 200+ TMEA projects (direct interventions and enabling activities) were mapped. The results of this exercise (called “output mapping” in the Inception Report) were previously provided in Deliverable 2A. The main finding from this output mapping shows that TMEA, in addition to providing infrastructure investment, provides learning, capacity building, and policy advocacy programming.

For the results mapping, the effectiveness of SO2 and SO3 projects and the outcome assessment focuses on two key questions:


- *Did TMEA select projects that were relevant to the mandate of TMEA and meet with the needs of stakeholders?*
- *Did these projects work and produce the intended outputs on time and according to plan and are they likely to contribute to the wider outcomes of TMEA as set out in the Theory of Change (shown in figure 1)?*

At a broader level, this deliverable contributes to the answer for Higher Evaluation Question (HEQ) 1:

- **HEQ1: Has the programme been effective in delivering its outputs and outcomes? How has this been affected by the programme’s organisational model and how could this be improved?**


HEQ1 was broken down into ten Detailed Evaluation Questions (DEQs), which provided the initial structure for this report.

Figure 1: Theory of Change



A third exercise, pathway mapping to test the achievement of outcomes, mapped all projects to the Programme Intermediate Outcomes in the programme results framework (RF), a key TMEA product. That more operational TMEA product is more detailed than the Theory of Change (ToC) as shown above in Figure 1, in terms of linking the projects to programme level outputs and outcomes. Performance indicators are attached to each level in the RF, and TMEA there records progress against those indicators, both at the country level and corporately. As expressed in the RF, the ToC can be arrayed as shown in Figure 2, below:

Figure 2: TMEA Results Framework



The Programme Intermediate Outcomes (PIO) are in blue in the diagram; the projects that contribute to a given PIO were mapped and, to the extent possible given limited data, described. Tracing the causal relationship through this results chain will be built upon in the Performance Evaluation.


1.2 Approach: Results Mapping

The broad evaluation design of the study is guided by a developmental approach (Patton, 2006)³. The approach suits the purposes of the evaluation best because it facilitates close to real-time feedback to the TMEA programme staff thus facilitating a continuous development loop. The chosen design is particularly suited to TMEA given the innovative and complex nature of the programme and the environment that it operates under. Another design option could have been to use contribution analysis but since the main focus on the study was assessing the output level achievements instead of outcome level results, the decision was to use the utilisation focussed developmental approach to generate real time interactions and learning.

The broad framework for undertaking this evaluation of project performance is set out below in Figure 3 and is based on the OECD-DAC criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability for evaluating outputs and outcomes. Where appropriate, we have linked OECD-DAC criteria to DEQs, as mapped out in the diagram below. We have also included gender as a cross-cutting criterion, in line with DEQ 4.5.

³ Patton, M.Q. (2006) Evaluation for the Way We Work. The Nonprofit Quarterly. Vol. 13 (1): 28-33. Retrieved via <http://www.scribd.com/doc/8233067/Michael-Quinn-Patton-Developmental-Evaluation-2006>

Figure 3: Evaluation Criteria



The organisational assessment component of HEQ 1 (DEQ 1.7 – 1.10) has some bearing to our evaluation questions, but primarily they refer to an evaluation of TMEA as an institution, rather than TMEA funded projects. These questions were addressed under deliverable 2B.

The DEQs developed in the inception phase structured the questionnaire completed with the projects in the evaluation sample, around the evaluation criteria. Sub-questions were then developed under each of these categories (the detailed questionnaire is set out in Annex 1). To effectively elicit stakeholder perceptions, the evaluation conducted semi-structured interviews with an open dialogue, rather than an interrogation based on a checklist of items. The process therefore validated and triangulated the information reported to TMEA.

The DEQs are listed below with their links to the evaluation criteria. For question DEQ 1.4, the issues cut across two evaluation criteria, relevance and effectiveness; it is therefore listed twice.

Table 1: Evaluation Questions

Criterion	DEQ
Relevance	1.1 To what extent are TMEA projects' intended outputs generally consistent with the programme TOC?
	1.4 Who were/are the main beneficiaries of the outputs? Are there organisations or groups of people who are negatively affected by the outputs?
Effectiveness	1.2 Were outputs achieved in accordance with plans/expectations and within budget? For ongoing projects, what is the likelihood of achieving the output targets within the project timespan?
	1.3 What constraints were/are encountered in achieving the outputs? What are the main reasons for non-achievement of the outputs (if any)?
	1.4 Who were/are the main beneficiaries of the outputs? Are there organisations or groups of people who are negatively affected by the outputs?
	1.5 To what extent have supported organisations (i.e. the implementing partners) built capacity and capability on relevant trade-related matters?

Criterion	DEQ	
	1.6	To what extent has TMEA been able to achieve expected outcomes (for finalised projects) and what is the general likelihood of ongoing projects achieving their outcomes?
Efficiency	1.7	To what extent does TMEA have the management arrangements, systems, processes and human resources appropriate for carrying out its mission (i.e. how suitable are these for the purposes of carrying out its activities)?
	1.8	To what extent do TMEA's financial (including procurement), human resource and risk management processes enable it to efficiently and effectively manage its contractual relationships with implementing partners?
Sustainability and learning	1.9	To what extent do the processes TMEA has in place promote organisational learning and sharing of good practices?
	1.10	Are the M&E tools and processes in place appropriate, both in regard to results and finances? How could they be strengthened?
Gender	4.5	To what extent has the programme benefited women and girls (noting that the programme design did not purport to benefit them equally)? Have there been any negative consequences for women and girls? Has the programme had an impact on relations, including power and influence, between girls/women and boys/men? How could the programme increase benefits to women and girls within its trade focus?

1.2.1 Relevance

DEQ1.1: *To what extent are TMEA projects' intended outputs generally consistent with the programme TOC?*

DEQ1.4: *Who were/are the main beneficiaries of the outputs? Are there organisations or groups of people who are negatively affected by the outputs?*

Three key tests for relevance were made under DEQ 1.1. Firstly, a broad consistency check with the TMEA mandate was undertaken by reviewing the objectives of the initiative against the ToC in Figure 1, while recognising that some projects may have been agreed before the ToC was formalised in its current form. For example, investment climate projects are no longer a focused priority, but may have been within the programme mandate when the project was selected.

A second key test was to review the relevance of the project in relation to the TMEA Country Strategy, recognising the decentralised governance structure of TMEA. The key source document was the relevant TMEA Country Strategy document for the country in question.

Thirdly in assessing the relevance in relation to country context, stakeholders were given the opportunity to express openly their perception of the extent to which the project met with the needs of their institutions. More generally, the discussion and assessment required a link to be made to the project's strength in supporting regional economic integration.

DEQ 1.4 also has implications for relevance, in that it asks who the main beneficiaries of outputs were. The main project recipients or partners of SO2 projects are national ministries, standards agencies and parastatals, and the East African Community Secretariat. With regard to supporting technological solutions for trade and eliminating non-tariff barriers (NTBs), additional beneficiaries include firms exporting and transporting goods, for whom average trade times and trade costs were reduced. Regarding SO3, a significant proportion of the project beneficiaries were small-scale, often informal women traders; cooperatives working with selected value chains; logistics actors such as freight forwarders and transport companies; business membership associations and apex bodies of such associations; and civil society organisations trained to effectively engage in policy advocacy. In each

case for SO3, activities strengthened their abilities to become part of a formalised trade system. Implicit within that is the question of whether the targeted beneficiaries were the most relevant possible beneficiaries for achieving TMEA's objectives. Furthermore, the questions around potential negative impact for specific target groups includes an assessment of whether the intended beneficiaries are being targeted and whether negative impacts could outweigh the positive, in which case the relevance of the project comes into question. The evaluation team recognised that most TMEA interventions in SO2 and SO3 did not explicitly consider specific stakeholder groups that would be adversely affected by the project. Notwithstanding, good project design would identify those groups that are potentially negatively affected, and would have some discussion over whether the intended beneficiaries were well-targeted.

1.2.2 Effectiveness

***DEQ1.2:** Were outputs achieved in accordance with plans/expectations and within budget? For ongoing projects, what is the likelihood of achieving the output targets within the project timespan?*

***DEQ1.3:** What constraints were/are encountered in achieving the outputs? What are the main reasons for non-achievement of the outputs (if any)?*

***DEQ1.4:** Who were/are the main beneficiaries of the outputs? Are there organisations or groups of people who are negatively affected by the outputs?*

***DEQ1.5:** To what extent have supported organisations (i.e. the implementing partners) built capacity and capability on relevant trade-related matters?*

***DEQ1.6:** To what extent has TMEA been able to achieve expected outcomes (for finalised projects) and what is the general likelihood of ongoing projects achieving their outcomes?*

The evaluators' assessment of effectiveness was driven by reviewing the extent to which the activities could be considered to have been completed (or expected to be) successfully and that these outputs are likely to support achieving intended outcomes. Most projects were completed but the process of capacity building was on-going and further interventions were expected.

The evaluators recognised that project activities were often subject to delays, some of which were beyond the control of TMEA or the recipient institution. Nevertheless, there was some discussion as to whether the project as designed set realistic time frames for the achievement of activities, given the known political economy context and implementation capacity. A well-designed project and intervention should have a good understanding of the internal (mainly institutional) constraints as well as the external national and international political context, which should be reflected in a risk mitigation strategy.

It should be noted that there is a deliberate overlap in considering DEQ1.4 in terms of both relevance and effectiveness. In considering relevance, more emphasis is given to whether negative effects were considered during the design of the project. For effectiveness, on the other hand, specific consideration is given to assessing how negative impacts were managed in implementation. In generating data for DEQ1.4, the evaluation team attempted to look both for potential negative effects on intended recipients, and for potential negative distributional effects on other groups.

As the output mapping activity noted (see Deliverable 2A), many projects have undertaken capacity building activities. The evaluators' assessment here was based on the extent to which there was evidence that capacity had been built which would enable sustainability, i.e. the continuation of economic integration activities beyond the completion of the project.

1.2.3 Efficiency

DEQ1.7: *To what extent does TMEA have the management arrangements, systems, processes and human resources appropriate for carrying out its mission (i.e. how suitable are these for the purposes of carrying out its activities)?*

DEQ1.8: *To what extent do TMEA's financial (including procurement), human resource and risk management processes enable it to efficiently and effectively manage its contractual relationships with implementing partners?*

Given the weaknesses and limitations of project monitoring reports and other relevant documentation, the evaluation of efficiency was limited to the performance of the project management function in procuring the right inputs expediently and in the efficiency of TMEA's support to partner institutions. This included their ability to provide appropriate inputs on time and within budget. The assessment of efficiency was only undertaken and scored for those projects that were visited and was therefore largely based on field visit interviews.

1.2.4 Learning and sustainability

DEQ1.9: *To what extent do the processes TMEA has in place promote organisational learning and sharing of good practices?*

DEQ1.10: *Are the M&E tools and processes in place appropriate, both in regard to results and in regard to finances? How could they be strengthened?*

The evaluation team examined projects on the basis of the expected sustainability of their outputs as well as their legacy, in line with OECD-DAC criteria. In many cases the TMEA projects had been completed but subsequent initiatives from TMEA were planned. In this sense we were undertaking an ex-post assessment of a TMEA supported project but in many cases follow up activities were either still on-going or planned. The Monitoring & Evaluation (M&E) processes and capacities of the projects were also analysed.

1.2.5 Gender

DEQ4.5: *To what extent has the programme benefited women and girls (noting that the programme design did not purport to benefit them equally)? Have there been any negative consequences for women and girls? Has the programme had an impact on relations, including power and influence, between girls/women and boys/men? How could the programme increase benefits to women and girls within its trade focus?*

The approach for this DEQ was to review the extent to which gender was addressed in project design and was visible, such as with disaggregated data in design documents and monitoring reports. The evaluation spent limited time with the project stakeholders to assess the extent to which gender mainstreaming has been implemented in the workplace and/or addressed issues of gender discrimination and harassment. As such a complete assessment of gender is not within the scope of this evaluation.

1.2.6 Institutional Assessment

DEQ1.7: To what extent does TMEA have the management arrangements, systems, processes and human resources appropriate for carrying out its mission (i.e. how suitable are these for the purposes of carrying out its activities)?

DEQ1.8: To what extent do TMEA's financial (including procurement), human resource and risk management processes enable it to efficiently and effectively manage its contractual relationships with implementing partners?

DEQ1.9: To what extent do the processes TMEA has in place promote organisational learning and sharing of good practices?

DEQ1.10: Are the M&E tools and processes in place appropriate, both in regard to results and in regard to finances? How could they be strengthened?

Data was collected on DEQs 1.7-1.10 as part of the evaluation team's interviews. Although this falls primarily under deliverables 1B and 2B, the analysis from the stakeholder's perspective can be used as evidence for those components of the evaluation.

1.3 Methodology

Our data collection process for Results Mapping was based on a desk-based review of PARs, project monitoring reports, results chains, TMEA country strategies, internal TMEA evaluations, project deliverables, and any other relevant project documentation. For a subset of projects, face-to-face interviews were conducted with TMEA staff, partner organisations, and beneficiaries during field visits. The methods selected have provided some robust evaluation data. Interviews were chosen specifically for their ability to generate in-depth data that the team needed in order to contextualise the findings of secondary data analysis. Other methods were considered, e.g. group discussions, but were not chosen for methodological reasons. For example, group discussions were not suitable since the objective of data collection was not to assess group views, dynamics, etc. but contrary to generate detailed data that interviews do best. The sample of 20 projects selected for field visits (see Section 1.4 below) was drawn up in consultation with TMEA, who prioritised projects for learning purposes. The evaluation team then reviewed project documents and data to prepare for the field visits to Tanzania (Dar es Salaam and Arusha), Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda and Kenya.

The focus of the site visits was to interview the recipients of TMEA funding and technical assistance to assess the achievements of the intervention and gauge the extent to which outcomes were likely to be achieved. Semi-structured interviews were undertaken to validate TMEA's reporting against the PAR, quarterly reports, results framework and monitoring plan. Where possible beneficiaries of TMEA programmes were also interviewed. The evaluation was able to work freely and without interference.

Other documentation was reviewed where available, including independent evaluation reports. The team also collected some data for the institutional assessment (Deliverable 2B), requesting information on stakeholders' perceptions of working with TMEA. The validation process did not involve consultation with wider beneficiaries or field verification of outcomes.

The final stage included a more in-depth desk-based review of the remaining 20 projects in the sample, similar to the preparatory work described above (namely reviewing project documentation provided by TMEA) and in some cases with telephone interviews to clarify issues with documentation.

A key part of the evaluation process was to ensure that the evaluation team were adequately briefed by the TMEA team. This was crucial because much of the evaluation assessment needed to be contextualised in terms of how and why the project was selected by TMEA, the political economy of the country or institution supported, and issues and constraints influencing the performance of the project.

1.4 Sample Selection

The inception report envisaged a qualitative approach of heterogeneous purposive sampling, designed to cover a wide diversity of situations regarding the TMEA programme implementation. This would ensure maximum representativeness and imply that the findings from this portfolio evaluation would allow for conclusions to be drawn for the entire TMEA programme.

In practice a pragmatic approach was adopted to ensure the selection of the key projects which TMEA had prioritised for learning as well as adequate representation by budget spend and all countries of TMEA. A total sample of 40, which represents roughly one quarter of all SO2 and SO3 interventions, was agreed. 17 projects were identified by TMEA as priority projects; the potential bias introduced by that prioritisation was compensated through purposive random sampling of the remaining 25 projects. This ensured an adequate distribution between the TMEA countries and other project characteristics (e.g. size). Although there was only partial random sampling, the evaluation team and DFID were satisfied that there were no reasons to suggest a bias. SO1 projects were assessed as part of Workstream 3A.

Table 2: Evaluation sample compared to TMEA Portfolio, by project characteristics

Country	TMEA SO2 and SO3 portfolio	Evaluation Sample
Kenya	16%	18%
Tanzania	8%	13%
Uganda	15%	13%
Rwanda	17%	13%
Burundi	7%	10%
South Sudan	4%	8%
Regional	34%	28%
National	67%	73%
SO2	51%	50%
SO3	49%	50%

Table 3: Comparison with TMEA portfolio by activity

Principal project activity	TMEA SO2 and SO3 portfolio	Evaluation Sample
Advocacy and policy advice - Private Sector led	11%	10%
Advocacy and policy advice - Public Sector led	4%	1%
Knowledge generation and studies	8%	9%
Institutional strengthening (soft)	35%	36%
Institutional strengthening (hardware)	3%	4%
Training and awareness creation	26%	26%
Provision of infrastructure	0%	0%
Direct services to final users	9%	6%
Explicit focus on gender	4%	7%
Explicit focus on environment	0%	0%

Site visits were undertaken to Rwanda, Uganda, Tanzania (Dar es Salaam and Arusha for regional projects), Burundi and Kenya during March and April 2017. A visit to South Sudan was ruled out on security grounds, which was not considered problematic as there are relatively few interventions in the country and three projects were covered with desk reviews. The final sample is set out in Tables 5 and 6 and summarised in Table 4.

Table 4: Sample Selection Summary*

Sample Selection by Country and Desk and Site Visit					
	Site Visit		Desk Review		Total
	SO2	SO3	SO2	SO3	
Burundi	1	1	1	1	4
Kenya	1	1	2	2	6
Regional	4	3	2	1	10
Rwanda	2		2	1	5
South Sudan			2	1	3
Tanzania	1	2	2	2	7
Uganda		3		2	5
Total	9	10	11	10	40

Note – EAC projects counted as Regional. Numbers are based on project codes. Follow-on projects visited as part of a single unit are counted as two projects.

It should be noted that in some of the projects classified as a desk review, the evaluation team did carry out stakeholder interviews, which were arranged by TMEA teams during field visits.

Table 5: Sample Selection: SO2 Projects

No.	Country	Desk/ Field	Project Code	Project Title	Budget \$	TMEA Priority Project
19	Burundi	Field	1326	OBR: Long term technical advisers, incl. security costs	12,560,000	Yes
36	Burundi	Desk	1320	IFC Business licensing	1,964,000	No
2	EAC	Field	0215	EAC Secretariat VC equipment	2,740,000	Yes
3	EAC	Field	0216	EAC financial, audit and procurement systems and processes	5,193,000	Yes
15	EAC	Field	0223	Single customs territory	5,027,000	Yes
20	Kenya	Field	0927	Kenya Revenue Authority- customs management systems	12,240,017	Yes
32	Kenya	Desk	0915	Kenya EPA negotiations	1,714,000	No
40	Kenya	Desk	0916	Reform of standards regulatory framework and SQMT	1,900,000	No
1	Regional	Field	0113	Northern Corridor Transport Observatory	1,017,000	Yes
22	Regional	Desk	0114	Central Corridor Transport Observatory	773,000	No
38	Regional	Desk	0126	Elimination of NTBs	1,254,000	No
17 & 18	Rwanda	Field	1212 & 1221	RBS institutional capacity strengthened & Direct support to SMEs for product certification (RBS)	4,444,000	Yes
27	Rwanda	Desk	1236	Electronic Cargo Tracking System	4,550,000	No

No.	Country	Desk/ Field	Project Code	Project Title	Budget \$	TMEA Priority Project
30	Rwanda	Desk	1240	Rwanda Ministry of Health SWIFT	82,000	No
33	South Sudan	Desk	1416	EAC accession plan South Sudan	344,000	No
34	South Sudan	Desk	1413	South Sudan Bureau of Standards established	2,346,000	No
16	Tanzania	Field	1119	MEAC coordination and leadership	2,582,000	Yes
29	Tanzania	Desk	1136	Zanzibar Food & Drug Board (ZFDB) SWIFT	150,000	No
41	Tanzania	Desk	1118	Ministry of Industry and Trade	1,181,000	No
Total					\$62.1mn	
					Number	Value
Total S02 Interventions					84	\$156.2mn ⁴
Evaluation Sample %					24%	39.8%

Table 6: Sample Selection: S03 Projects

No.	Country	Desk/ Field	Project Code	Project Title	Budget \$	TMEA Priority Project
31	Burundi	Desk	1344	Search for Common Ground (Phase I)	56,132	No
12	Burundi	Field	1356	Enhancing Private Sector Capability to Influence Trade Policy Formulation and Implementation	450,000	Yes
4 & 5	EAC	Field	0424 & 0448	EABC institutional and advocacy support & EABC Phase II	601,590	Yes
37	Kenya	Desk	0923	EATTA tea product quality standards	25,000	No
6 & 7	Kenya	Field	0934 & 0921	Kenya trade logistics & investment climate- KEPSA 2	1,020,000	Yes
21	Kenya	Desk	0941	Advocacy on the single tourism visa – KTF	102,000	No
25	Regional	Desk	0453	Regional Coffee Export Capability	1,555,000	No
8	Regional	Field	0449	Consolidating Gains for Women Traders in EAC	754,000	Yes
10	Rwanda	Field	1229	PROFEMME- women ICBT empowerment & Capacity Building to Women Cross Border Traders	734,000	Yes
35	South Sudan	Desk	1419	Trading out of conflict - Promoting Women Informal Cross Border Traders & Entrepreneurs	400,000	No
26	Tanzania	Desk	1129	Tanzania Private Sector Foundation (TPSF)	671,000	No
11	Tanzania	Field	1138	Empowerment & Capacity Building to Women Cross Border Traders	384,000	Yes

⁴ Based on database developed by the Evaluation Team with TMEA. December 2016

No.	Country	Desk/ Field	Project Code	Project Title	Budget \$	TMEA Priority Project
28	Tanzania	Field	1131	Support to Foundation for Civil Society (FCS)	577,000	Yes
24	Uganda	Desk	1076	Tourism: Enhanced Institutional Capacity and sustainability	336,000	No
23	Uganda	Desk	1074	Amplifying the Influence of Women in National and Regional Trade	500,000	No
9	Uganda	Field	1077	National Logistics platform	205,000	Yes
13 & 14	Uganda	Field	1066 & 1071	Strengthening SEATINI'S institutional capacity &-upgrading quality standards	330,000	Yes
Total Value of Evaluation Interventions					\$8.70mn	
					Number	Value
Total S03 Interventions					80	\$62.8mn
Evaluation Sample %					25%	13.9%

1.5 Rationale for assessment and project scoring

All projects were given a RAG rating and scored against the OECD-DAC criteria according to the evaluators' assessment using the following judgement criteria. In order to allow synthesis and comparability from the results of RAG ratings, we assigned a score to each RAG rating, from 0-10. We also assigned a weighting to each criterion. The weighting was a reflection of the evaluation team's understanding of the importance of each criterion to TMEA and its projects' performance, as well as the overall objectives of this evaluation. Given the focus on outputs, the highest weightings were given to relevance (30%) and effectiveness⁵ (30%) and lower weights given to efficiency (20%) gender (10%) and learning (10%). This approach allowed RAG ratings for different criteria to be synthesised into an overall score for a project.

The scoring by the evaluation team has been based on the evaluators' judgements using the material made available by TMEA and the evidence was mainly from the written material as well as interviews with beneficiary/recipient institutions in the case of site visits. Only a limited amount of triangulation with third parties was undertaken given the limitations of time and stakeholder interviews were limited to those recipients/beneficiaries with a close involvement in the intervention. Some limited interviews with end beneficiaries (e.g., businesses working on Single Customs Territory (SCT) issues and cross border traders) were also undertaken. Annex 1 sets out a series of sub-criteria questions which are structured into the categories of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, gender and learning & sustainability. The criterion of efficiency relating mainly to relations between the project and TMEA was not answered for the desk-based portion of the sample. The notes and detailed assessment of each project is set out in detail in Annex 5. The scoring and weights are summarised in the table below.

Table 7: Scoring and Judgement Criteria

Criteria	Green	Amber	Amber-Red	Red	Weight
Relevance	Fits with TMEA Mandate and meets needs of stakeholders	Some concerns with either TMEA fit or needs of stakeholders	Major concerns on fit with TMEA or needs of stakeholders	Not within TMEA mandate	30%

⁵ In projects involving capacity building, the effectiveness score takes capacity building into close consideration.

Criteria	Green	Amber	Amber-Red	Red	Weight
Effectiveness	(i) Outputs expected to be achieved or exceeded (ii) Constraints adequately addressed (iii) Effective capacity building achieved (iv) Outcomes expected to be achieved	Some concern on the achievement of the outputs and contribution to the outcomes or mixed results in the capacity building or addressing of the constraints	Major concerns on the achievement of the outputs and outcomes and capacity building	No achievement of outputs	30%
Efficiency	TMEA support managed very effectively	Some concerns on efficiency of TMEA support, timeliness on inputs provided	Major concerns on TMEA's support to project and processes	Project failure due to TMEA processes	20%
Gender	Clear gender sensitive strategies and implementation plans incorporated with gender sensitive indicators	If relevant gender addressed but incomplete	Gender not addressed adequately	Gender very relevant but not addressed	10%
Learning and Sustainability	Sustainability of intervention's outputs addressed. Good M&E tools in place to provide good quality of evidence of results. Good promotion and sharing of results and best practice	Some concerns on sustainability of a supported intervention or institution. Some concerns on result reporting or sharing of best practice	Major concerns on Sustainability Major concerns on result reporting or sharing of best practice	No evidence of results or sharing of best practice	10%
Scoring criteria (0-10)	10	7	4	0	

Projects that score green overall can be considered to be projects that are relevant to TMEA and have fulfilled expectations. The performance can range from just meeting expectations to outstanding performance. Projects that have scored an amber overall is where there are some concerns either with the design and appropriateness of the intervention and the effectiveness of its implementation, or with both. An amber project could also be one where there were some issues in the project but TMEA or the implementing partner could address these.

Projects are scored at the criterion level (i.e., all green criteria scored a 10, amber 7, amber-red 4 and red nil). A project would score 10 at the criterion level whether in the view of the evaluators it was a very high performing project or simply met expectations.

It is important to note that at a project level, the RAG rating for each DAC criterion is based on an average judgement for a number of sub-criteria. The RAG rating is simpler – just the three (green, amber, red) levels – for sub-criteria, but when this is aggregated at criterion level this is sub-divided into green, amber, amber-red and red in order to differentiate areas of most concern. Thus, an amber-red score for a criterion could be based on a number of amber scores and some red scores. Amber/Red or Red scores indicate the need for some major action by TMEA to review the project and/or cease activity.

1.6 Limitations to the evaluation and Quality of Evidence

The overall quality of the evidence presented in this report has been influenced by a number of factors highlighted below. In particular an evaluation would normally use the evidence produced by TMEA on outputs from monitoring reports and then validate these findings as the first step in the analysis of the impact pathway to trade outcomes. But a key issue in undertaking this evaluation was that the base project documentation supplied was often insufficient to analyse the output performance of the portfolio. There are therefore limitations on the overall quality of evidence, especially from some of the desk-based reviews where there has been a reliance on self-reported data from the project recipients.

This issue was partly compensated for by interviews with TMEA staff, partner organisations, and, in some cases, project beneficiaries. However, there are limitations to triangulation of performance measures and outcome assessments through this study, particularly in relation to specific groups of the private sector. The Performance Evaluation in Phase 2 will draw in other perspectives such as corporates and private business exporters to strengthen triangulation in final evaluation conclusions - particularly with respect to outcome assessment.

Furthermore, TMEA staff were often able to supply additional documentation upon request which provided a wider evidence base. This suggests that TMEA has a large body of evidence and supporting information on project implementation but the basic reporting and recording of project deliverables requires improvement.

The following issues were identified; further detail is set out in Annex 6 of Deliverable 6B (Interim Evaluation Summary Report).

1. Poor alignment between PAR, M&E framework, and monitoring reports

In many cases there was inconsistency between the outcomes, outputs and activities defined in the PAR and those used in the monitoring report. It was not clear whether the project had changed, or whether the process of constructing an M&E framework had resulted in changes. More importantly, it sometimes became unclear what the precise outputs of the project were meant to be, and how they linked to the outcomes. It was also noted that there was inconsistency in the M&E frameworks, in that some were structured in Excel, and some were Word document templates. These were difficult to link to the quarterly and annual reports, some of which contained long lists of activity indicators that were not linked or categorized according to outputs or outcomes or clearly shown as being reported against the monitoring framework.

2. Issues with the quality and structure of quarterly and annual reports

The monitoring reports, both quarterly and annual, are not structured in a way that provides the reader with a clear sense of past achievements and current progress. In particular, the narrative sections of the report would have benefited from additional contextual information to assist in making sense of the activity and output indicators that were included. As a result, it was generally difficult to ascertain what had been planned compared to what was actually delivered. Where this information did exist, and it was clear that an activity or output had not been achieved as planned as there was often no accompanying explanation or revised date for delivery. Furthermore, there was often little analysis of how this drift from the project plan might affect overall project progress. The quality of reporting provided by the partners to TMEA would suggest that many of these reports have not been validated, analysed and quality assured by TMEA staff.

3. Unclear evidence

A specific area of concern was the lack of evidence provided in the reports. Quarterly and annual reports did not present or reference the means of verification of the indicators reported against, and there was no sense whether this had been checked by TMEA. Likewise, the monitoring plans largely did not include the means of verification that would be required against each output or activity indicator. Combined with the lack of analysis in the reporting, this often meant that it was unclear what

had simply been reported by the project, what had been verified by a project manager at TMEA, and what type of supporting evidence had been provided. This is not to suggest that the projects are not achieving these outputs, simply that the reporting does not systematically and clearly provide this information.

4. Quality of evidence

The overall quality of evidence of the evaluation is therefore limited by the above but also by the fact that not all interventions were completed and it was therefore necessary to make some judgements based on incomplete information. Much of the assessment of effectiveness at output level for SO2 is a judgement based on the evidence presented by the recipient/beneficiary institution to implement the tasks, which at outcome level are designed to lead to trade enabling reform (see box 2).

The approach taken for the evaluation is to interrogate with the key recipient institution, the extent to which the capacity building or other support delivered by TMEA met or exceeded their expectations. The question of effectiveness is therefore not so much about the expectation of the completion of skill training but much more about the expectation of the capacity of the institution to deliver its required function. In some cases, there was insufficient evidence available from the key stakeholders interviewed for the evaluators to make this judgement. Cases have been highlighted where the evidence on expected outcomes is incomplete. The quality of evidence was generally less for the desk-based reviews, given the limitations from the TMEA monitoring data.

We acknowledge that there was a limited triangulation, particularly from businesses, which will be further strengthened during Phase 2. We were reliant on a limited number of key stakeholder interviews to triangulate the largely self-reported data from the projects. There may be unavoidable bias in our reporting but we note that there was no conflict between self-reported data from the projects and stakeholder interviews. Findings from the two sources complemented each other and therefore we can suggest that although the triangulation was limited it still provided an important validation to self-reported data. During the performance evaluation we will, in all the countries visited, be involving representatives of businesses to explore their views and engage them in evaluating TMEA and its contribution to the outcomes.

Furthermore, the report has a limited scope for analysis of the difference between beneficiary groups. During Phase 2 we will address these shortcomings to the extent possible through the Poverty and Gender study. In particular, we will look at differences between the groups of people who are wealthier, poorer, representing different livelihood and labour markets. This focus is based on the two lessons learned from our previous work. First, in the PPA study, our team selected only poorer groups of men and women for focus groups, to understand system-wide changes. However, in choosing the poor there is a likelihood of speaking to those for whom things have not gone well, whose perceptions are by definition more negative. They may also be an unrepresentative perception of how the local economy is faring. Therefore, in this round of research we will speak with wealthier and poorer groups of people. Second, in the PPA we only had participants from a single livelihood group in each FGD to understand the system-wide changes, which gave us only a partial understanding of the local economy. The research will be expanded to interview a more diverse set of actors in the labor market during the upcoming round of research.

1.7 Pathway Mapping

In addition to mapping outputs (Deliverable 2A) and results (this report, with detail in Annex 5), the evaluation team also worked to trace the transmission pathways along which TMEA's intervention logic was designed to work. That logic is contained to some extent in the TMEA ToC, but this document was under-specified; the TMEA RF went a long way to detailing how the projects were

expected to combine to achieve those intermediate programme goals. Using the RF and the evaluation field data, the evaluation team began to trace the finer-grained results chains leading to the programme's intermediate outcomes. These were dubbed pathways, as a metaphor for the causal logic implied in each, of taking sets of steps towards those intermediate outcomes but also, ultimately, strategic outcomes of the entire programme. What sits at the apex of each of these pathways are intermediate outcomes, which are measured by a set of indicators that have largely been met. What is yet to be tested is the degree to which those indicators were achieved as a result of TMEA efforts.

The evaluation team examined this “missing middle” by reconstructing the actual achievements of the intervention logic, and to the extent possible with the available data, to begin to examine whether the main transmission pathways resulted as planned. This initial analysis will be fleshed out in the Performance Evaluation in 2018-2019, following additional fieldwork to test the hypothetical results chains posited by the TMEA Strategy 1 framework.⁶ The Performance Evaluation in Phase 2 will draw in other perspectives such as corporates and private business exporters to strengthen triangulation in final evaluation conclusions with respect to the outcome assessment.

⁶ Further description of the efforts used for this initial pathway mapping are contained in Annex 6.

2 Output-level analysis of SO2 portfolio

The TMEA SO2 portfolio covered projects which contribute to TMEA’s strategic objective of **enhancing the trade environment**. Referring back to the TMEA Theory of Change, the SO2 portfolio contained projects with the following primary objectives:

- More favourable trade agreements
- Improved EAC trade policy
- Reduced non-tariff barriers to trade
- Efficient trade facilitation
- Improved national-regional implantation and coordination

SO2 projects predominantly involved the provision of funding and technical assistance to public sector institutions, either at national or regional level. This incorporates both support to government institutions, such as EAC or national ministries, civil service bodies such as revenue authorities, and independent government-funded organisations. The SO2 portfolio contained 39% of projects, and was allocated 34% of the budget.

2.1 Key results

Table 14 at the end of this section sets out the results for SO2 projects evaluated, shown by score in descending order. The summary result by the evaluation criteria is shown in Table 8 below. The SO2 sample is too small to make any general comments about the performance by country. The scores presented are the average scores using the conversion of RAG ratings to numerical values as presented in Table 7. Annex 4 sets out a summary of the responses to the evaluation questions by strategic objective including an assessment of the quality of TMEAs contribution.


The scores are presented to one decimal place not to show any sense of statistical significance or accuracy but to illustrate the extent to which the RAG rating could be considered as a ‘strong green’ at 9.4 or more ‘borderline amber’ at 8.3. Figures in parenthesis show the scores for the desk-reviewed projects only. While these scores are on average slightly higher than for those that received a field visit, the differences are small.

Table 8: SO2 summary ratings, by DAC criterion, from 0-10

Objective	Relevance	Effectiveness	Efficiency	Gender	Learning & Sustainability
SO2- all projects (SO2-desk only)	9.4 (9.7)	8.6 (8.8)	8.3 (-)	5.6 (5.4)	6.8 (7.3)

2.1.1 Relevance

Figure 4: SO2 relevance scores



Summary

- The relevance of projects was graded according to their fit within **TMEA’s mandate**, their fit with the **TMEA country strategy**, their **relevance from the perspective of project stakeholders**, and whether the **targeted stakeholders were relevant** to TMEA’s objective.
- The projects generally score well with **16 out of 20 projects performing well** (Green) on relevance and just **four receiving an amber rating**.
- Some projects **developed capacity for trade-related institutions**, but didn’t **directly contribute to increasing trade**.
- Projects working to generate trade data need to demonstrate how this directly contributed to TMEA’s outputs, given that **“improved transparency in trade processes” is highlighted as a non-TMEA area** in the TMEA Theory of Change.

The assessment of the evaluators based on the responses of key stakeholders was that there was a strong performance of relevance to country needs, but a slightly weaker fit with the overall mandate of TMEA. This conclusion applied to a number of projects that are intervening lower down the TMEA theory of change and providing generic capacity building rather than specific support to trade facilitation and enabling. Thus, a lot of such capacity building could have been provided by other development partners leaving TMEA a more strategic role on trade issues.

The four projects rated amber on relevance were: (0215) Video Conferencing equipment for EAC, (0216) Financial Capacity building for EAC, (1320) IFC business licencing, and (1119) Ministry of East African Community (MEAC-TZ) in Tanzania.

Some good examples of relevant interventions as set out in Annex 5 includes Project 1326 (Burundi OBR: Long term technical advisers): *The project is firmly aligned with TMEA ToC and contributes to the achievement of "effective trade systems and processes" and "increased transparency in trade processes". The intervention has been highly relevant and effective in improving the OBR's organizational efficiency and enhancing its institutional capacity. The OBR's resilience during the 2015 political crisis is a testament to the programme's effectiveness*

In the case of the two EAC projects, whilst the EAC is an institution designed to promote trade within the EAC, neither providing financial capacity support (0216) nor video-conferencing equipment (0215) is directly contributing to TMEA's goal of increasing trade. Capacity building in trade institutions is not necessarily within TMEA's mandate if the link is sufficiently tangential, as in this case. With respect to the IFC business licensing, this project focused on developing a strategy for improving the business climate in Burundi with only a partial focus on trade enabling. The re-assessment of the TMEA ToC, which retrospectively fitted a new TMEA ToC onto pre-existing projects, determined that the business climate was not an area in which TMEA should be operating. Finally, whilst the Tanzanian Ministry for the East African Community is responsible for economic integration, its mandate explicitly does not cover trade. Again, support to the ministry under the MEAC project (1119) therefore had only an indirect link to TMEA objectives. While these projects are relevant and important to the partner organisation, they are not contributing directly to the higher order outcomes of TMEA.


Some projects required some interpretation on relevance and this partly reflects the fact that TMEA did not have a specific element related to generating better information and data on trade processes. In projects where the principal output was improved data (for example, the Northern Corridor Transport Observatory), project partners and TMEA staff had to justify relevance through secondary effects on reducing NTBs, efficient trade facilitation or improved policy. Within the TMEA ToC, "Improved transparency in trade processes", is highlighted as a non-TMEA area, suggesting the onus is on projects to prove how their data is relevant and contributing to another TMEA objective.

Table 9: Relevance and Relation to DEQs

<p>DEQ1.1: To what extent are TMEA projects' intended outputs generally consistent with the programme TOC?</p>	<p>16 out of 20 projects received green for relevance. Broadly, programmes were consistent with the TMEA ToC. In cases where they were not, it included non-relevant capacity-building to a trade institution (i.e. the EAC), or was a result of the re-examination of the TMEA ToC in 2014.</p> <p>There is a question mark over the extent to which TMEA should provide generic capacity-building to trade institutions, which should be assessed going into the new phase</p> <p>The quality of evidence for this judgement is good as the evaluators have reviewed the design documents of a significant proportion of the SO2 portfolio and validated findings with key Government and EAC stakeholders.</p>
<p>DEQ1.4: Who were/are the main beneficiaries of the outputs? Are there organisations or groups of people who are negatively affected by the outputs?</p>	<p>The main beneficiaries or recipients of assistance of SO2 projects were national ministries, standards agencies and parastatals. In some cases, the beneficiaries were arguably not relevant to TMEA's mandate (e.g. MEAC in Tanzania, in particular). There was very little assessment of potential negative impacts on specific target groups, although in projects which mainly focused on technical assistance to public institutions the groups which could lose out are less readily apparent.</p> <p>TMEA is, in intentional design, partly demand-led, responding to requests from partner organisations for assistance. This has resulted in cases where the partner organisation or recipient of assistance was not the most relevant possible partner. From the desk review of the portfolio of the projects and the interviews undertaken there is no evidence of groups of people being adversely affected by either the institutional capacity building or training activity. However, the evaluation has not interviewed groups who may have been adversely affected by TMEA interventions and therefore we have limited evidence at this stage to confirm this assertion. This will be revisited for the next stage of data collection in 2018.</p>

2.1.2 Effectiveness

Figure 5: SO2 effectiveness scores



Summary

- Effectiveness was scored against the 4 key criteria: (i) **achievement of outputs**; (ii) ability to **overcome capacity constraints**; (iii) extent to which **project addressed potential negative impacts**, and (iv) **effectiveness of capacity building**. The relation to the relevant DEQs is outlined in the table below.
- Overall projects have generally scored well on effectiveness, with **12 out of 20 achieving green** ratings, **7 achieving amber**, and **1 rated as amber-red**.
- Projects consistently experienced **delays in implementation**, although to varying degrees. Delays were the primary reason for scoring projects amber.
- Political circumstances were a major external cause of delay**, particularly in Burundi and South Sudan.
- Internal constraints** were mainly around more **limited capacity** than was assumed during design phase and which only became visible during implementation.

An example of an effectively implemented project in SO2 is project 0223 on the Single Customs Territory (SCT), which involved the automation of customs business processes and the development of IT systems at border posts, the training of customs officers, port and border officials and clearing & forwarding agents on customs legislations. It also involved implementing One Stop Border Post (OSBP) Law and procedures to facilitate the operationalisation of the adopted SCT framework. Thus, there were a range of outputs completed which resulted in the outcome of a reduction in clearance and transit time for the Northern Corridor (Mombasa- Kigali) from 21 days to 5 days and on the Central Corridor (Dar- Kigali) from 25 to 6 days⁷.

The reasons for project delays were varied, but reflected both external and internal constraints. The key external constraint for SO2 projects was from interference of other political actors. In South Sudan and Burundi, the fragility and weakness of other state institutions was a major reason for delay in project implementation. In the latter country, a change in political circumstances led to projects effectively being put on hold due to restrictions on channelling development aid to public body

⁷ Please note this reduced time is as recorded on pilot projects

institutions. In the rest of the region, political constraints were also cited as a major problem. The upcoming election in Kenya in August 2017 had effectively meant that projects requiring approval from other government actors were delayed from the end of 2017 Q1 onwards. Another large SO2 project in Kenya experienced considerable delays after unexpected legal challenges from other stakeholders.

Internal constraints centred on limited capacity, which often became more visible during implementation. For example, in South Sudan the project with the Bureau of Standards (1413) encountered institutional problems more severe than expected, with no adequate offices and laboratories for the Bureau in place, inadequate operational budget for the Bureau for their daily operations and in general limited organisational capacity of the Bureau to absorb the technical assistance. The project appears to have dealt competently with these challenges, and is attempting to phase and prioritise work around expected availability of counterparts.

There was only one project where there were some major concerns, 1119 MEAC in Tanzania. While some significant achievements in capacity building have been recorded, at the time of the visit to the project in April, a substantial proportion of the deliverables of this large project (USD 2.6mn project) were pending with little prospect of completion on schedule. As with other SO2 projects, a core reason for this delay was political interference; in 2015, the new Tanzanian government merged MEAC with Foreign Affairs, which was cited by stakeholders as impeding project progress due to a change in project personal and the loss of institutional knowledge. Interviews also suggested that in general the Tanzanian government had reservations in its commitment to regional integration, which limited the political capital and momentum of MEAC. However, the TMEA team appeared to have limited awareness of the extent to which the project was behind in key deliverables, perhaps also suggesting that with more active management these constraints could have been better overcome.

Projects have on many occasions been effective at overcoming constraints, even when these are of a political and institutional nature, though this has taken time.⁸ In this regard while capacity building activities have generally been focused on trade enabling activities, many stakeholders have commented on the need for continued support to their institution and the fact that achievement of the outputs can only be sustained with further external technical assistance. Thus, many of the SO2 capacity building initiatives, though effective in what was achieved, could not be considered completed by the end of the project.

The approach of TMEA in having a presence and local governance structure in each of the EAC countries is therefore critical in this respect as all TMEA projects need to build ownership of activities and influence stakeholders to support and engage in implementation. Of particular note in this regard was the concern that TMEA was reducing its presence in Arusha and therefore would have less capacity to undertake the important facilitation role in ensuring the uptake of the TMEA activities.

It is further noted that the perception on project performance by the key stakeholders is positive in that the most significant changes generally reflect achievements beyond the completion of outputs and thus contribute to the TMEA mandate in facilitating trade and economic integration.

Table 10: Relationship between Effectiveness and DEQs for SO2

DEQ1.2: Were outputs achieved in accordance with plans/ expectations and within budget? For ongoing projects, what is the likelihood of achieving the output targets within the project timespan?


The pattern shown in Annex 2 is that most projects will achieve their outputs though a key issue across most SO2 projects has been a lack of institutional capacity and general delays in the completion of activities caused by the multi-stakeholder, multi-country aspect of the projects. There were very few cases of achievements that were not expected which again reflects the activities undertaken under SO2. In a number of cases

⁸ Burundi is a notable exception, due to the suspension of the majority of TMEA projects in that country. Similar problems affected activities in South Sudan.

	<p>the capacity building initiatives had to be changed during the course of implementation.</p> <p>Across all projects, extending timelines and allowing more room for likely delays would, if not directly lead to more effective projects, at least allow for more realistic project management.</p> <p>The evidence for this judgement is good as 20 project plans have been reviewed in detail and the pattern that has been described above has been confirmed with interviews in the TMEA country offices and project recipients.</p>
<p>DEQ1.3: What constraints were/are encountered in achieving the outputs? What are the main reasons for non-achievement of the outputs (if any)?</p>	<p>There were major political constraints encountered in the implementation of project activities related to the fragile state status of two of the countries (Burundi and South Sudan). While the timing of events is unexpected, TMEA is cognisant of the political landscape of the region and persevered with activities in South Sudan in spite of the fragile situation. In other countries, political constraints continued to have an effect, if not as severe.</p> <p>Other key issues delaying project implementation was the change in Government in Tanzania which put on hold most of the SO2 activities as MEAC merged with the Department of Foreign Affairs.</p> <p>TMEA has been very wary of using any of their political influence to try and resolve political constraints, and has maintained a strict policy of neutrality and non-interference.</p> <p>The assessment of the evaluators (which was also brought out in Deliverables 6A Preliminary Relevance and Sustainability Assessment and 2B: Institutional Assessment) is that TMEA has adapted to the unstable political environment well by being flexible and adaptive. The presence of country offices and country level governance structures has enabled programmes to be flexible and adaptable to changing conditions.</p>
<p>DEQ1.5: To what extent have supported organisations (i.e. the implementing partners) built capacity and capability on relevant trade-related matters?</p>	<p>Many of the SO2 projects had the ambition to take on ambitious trade enabling activities which required multiple government and stakeholder engagement, for example 0223 Single Customs Territory.</p> <p>A typical feature of these projects is the multiplicity of technical and ICT tasks undertaken involving a range of stakeholders, and while capacity building was a major feature of these projects, it was typically conducted to accompany a range of other activities. Some of the capacity building initiatives were considered to be more of a generic nature as highlighted above including for the two EAC projects providing financial capacity support (0216) and video-conferencing equipment (0215). Neither are directly contributing to TMEA’s goal of increasing trade.</p> <p>The overriding conclusion from the evaluation is that TMEA was viewed by many as the ‘go to’ agency for capacity building in trade facilitation, NTBs etc. To some extent this resulted from the very close relationship between TMEA and the Ministries of Trade and East African Cooperation which has taken time to develop but this has now developed into a relationship of dependence on TMEA’s capacity building skills. The evaluators consider that there is good evidence for this judgement and this has been supported by other findings in Deliverable 6A: Preliminary Relevance and Sustainability Assessment.</p>

2.1.3 Efficiency (desk projects not scored)

Figure 6: SO2 efficiency scores



Summary

- As outlined in the approach, the evaluation of efficiency centred on an assessment of the **efficiency of TMEA's inputs to projects**, based on interviews with stakeholders.
- A more comprehensive evaluation of project efficiency was not possible due to the **weaknesses in project monitoring** which made systematically tracking costs and time delays extremely challenging.
- Efficiency had a mixed performance, with **6 projects rated amber** and **4 projects rated green**.
- Although some partners were happy with TMEA's procurement's process, others felt it was **too slow, overly risk-cautious, and subject to delays**.
- Projects were **pleased with their level of input** into the procurement process, and were generally **pleased about the quality and commitment of external consultants** procured through TMEA.

As outlined in the approach, the evaluation of efficiency centred on an assessment of the efficiency of TMEA's inputs to projects, based on interviews with stakeholders. Evaluating project efficiency comprehensively was not possible due to project monitoring weaknesses. The evaluation team was unable to systematically track costs and time delays in most cases. TMEA operates an outsourcing model for procurement and therefore TMEA is responsible for the financial and reputational risks in procurement processes. Furthermore, project interviews also revealed insights about the extent of time delays and the necessity of any budget extensions, which also influenced scoring on this criterion.

Only projects which were subject to site visits were assessed for efficiency due to weaknesses in monitoring, and two projects (1212 and 1221), both of which involved the Rwandan Standards Board, were merged in analysis.

Stakeholders generally commented positively on the TMEA's selection of external consultants to implement projects. Some project stakeholders were satisfied with the outsourced model of procurement operated by TMEA. Stakeholders were also generally positive about their level of input into the procurement process, particularly in comparison with other development agencies which offered partners very little input into the selection of expertise. Assessments of the timeliness of TMEA

procurement were mixed. Some stakeholders, particularly from central governmental institutions, were positive, particularly because they were used to using official government procurement procedures, which often were subject to greater delays and cost.

This varied by country. For example, the Rwandan Standards Board said that procurement would have been faster had it been managed through the relevant Rwandan government procurement agency. In other instances, such as the support to the South Sudan Bureau of Standards, complicated procurement procedures led to significant delays. It was highlighted that TMEA's centralised procurement process can sometimes lead to delays, in particular when changes to budgets or large budget items in projects require sign off in Nairobi and such delays were recorded in Tanzania, Rwanda and Uganda.

There has been a general problem of delay in implementation and this may be more of an issue of project design in that interventions were drawn up for too short a period to be effective. Of the 20 projects visited none had completed all planned activities on time and most were involved in no-cost extension or continuation into a follow-on phase. This raises a key question of sustainability and on the level of ambition that is set at the design of intervention. Projects are generally delayed on their outputs and given the concerns on sustainability, arguably the interventions are too short in their duration given that many focus on institutional capacity building. There are a large number that are well behind schedule and although some have been affected by political issues (e.g. Tanzania) others have interventions which have been designed over too short a period to be effective, and therefore have required time extensions.

Projects in Tanzania have all been substantially delayed by the change in Government in 2015. While such factors are largely outside the control of TMEA, it is also noted that improvements in the functioning of the TMEA office in Dar es Salaam have also coincided with an improvement in the timeliness of the delivery of project outputs which indicates the key role that the TMEA staff can play in enabling Government engagement with and ownership of the programme.

Table 11: Relationship between Efficiency and DEQs for SO2

<p>DEQ1.7: To what extent does TMEA have the management arrangements, systems, processes and human resources appropriate for carrying out its mission (i.e. how suitable are these for the purposes of carrying out its activities)?</p>	<p>TMEA was able to support projects with in-house expertise at short notice in a timely and efficient manner. For more complex projects, such as support to the Kenya Revenue Authority (KRA), project stakeholders praised the responsiveness and involvement of TMEA technical staff. Projects were also generally positive about the quality of the expertise they were receiving.</p> <p>This does raise a question about sustainability and project independence, given that some projects did not appear to be able to effectively operate without focused support. There is perhaps a balance between effective and efficient support and sustainability, which TMEA could be more aware of. Furthermore, the independence of TMEA was compromised on some projects where there was extensive involvement, making objective judgments about project implementation and future funding more difficult.</p>
<p>DEQ1.8: To what extent do TMEA's financial (including procurement), human resource and risk management processes enable it to efficiently and effectively manage its contractual relationships with implementing partners?</p>	<p>TMEA managed procurement for most SO2 projects. This was broadly a successful set-up, with project partners pleased about the cost, timeliness, and their level of input into procurement. On occasion, TMEA's risk management processes were viewed as overly burdensome and as a contributor to unnecessary delays (e.g. Rwanda Standards Board).</p> <p>Procurement procedures have to pass through a variety of different organisations, including both country offices and the central TMEA office in Nairobi. This process can be slow and somewhat cumbersome, according to project partners, but on the other hand it does help to guarantee greater independence given the close working relationship between country offices and many TMEA projects.</p>

2.1.4 Gender

Figure 7: SO2 gender scores



Summary

- TMEA has **only actively started to address gender in the past two years**. In SO2 TMEA started to **collect gender-disaggregated data** in various training events and meetings held across the programmes.
- Gender has been poorly addressed, with only **1 project rated green, 12 amber, 5 amber-red,** and **2 red**.
- There is rarely a **gender perspective within project design documents**, nor any attempt to track **gender-disaggregated indicators at a project level**.
- Opportunities for **mainstreaming gender as part of capacity-building and training exercises** have also been **missed**.

In SO2 the main concentration of effort on measuring gender was the collection of gender-disaggregated data in various training events and meetings held across the programmes. The meetings and trainings were not necessarily on gender but the aim was to collect data on exactly how many women and men attend and to find out who attends the most and why.

According to the data collected by the Gender Unit⁹ a total of 1,488 women and 918 men have been trained across the different country programmes. The highest being in Rwanda where 1,149 women and 407 men were trained on NTBs. Due to weaknesses in the monitoring system, this data is incomplete. The plan moving forward is to address gender issues in decision making and governance of these institutions with a view to tracking employment and incomes for women and the generation of policies and procedures that address women's concerns.

From the evidence presented to the evaluators of the project design and monitoring documents, gender has been poorly addressed. Consideration of gender has therefore to a large extent been retrofitted to some of the projects and is still not adequately reported in the monitoring and progress reports. Of particular concern was the absence of any gender indicators presented to the evaluators

⁹ Gender Status Report May 2017. TMEA

for project (113) Northern Observatory which, by the nature of the activities undertaken for this data collecting project should be attempting gender disaggregation where this is relevant and possible.


While it can be expected that many of the SO2 projects (e.g. on trade barriers or SCT) do not have a gender focus or even specific relevance in terms of gender issues, gender is also poorly addressed in the capacity building projects in ensuring that best practice is adhered to in the workplace and/or that monitoring data on training and capacity building is adequately disaggregated. TMEA have taken steps to mainstream gender and such changes should also be reflected in the standard project design and monitoring documents in the next phase.

Table 12: Relationship between Gender and DEQs for SO2

<p>DEQ 4.5: To what extent has the programme benefited women and girls (noting that the programme design did not purport to benefit them equally)? Have there been any negative consequences for women and girls?</p> <p>Has the programme had an impact on relations, including power and influence, between girls/women and boys/men?</p> <p>How could the programme increase benefits to women and girls within its trade focus?</p>	<p>In order to be able to address this question, TMEA projects need to start collecting gender-disaggregated data in a much more systematic way. Although there is now centralised data collection by the Gender Unit on training participation by gender, on an individual basis projects rarely make any attempt to gather any kind of gender-disaggregated data. Gender is also rarely mentioned in project design documents.</p> <p>TMEA could also attempt to use their influence to mainstream gender within the partner organisations where they work. As a starting point, that means collecting data on the number of women in each position, but should go beyond this and assess gender issues in the workplace.</p>
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2.1.5 Sustainability and Learning

Figure 8: SO2 sustainability and learning scores



Summary

- Projects score less well with respect to sustainability and learning, with **4 projects rated green, 11 as amber, 3 as amber-red, and 1 as red.**
- Public sector partners **struggled with effective project management**, and often **required further support from TMEA.**

- This raises questions about the **absorption capacity** of some of the public-sector partners involved in large and more complex projects.
- The three **projects rated as amber-red** were primarily highlighted over concerns over their **monitoring and learning processes, which were inadequate**.
- Amber-rated projects often appeared **overly dependent on TMEA funding**, with no firm strategy for moving towards another funding model.

These capacity constraints raise questions on the sustainability of a number of projects at the end of TMEA’s support. The sustainability of these projects is recognised as weak and there should have been a greater ex ante understanding of the consequences of TMEA exit. The focus was on supporting the trade enabling activity with insufficient attention on how the institution could continue without TMEA support. The project which scores particularly low on sustainability and across a number of other indicators is the MEAC (Ministry of East Africa Cooperation) project in Tanzania which has received substantial support from TMEA. Two key mitigating factors need to be considered- firstly MEAC was the designated institution for support by TMEA (under the EAC), so while the Ministry of Trade was a more appropriate institution to address trade issues, TMEA was directed to work with MEAC as the designated Ministry by the EAC Council of Ministers. Secondly the merging of the Ministry’s function with the Department of Foreign Affairs has caused serious delay to the implementation of activities.

The three projects rated as amber-red for this criterion had inadequate monitoring and learning, to the extent that very limited learning was possible and the projects’ legacy and sustainability was difficult to effectively assess. These projects were also all desk-review projects, meaning that questions over sustainability could not be answered in person during interviews. Indicators offered little value as to the extent of project progress, and the likelihood of sustainability.

The 11 projects rated amber reflected concerns over limited learning opportunities and the dependency upon TMEA funding. For example, the two Corridor Transport Observatories were pessimistic about finding significant sources of financing other than TMEA for the foreseeable future.

Table 13: Relationship between Sustainability and Learning and DEQs for SO2

<p>DEQ1.9 To what extent do the processes that TMEA has in place promote organisational learning and sharing of good practices?</p>	<p>Formal learning seemed limited, following on from the weak monitoring system. However, informal learning opportunities seemed to be stronger – TMEA country teams were in regular contact and sharing ideas, although not in a systematic forum, and projects often appeared to know of other relevant TMEA projects and had shared knowledge with them.</p> <p>A better monitoring system which produced reports of value would greatly strengthen learning opportunities. From there, it would be easier to share information and best practices amongst similar projects, as well as accurately see what best practices actually consist of – given that monitoring is so weak at the moment, it is difficult to tell what is working and what isn’t.</p>
<p>DEQ1.10 Are the M&E tools and processes in place appropriate, both in regard to results and in regard to finances? How could they be strengthened?</p>	<p>Projects frequently had very poor monitoring reports, with inadequate indicators and limited narrative explanation. These reports did not appear to have undergone quality assurance by TMEA. A more detailed assessment of the M&E systems is set out in the annex of Deliverable 2B (Organisation & Institution Assessment).</p>

Table 14 shows the summary results by criteria and the overall score. No particular pattern of performance is noted by size of project with a fairly even distribution of good and poorer performers by size of budget.

Table 14: Key Results Strategic Objective 2 (In score order)

Country	Project Code	Project Title	Budget	Relevance Effectiveness		Efficiency	Gender	Learning and Sustainability	Total
Kenya	0927	Kenya Revenue Authority - customs management systems	12,240,017	100	100	100	100	70	96
Regional	0126	Elimination of NTBs	1,254,000	100	100	N/A	70	100	96
Rwanda	1236	Electronic Cargo Tracking System	4,550,000	100	100	N/A	70	100	96
Tanzania	1136	Zanzibar Food & Drug Board SWIFT	150,000	100	100	N/A	70	100	96
Rwanda	1240	Rwanda Ministry of Health SWIFT	82,000	100	100	N/A	70	70	93
Rwanda	1212 & 1221	Direct support to SMEs for product certification (RBS)	4,444,000	100	100	70	70	100	91
EAC	0223	Single customs territory	5,027,000	100	100	70	70	70	88
Regional	0113	Northern Corridor Transport Observatory	1,017,000	100	100	100	0	70	87
S. Sudan	1416	EAC accession plan South Sudan	344,000	100	100	N/A	40	40	85
Kenya	0916	Reform of standards regulatory framework and SQMT	1,900,000	100	100	N/A	0	70	84
EAC	0215	EAC Secretariat VC equipment	2,740,000	70	100	100	70	40	82
Tanzania	1118	Ministry of Industry and Trade	1,181,000	100	70	N/A	70	70	81
S. Sudan	1413	Bureau of Standards established	2,346,000	100	70	70	70	70	81
Regional	0114	Central Corridor Transport Observatory	773,000	100	70	N/A	70	70	81
Burundi	1326	OBR: Long term technical advisers	12,560,000	100	70	70	40	70	76
EAC	0216	EAC financial, audit and procurement systems and processes	5,193,000	70	70	100	70	70	76
Kenya	0915	Kenya EPA negotiations	1,714,000	100	70	N/A	40	40	74
Burundi	1320	IFC Business licensing	1,964,000	70	70	N/A	40	70	66
Tanzania	1119	MEAC coordination and leadership	2,582,000	70	40	70	40	0	51

Nb- *grey indicates that a criterion was not assessed, because the assessment in question was a desk review

The following box sets out a summary of the key changes as perceived by the stakeholders.

Box 1: Understanding significant changes in the SO2 portfolio

Significant Changes	
Project	Significant Change
0113 Regional Northern Corridor Transport Observatory	Improved access to high-quality data to make business decisions, to highlight weaknesses in the transit process and strengthen policy advocacy arguments.
0927 Kenya Revenue Authority - customs management systems	The single biggest change has been the increase in compliance levels following the introduction of a single customs portal.
1212 & 1221 Rwanda RBS institutional capacity strengthened & Direct support to SMEs for product certification	Businesses certified through this programme said the most important change has been their ability to sell to international entities operating in Rwanda (mainly hotels) who require certified agricultural products.
0215 Regional EAC Secretariat VC equipment	Communication and cooperation amongst the partner states has been improved significantly
0216 Regional EAC financial, audit and procurement systems and processes	The ability to have integrated budgeting and financial management at EAC was introduced for a number of EAC institutions
0223 Regional Implementation of the Single Customs Territory programme	Very significant reduction in clearance and transit times for many
0916 Kenya Reform of standards regulatory framework and SQMT	Increase in the number of certified products and improvement in product compliance
0941 Kenya Single Tourist Visa & Use of National ID Implementation	Increased partnerships between tourism and hospitality agents in the three countries.
1320 Burundi IFC Business licensing	Burundi became a top doing business reformers and key changes made in debt resolution and tax simplification
1119 Tanzania MEAC coordination and leadership	Effectiveness in working with a coordination body is limited but an important part of the political economy of integration

It is worth noting that most of these changes recorded by stakeholders can be described as being at outcome level which is a positive indicator of the success of the project intervention. For example, support to the KRA has led to significant improvement in compliance level at the single customs portals (0927) and stakeholders highlight tangible gains in product certification (1212). It is also noted that even for one of the projects that was considered less successful (1119), stakeholders pointed to the importance of improved trade relations and cooperation that the project generated. These assessments of change were made by project stakeholders, including implementation staff, and, where possible, beneficiaries.

Overall there should be recognition of the consequence of TMEA exit from the projects, and this should be established and planned for in the programme document accordingly.

2.2 Output Mapping of SO2

Workstream 2A conducted an output mapping exercise where all the project activities were mapped according to some key groupings – please see deliverable 2A, while a summary is shown in Table 15. Having assessed outputs of individual projects using our evaluation criteria, we combined both the output mapping (2A) and the results mapping from both the desk work and the fieldwork conducted

under this exercise. The purpose is to provide an indication of the relationship between the activities that have been successful in delivering results. Table 15 shows a summary of the activities identified in the mapping exercise and shows that SO2 projects had a high proportion of institutional strengthening and training activity, and only a limited number of activities on advocacy (6.2%) and knowledge generation (7.9%).

Table 15: Output Mapping Strategic Objective 2

Project type	Example	Activities in portfolio	
		No	%
Institutional strengthening (soft)	Technical assistance, organisational reform	342	41.0%
Training and awareness creation	Formal training activities	232	27.8%
Advocacy and policy advice – private sector led	Lobbying, policy briefs, recommendations, drafted laws, multi-agency convening, PPDs	4	0.5%
Advocacy and policy advice – public sector led	Lobbying, policy briefs, recommendations, drafted laws, multi-agency convening, PPDs	48	5.7%
Knowledge generation and studies	Research and academic studies	66	7.9%
Institutional strengthening (hardware)	Provision of equipment	48	5.7%
Direct service to final users	Automated systems processes and procedures to final users	94	11.3%
Provision of infrastructure	Construction of markets, logistics hubs etc.	1	0.1%
Explicit focus on gender or the environment		0	0.0%
Total		835	100%

Source: Evaluation Team (Deliverable 2A)

Table 16 below shows the performance of the projects in relation to the DAC criteria and whilst caution needs to be used in interpreting this data given the small sample size, the table broadly shows that those projects which could be considered TMEA's core activities have done slightly better than average with scores of 8.7 and 8.5 respectively against a portfolio average of 8.3 though this should not be regarded as significantly different.

Table 16: Average output-level performance by project result type (SO2)

Activity	No	Relevance	Effectiveness	Efficiency	Gender	Learning and Sustainability	Total
Advocacy and policy advice - private sector led	1	10.0	10.0	N/A	7.0	10.0	9.6
Advocacy and policy advice - public sector led	7	9.1	7.4	7.0	5.2	6.0	7.6
Knowledge generation and studies	8	9.6	8.5	8.0	5.4	7.0	8.3
Institutional strengthening (soft)	18	9.3	8.8	8.3	5.9	6.9	8.5
Institutional strengthening (hardware)	10	9.1	8.2	8.7	6.0	6.3	8.1
Training and awareness creation	15	9.6	9.0	8.3	6.3	7.2	8.7
Provision of infrastructure	1	10.0	7.0	N/A	7.0	7.0	8.1

Activity	No	Relevance	Effectiveness	Efficiency	Gender	Learning and Sustainability	Total
Direct services to final users	12	9.5	9.5	8.7	5.8	7.5	8.8
Explicit focus on gender or environment	0	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Portfolio average	19	9.4	8.6	8.3	5.6	6.8	8.3

2.3 SO2 output-level assessment conclusions

The conclusion from the output assessment of the SO2 projects is that the overall portfolio of projects has performed well, with some notable shortcomings on gender and learning and sustainability. The projects designed have been broadly **relevant** and **effective** in delivering expected outputs, with the caveat that many have been subject to significant delay. Across these two criteria the portfolio of projects scored majority green or amber, with only 1 project rated amber-red, and no red ratings.

Project activities have **generally experienced** delays in implementation and while this is often due to bureaucracy, the unstable and changing political landscape in a number of TMEA countries has also contributed to these delays. In this regard it was surprising to note that the Country Strategies which set the framework for TMEA assistance have, in a number of cases, not been updated. This was of particular note in Tanzania where a change in Government in 2015 should have led to a review and an updating of the TMEA country strategy.

There has been a strong emphasis in **capacity building** that has often mixed hard technical assistance and equipment with softer training. The overall assessment is that many of the receiving national and EAC institutions have been faced with major funding and capacity constraints. This has required a key role for TMEA to ensure adequate implementation and absorption of the technical assistance. Thus even though the delivery of the assistance is outsourced, the TMEA staff have an essential role working as a facilitator and in quality assurance to ensure that project outputs were achieved.

There is strong **stakeholder ownership of the interventions undertaken** as evidenced by their project experience and perception of TMEA's role. In some countries, it took time for TMEA's mandate to become fully accepted by stakeholders both at National and EAC levels. However, eventually with the successful delivery of several difficult and ground-breaking initiatives on areas such as SCT and NTBs, TMEA's mandate is generally well accepted and strongly welcomed by the national and EAC stakeholders. The very tangible and visible benefits of the OSBPs are an oft-cited symbol of TMEAs importance to East African economic integration. Given the concerns on the internal weakness of several institutions supported, further TMEA assistance is required and would be well received by the stakeholders.

Whilst it is recognised that TMEA has stepped up attention to gender in the design, implementation and monitoring of projects, still, many of the projects reviewed were designed around PARs and monitoring frameworks with current reporting which gave little **attention to gender**.

The quality of output reporting requires improvement. Evidence of project results is often available from evaluation reports and other TMEA documents. But there is a general lack of consistency in the monitoring and results frameworks, definitions of terms, specification of indicators and reporting. It was also observed that many of the monitoring reports produced by the recipient organisation were not adequately validated or quality assured by TMEA. There were many differences between budgets and indicators contained in the PARs and the quarterly/monitoring reports. It was sometimes unclear whether these differences were due to an inconsistency or as a result of changes that had been made to the programme and results frameworks. There are clear lessons for improvements in TMEA

processes. There needs to be a clear anchor and traceability for monitoring reports and clear explanations on changes to budgets, activities and indicators. This affected the ability to learn from projects. Furthermore, several appeared overly dependent on TMEA funding, with **no firm strategy for moving towards a sustainable funding model**.

The projects have generally contributed to stakeholders' **trade enabling objectives**. Furthermore, the activities have generated outputs that have succeeded in contributing to the **wider outcomes** of facilitating trade and reducing NTBs, as suggested by stakeholder perception of significant changes.

3 Output-level analysis of SO3 portfolio

The TMEA SO3 portfolio covered projects that contribute to TMEA’s strategic objective of improving business competitiveness. Referring back to the TMEA Theory of Change, the SO3 portfolio contained projects with the following primary objectives:

- Enhanced business environment for trade, with two programme intermediate outcomes:
 - Private sector/ civil society-led policy formulation
 - Improved processes for small traders, especially women;
- Improved export capability, comprising three programme intermediate outcomes:
 - Improved quality & standards of goods and services
 - Increased Trade in Services
 - Strengthened export capabilities
- Effective and innovative trade logistics services.

The TMEA Theory of Change also demarcates areas which contribute towards improving business competitiveness, but were re-evaluated as non-TMEA areas in the re-appraisal of the TMEA Theory of Change:

- Improved access to finance, and
- Enhanced investment climate.

SO3 projects covered a wide range of different activities, including support to industry associations to increase private-sector led policy formulation, work with informal cross-border traders, and working to increase quality and standards in SMEs through a variety of different mechanisms including adoption of national standards. Some projects were somewhat atypical in being more akin to market development projects rather than trade promotion projects. 37% of the total TMEA portfolio was SO3 projects, but they only accounted for 13.6% of the budget. This disparity is because both SO1 and SO2 contained large infrastructure projects.

3.1 Key results


Table 23 at the end of this section sets out the results by project shown by score in descending order. The summary result by evaluation criteria is shown in Table 17. The detailed responses to each questionnaire are shown in Annex 5 and a summary in Annex 2b. The sample is too small to make any general comments about the performance by country. Figures in parenthesis show the scores for the desk-reviewed projects only and while these scores are on average slightly higher, the differences are small. Annex 4 sets out a summary of the responses to the evaluation questions by strategic objective including an assessment of the quality of TMEAs contribution.

Table 17: SO3 summary ratings, by DAC criterion, from 0-10

Objective	Relevance	Effectiveness	Efficiency	Gender	Learning & Sustainability
SO3 All projects	8.6	9.3	8.6	8.6	8.1
(SO3 Desk projects)	(9.5)	(10.0)	(-)	(9.0)	(9.5)

3.1.1 Relevance

Figure 9: SO3 relevance scores



Summary

- SO3 projects had a mixed score with respect to relevance, with **10 out of 20 projects performing well** (Green) on relevance and **10 with an amber rating**.
- There were **no projects that scored low on relevance** or where there were any major concerns.

As with SO2, the relevance of projects was graded according to their **fit within TMEA's mandate**, their **fit with the country strategy**, their **relevance** from the perspective of **project stakeholders**, and whether the **targeted stakeholders were relevant** to TMEA's objective.

A key issue for SO3 is that it has a very **wide scope** and therefore most projects that **support business competitiveness** are within the broad mandate of TMEA, but may appear somewhat **tangential to a focus on trade**.

As with SO2, there were some projects around **capacity building for trade-related institutions** that **didn't directly contribute to TMEA's core objectives**.

A question is raised in some interventions as to whether TMEA is the most suitable funder of certain activities. This has included projects that intervene within specific sectoral value chains at the level of production quality (e.g., primary processing by coffee farmer cooperatives). Whilst these types of projects have an element of improving trading standards, it is questionable whether TMEA should themselves be taking such a "deep dive" into the market system of specific agricultural commodities.

Whilst in general there was good connection with TMEA's mandate around trade facilitation and export standards, this issue also applied to some of the capacity building initiatives. For example, there are a number of projects focused around sensitising female traders on export requirements which extended beyond 'improving processes for small traders' to working with them to expand access to finance, which is listed as a non-TMEA area. Other capacity building projects could be considered to be outside the TMEA mandate. These include interventions around generic capacity building activities on access to finance and financial risk management. Of course such capacity building is required as part of the project implementation and TMEA has worked with innovative organisations that are weak in capacity, and should therefore be commended for doing so. Nevertheless, there remains a question


on the boundaries of TMEA’s activities and whether it is the most appropriate organisation for funding and supporting these activities.

Table 18: Relevance Strategic Objective 3

<p>DEQ1.1: To what extent are TMEA projects’ intended outputs generally consistent with the programme TOC?</p>	<p>The SO3 portfolio covers a wide spectrum of activities from advocacy on trade and economic integration to supporting companies to meet trading standards. There has been a major emphasis on working with lower income and often informal women traders. However, some projects had questionable relevance for TMEA, because they appeared to be market-development projects without any particular emphasis on trade. Other projects expanded into access to finance, which is not relevant for TMEA. This is partly a result of the broad range of activities that fall under the mandate of improving business competitiveness, and TMEA’s status as a demand-led institution. This means there is, to a certain extent, a lack of coherence in the portfolio of TMEA SO3 projects.</p> <p>The quality of the evidence for this judgment is good given that the evaluators have reviewed over one quarter of the 80 SO3 TMEA projects and reviewed the objectives and frameworks for a number of the remaining projects.</p> <p>Clarifying further what specifically does not fall under the TMEA mandate (as was previously done with access to finance) would lend further coherence. That should be a goal for TMEA, as it allows for greater evaluability and specialisation. This is perhaps particularly the case with SO3 projects, which sometimes branch out into projects more akin to traditional market systems development projects. There are many institutions which carry out market-systems-development projects, and fewer that focus on trade-enabling activities.</p>
<p>DEQ1.4: Who were/are the main beneficiaries of the outputs? Are there organisations or groups of people who are negatively affected by the outputs?</p>	<p>From the projects reviewed there is a very good portfolio mix of meeting industry sector needs and trade associations. Few negative impacts of the projects were recorded and the inclusivity of a number of projects should be commended. For example, the cross-border trader project in Tanzania (1138) brought the women’s husbands into the training to address wider gender issues of asset control.</p> <p>This DEQ applies more pertinently to a review of activity in SO1 which needs to examine the extent to which the benefits of improved infrastructure have been pro-poor and enabled greater access to markets and trades, the SO3 interventions have- by definition- addressed targeted issues of business competitiveness with a strong emphasis on marginalised and vulnerable groups including women traders.</p>

3.1.2 Effectiveness

Figure 10: SO3 effectiveness scores



Summary

- As with SO2, effectiveness was scored against the 4 key criteria: (i) **achievement of outputs**; (ii) ability to **overcome capacity constraints**; (iii) extent to which **project addressed potential negative impacts**, and (iv) **effectiveness of capacity building**. The relation to the relevant DEQs is outlined in the table below.
- SO3 projects have performed well with respect to effectiveness, with **14 green ratings** and **6 amber**.
- SO3 projects have delivered a **wide range of different outputs** to support business competitiveness, including **technical assistance to support traders** and organisational **strengthening of civil society organisations and business associations** Tanzania Private Sector Federation (TPSF) (1129) and East African Business Council (0424) and Foundation of Civil Society (1131).
- Projects have occasionally struggled with **issues of internal capacity**, which has in some cases been a constraint.
- As for SO2, projects were **delayed because of changing political circumstances**.

Some SO3 projects, such as TPSF (1129), have found a clear role in developing an **evidence-based advocacy** approach on trade issues. TPSF considers TMEA to be an essential facilitating body and as stated *“is needed at this time in Tanzania”*. It was apparent to the evaluators that TMEA had strengthened the capacity of TPSF and that TPSF was using its convening and consultative role with Government to support evidence-based advocacy in for example working towards a Single Market for rice within the EAC. However, while the evidence of TMEA’s effectiveness is compelling it is also noted that TPSF had also received capacity building support from supporting programme with DFID funding (BEST-AC).

Other projects have had substantial success in working with smallholders and women informal cross-border traders, in developing their capacity and improving their routes to export markets. As with SO2, some projects were considerably delayed which was a core reason behind some of the ‘Amber’ ratings. In one case, that of the National Logistics Platform (0934), the key reason behind why they appeared unlikely to achieve their outputs was the relatively short life-span of the project (1 year). This

was at the suggestion of TMEA, as they didn't want to commit to a longer-term project whilst awaiting the new TMEA strategy and new funding commitments. This in turn made it more difficult for other stakeholders to commit to the project.


The main internal constraint on the projects was the absorption capacity of the recipient organisations, many of which were small and lacking adequate financial management and general capacity. For example, for project Amplifying the Influence of Women in National and Regional Trade-Uganda (1074), following a year of implementation in which the project battled to show results and absorb grant funding, a consultancy was procured to assist the implementing partner (UWEA), which enabled TMEA to assume greater control of the project funds and ensure faster progress on outputs. This appears to have been an effective solution to the issues experienced and there are a number of examples where TMEA has intervened in order to achieve progress in the activities for capacity building and other assistance.

Table 19: Effectiveness: Strategic Objective 3

<p>DEQ1.2: Were outputs achieved in accordance with plans/expectations and within budget? For ongoing projects, what is the likelihood of achieving the output targets within the project timespan?</p>	<p>Projects have generally scored well on effectiveness with 14 out of 20 scoring good and only 6 scoring amber. There are no projects with any major concerns on outputs achieved. The evaluators have recognised that most outputs were not achieved on schedule but have not marked the projects down for delayed completion. Most of the stakeholders have reported that the projects had a very strong and successful capacity building component and are achieving successful outcomes.</p> <p>The strength of evidence for this assessment in terms of judging the performance of the outputs is good as the assessments have been validated by other sources including Annual Reviews and stakeholder consultation.</p> <p>As with SO2, this may be a case of setting more realistic timelines, which would enable more effective project and portfolio management.</p>
<p>DEQ1.3: What constraints were/are encountered in achieving the outputs? What are the main reasons for non-achievement of the outputs (if any)? Have the major expected and unexpected, internal and external constraints in achieving the outputs been addressed effectively?</p>	<p>There were major political constraints encountered in the implementation of project activities related to the fragile state status of two of the countries (Burundi and South Sudan).</p> <p>Other key issues delaying project implementation was the change in Government in Tanzania which put on hold a number of SO2 activities but also affected SO3.</p> <p>Internal capacity constraints also hindered project implementation and, in some cases, TMEA had to provide extensive additional support.</p>
<p>DEQ1.5: To what extent have the TMEA supported organisations (i.e. the implementing partners) built capacity and capability on relevant trade-related matters?</p>	<p>There has been a very strong component of capacity building in the SO3 portfolio and the results have been effective though the key question remains on the overall sustainability of some of the partners supported.</p> <p>The capacity of many of the CSO/PSOs to secure and manage funds remains weak. Whilst the sustainability of the institutions supported may be recognised as being weak from the outset, and whilst this should not be a barrier for TMEA engagement, there should be a greater ex ante understanding of the consequences of initiatives being sustained on exit of TMEA funding support.</p>

3.1.3 Efficiency (desk projects not scored)

Figure 11: SO3 efficiency scores



Summary

- As outlined in the approach, the evaluation of efficiency centred on an assessment of the **efficiency of the procurement of TMEA's inputs to projects**, based on interviews with stakeholders.
- Scores were mixed for SO3 projects. **8 projects were rated green** and **5 amber**.
- Civil society organisations appeared to struggle with having **appropriate internal processes related to risk mitigation** and cash flow management, which led to **delays in implementation** and delivery of outputs
- TMEA worked with organisations to **develop procedures and processes** for risk mitigation and procurement.
- In some cases, activities such as **grant management were outsourced to TMEA**.


In more extreme cases, some management processes were also effectively outsourced to TMEA, such as the financial management of TMEA grants and the procurement processes. Public sector partners, however, struggled with effectiveness and efficiency which required more active input than originally planned on the technical side, with TMEA staff either on secondment at institutions or part of weekly meetings.

Table 20: Relationship between Efficiency and DEQs for SO3

<p>DEQ1.7: To what extent does TMEA have the management arrangements, systems, processes and human resources appropriate for carrying out its mission (i.e. how suitable are these for the purposes of carrying out its activities)?</p>	<p>TMEA was able to step in and provide expertise on internal risk and financial management, which in several cases was necessary. In some cases, activities were outsourced to TMEA, an arrangement that appeared to work well. These arrangements and continued support enabled TMEA to work with smaller and more specialised institutions, which was a positive outcome. However, as with SO2, the high level of support did raise question marks over sustainability and independence.</p>
<p>DEQ1.8: To what extent do TMEA’s financial (including procurement), human resource and risk management processes enable it to efficiently and effectively manage its contractual relationships with implementing partners?</p>	<p>TMEA managed procurement for most SO3 projects. There was a mixed reaction to this – some projects appreciated the assistance in managing large procurement contracts, but others were less positive based on TMEA’s heightened risk and quality assurance procedures.</p>

3.1.4 Gender

Figure 12: SO3 gender scores



Summary

- The record for gender was more positive for SO3 than SO2, with **12 green ratings, 7 amber, and one amber-red.**
- This was predominantly because there were several **projects actively targeting women**, under the ‘improved trade processes for cross-border traders, especially women’ programme intermediate outcome.
- However, projects which did not actively target women **missed opportunities to mainstream women either in monitoring or in project design.**
- Projects which did target women often did not collect equivalent impact and outcome data for men, making it **difficult to evaluate the extent of progress on addressing gender issues or discrimination.**

TMEA has only had a gender team in the last two years. The TMEA Theory of Change provided a focus on trade and competitiveness issues for marginalised informal women traders in East Africa. Given that there has been little attention given to these groups, it is not surprising that many of the institutions supported by TMEA have lacked capacity.

The projects targeting women cross-border traders aim to have an impact on incomes and volumes of trade and have included training for women on cross-border trade policies and procedures. Whilst developed from a gender perspective, these projects had a common fault in their monitoring framework, in which they rarely captured equivalent data at impact or outcome level for men as well as women. Without capturing such data (on, for instance, the average time taken to cross a border-crossing), it is very difficult to evaluate the continued extent of gender-based discrimination, or any progress to which the projects might have contributed.

However, apart from these projects targeted explicitly at women, more generally on SO3 projects many monitoring indicators were not gender-disaggregated, and in many cases as a result it was difficult to assess whether women were negatively affected by the interventions. On advocacy projects funded under SO3, gender was also often not a feature of their strategy, which was a missed opportunity.


In the future not only should attention be given to ensuring adequate mainstreaming of gender in programme design and ensuring that the monitoring process includes disaggregated data, but it should also begin to address measurement of issues of voice, choice, and control of assets.

Table 21: Relationship between Gender and DEQs for SO3

<p>DEQ 4.5: To what extent has the programme benefited women and girls (noting that the programme design did not purport to benefit them equally)? Have there been any negative consequences for women and girls? Has the programme had an impact on relations, including power and influence, between girls/women and boys/men? How could the programme increase benefits to women and girls within its trade focus?</p>	<p>The comments made with reference to SO2 and gender are broadly valid here; TMEA projects need to start collecting gender-disaggregated data to answer this question. For projects that do actively target women, there is clear evidence of major benefits for women that are helping to increase their influence and power and help address gender imbalances.</p> <p>However, in those projects the lack of data on men for outcome and impact indicators makes it difficult to evaluate the extent of continuing gender discrimination.</p>
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3.1.5 Sustainability and Learning

Projects funded under SO3 performed less well with respect to sustainability learning, with the majority receiving ‘amber’ ratings.

Figure 13: SO3 sustainability and learning scores

Summary

- Projects funded under SO3 performed less well with respect to sustainability learning, with **7 green ratings, 12 amber, and one amber-red**.
- Partner organisations often had limited capacity and **were not able to continue activities without further support**.
- Projects had **few strategies for alternative sources of financing**.
- However, this is partly because **TMEA has funded small-scale and innovative projects under SO3**, especially around working with women cross border traders.
- The **monitoring reports** produced were of limited use in **tracking output performance**. This significantly reduced the scope for learning and understanding the projects' potential legacy.

A common feature of the SO3 projects was the lack of absorption capacity of the recipient organisation and therefore many of the activities, such as support to cross border traders, will not go to scale (or even continue without funding) without further support. As an example, one organisation which had a small delay in a TMEA grant had to temporarily close down a centre for helping women cross border traders, as it had no other financing. Furthermore, many of these projects had few plans to find alternative sources of financing following the TMEA project, and were quite resistant towards moving to any type of model of self-funding. TMEA staff were more cognisant than the project partner staff about the underlying issues of sustainability.

TMEA should be commended for undertaking a number of small scale catalytic and innovative projects including cross border trading projects which have the potential to address issues often ignored in trade such as the key gender issues of harassment and exclusion from markets. Given that governments and other donors have given little attention to these groups, it is not surprising that many of the institutions supported by TMEA have lacked capacity. Many interventions have been undertaken knowing that there will be little institutional sustainability.

Monitoring for SO3 projects was problematic, with many of the problems described for SO2. Despite relatively limited reports and poorly chosen indicators, partner institutions indicated that they struggled with the monitoring requirements imposed by TMEA, and suggested these were too considerable a drain on resources. This is a key issue as it reduces the scope to learn from SO3 projects and implement changes which lead to long term sustainability of impact.

Table 22: Relationship between Sustainability and Learning and DEQs for SO3

<p>DEQ1.9: To what extent do the processes TMEA has in place promote organisational learning and sharing of good practices?</p>	<p>TMEA had appeared to help build relationships between small organisations performing similar activities in different countries, and organised conferences bringing together beneficiaries.</p> <p>However, monitoring systems and reporting was weak. This is partly a result of working with smaller institutions in SO3 with limited experience in monitoring. TMEA has developed monitoring guidelines to help partners, but they appear to have been insufficient to address this issue.</p>
<p>DEQ1.10: Are the M&E tools and processes in place appropriate, both in regard to results and in regard to finances? How could they be strengthened?</p>	<p>Monitoring was weak, with reports offering little value or indication of project implementation. Partners also appeared to struggle with setting up monitoring frameworks, and indicated that these took too much time and resources. Further details are shown in the annex of Deliverable 2B (Organisation & Institution Assessment)</p>

Table 23 shows the summary results by criteria and the overall score. No particular pattern of performance is noted by size of project with a fairly even distribution of good and poorer performers by size of budget, noting that the SO3 interventions are generally substantially smaller in budget than SO2.

Table 23: Key Results Strategic Objective 3 (in score order)

Country	Project Code	Project Title	Budget	Relevance	Effectiveness	Efficiency	Gender	Learning and Sustainability	Total
Kenya	0923	EATTA tea product quality standards	25,000	100	100	N/A	100	100	100
South Sudan	1419	Trading out of conflict - Promoting Women Informal Cross Border Traders in South Sudan	400,000	100	100	N/A	100	100	100
Uganda	1074	Amplifying the Influence of Women in National and Regional Trade	500,000	100	100	N/A	100	100	100
Uganda	1076	Tourism: Enhanced Institutional Capacity and sustainability	336,000	100	100	N/A	70	100	96
Kenya	0941	Advocacy on the single tourism visa - KTF	102,000	100	100	N/A	70	70	93
Tanzania	1129	Support to Tanzania Private Sector Foundation (TPSF)	671,000	100	100	70	70	100	91
Regional	0453	Regional Coffee Export Capability	1,555,000	70	100	N/A	100	100	89
EAC	0424 & 0448	EABC institutional and advocacy support & EABC Phase II	601,590	100	70	100	100	70	88
Regional	0449	Consolidating Gains for Women Traders in EAC	754,000	100	100	70	100	40	88
Rwanda	1229	Capacity Building to Women Cross Border Traders in Tanzania	734,000	70	100	100	100	70	88
Kenya	0934 & 0921	Kenya trade logistics & investment climate - KEPISA 2 & Kenya trade logistics and investment climate	1,020,000	70	100	100	70	70	85
Burundi	1356	Enhancing Private Sector Capability to Influence Trade Policy Formulation and Implementation	450,000	70	100	70	100	100	85
Uganda	1077	National Logistics platform	205,000	100	70	100	70	70	85
Tanzania	1138	Women Cross Border Traders	384,000	70	100	70	100	70	82
Uganda	1066 & 1071	SEATTINI-upgrading quality standards	330,000	70	70	100	100	70	79
Tanzania	1131	Support to Foundation for Civil Society (FCS)	577,000	70	70	70	70	70	70
Burundi	1344	Search for Common Ground (Phase I)	56,132	70	100	100	40	70	62

*grey indicates a criterion was not assessed, due to it being a desk review

3.2 Output mapping of SO3

Workstream 2A conducted an output mapping exercise where all the project activities were mapped according to some key groupings (please see deliverable 2A for more information). A summary is shown in Table 24. This table shows that a high proportion of the project portfolio includes institutional strengthening (23.1%) and training activity (24.2%), but nearly one-third of the portfolio is engaged in advocacy (30.5%) and 9.5% with a focus on gender. Table 24 shows that, as in the case of SO2, the projects with a high proportion of core TMEA functions has scored around the overall *average* score indicating that there is a consistent pattern of performance across all TMEA activities.

Table 24: Output Mapping Strategic Objective 3

Project type	Key Activities	Activities in the portfolio	
		No.	%
Advocacy and policy advise – private sector led	Lobbying, policy briefs, recommendations, drafted laws, multi-agency convening, PPDs	169	28.5%
Advocacy and policy advise – public sector led	Lobbying, policy briefs, recommendations, drafted laws, multi-agency convening, PPDs	12	2.0%
Knowledge generation and studies	Research and academic studies	25	4.2%
Institutional Strengthening (soft)	Technical assistance and organisational reforms	137	23.1%
Institutional Strengthening (hardware)	Provision of equipment	4	0.7%
Training and Awareness Creation	Formal training activities	143	24.2%
Provision of Infrastructure	Construction of markets, logistics hubs etc.	0	0%
Direct service to final users	Automated systems processes and procedures to final users	46	7.8%
Explicit focus on gender	Work with cross-border women traders	56	9.5%
Explicit focus on environment		0	0.0%
TOTAL		592	100.0%

Table 25: Average output-level performance by project result type (SO3)

Activity	No	Relevance	Effectiveness	Efficiency	Gender	Learning and Sustainability	Total
Advocacy and policy advice - Private Sector led	16	8.5	9.3	8.2	8.1	7.0	8.5
Knowledge generation and studies	8	8.1	9.3	8.0	8.1	7.0	8.4
Institutional strengthening (soft)	14	8.7	9.1	8.3	8.3	7.0	8.6
Institutional strengthening (hardware)	2	8.5	10.0	10.0	10.0	7.0	9.3
Training and awareness creation	15	8.6	9.2	8.2	8.2	6.8	8.6
Direct services to final users	6	8.5	9.5	10.0	9.5	7.5	9.0

Activity	No	Relevance	Effectiveness	Efficiency	Gender	Learning and Sustainability	Total
Explicit focus on gender	6	8.5	10.0	7.0	10.0	6.5	8.8
Advocacy and policy advice - Public Sector led	0	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Provision of infrastructure	0	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Explicit focus on environment	0	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Portfolio average	17	8.6	9.3	8.6	8.6	8.0	8.7

More generally it can also be noted that **advocacy and policy advice** led by the private sector under SO3 has been rated better than advocacy and policy advice led by the public sector under SO2 (average rating of 8.5 versus 7.3). The latter was identified as the weakest component of the entire portfolio. Although these are small sample sizes, and based on interviews rather than quantitative assessments, the evidence would suggest advocacy and policy advice projects perform better when led by the private sector.

Knowledge generation and studies have been rated higher when carried out under SO3 than SO2 (8.4 versus 8.0). Similarly, institutional strengthening (soft) was also rated higher when carried out under SO3 rather than SO2 (86 versus 82). For both knowledge generation and institutional strengthening (soft), this difference in ratings appeared largely driven by differences in how projects were rated on the **gender criterion**. However, the SO3 projects were rated marginally better in terms of relevance for both actions.

The data in the box below represent a set of key issues of change as perceived by the stakeholders in SO3 projects. It is worth noting that most of these changes recorded by the stakeholders are outcome level which is a positive indicator of the success of the project intervention. Interestingly, on some projects, beneficiaries and project partners had divergent views with TMEA staff in determining the significant changes. For example, in 1017 (SEATINI), TMEA staff suggested the significant changes were in the export capacity of smallholder farmers growing maize and their household income from this activity. Beneficiaries stated that the most significant change from their perspective was the public health benefits as maize was no longer produced using carcinogenic chemicals.

Box 2: Understanding significant changes in the SO3 portfolio

Significant Change	
Project	Significant Change
0424 and 0448 Regional EABC institutional and advocacy support Phase I and II	Using role to implement changes on taxes based on rules origin including cooking oil as using influence to abolish railway levy
0449 Regional Consolidating Gains for Women Traders in EAC	The most important change is the increased security both financially and with respect to freedom from sexual assault for women and informal cross-border traders.
1138 Tanzania Capacity Building to Women Cross Border Traders	Bringing husbands to the training changed attitudes and linking women to product standard development (SIDO) provided sustainable opportunity.
1129 Tanzania Support to Tanzania Private Sector Foundation (TPSF)	TPSF has found a clear role in developing an evidence-based advocacy approach based on the success of the rice case study in contributing to changes in legislation
1131 Tanzania Support to Foundation for Civil Society	Civil Society has started to assume its role in exercising its voice in advocating for changes to support business

Significant Change	
1229 Rwanda PROFEMME-empowerment & capacity building for informal cross-border traders	Beneficiaries stated the most important change was the support to the formation of cooperatives and the subsequent capacity training
0921 and 0934 Kenya Improving trade logistics and the investment climate	Increased knowledge and awareness among port of Mombasa stakeholders on the bottlenecks affecting the efficiency and effectiveness of the Port of Mombasa and their role in unlocking the bottlenecks.
1344 Burundi Search for Common Ground	Improved relations between petty traders and customs officials
0941 Kenya Advocacy on the single tourism visa	Increased partnerships between tourism and hospitality agents in the three countries.
1066 & 1071 Uganda Strengthening SEATINI'S institutional capacity & upgrading quality standards	Beneficiaries said the most important change is not around incomes or export capacity, but rather around the public health benefits. Maize grown in accordance with the standards developed by SEATINI is no longer potentially toxic. This made a big impact on local communities.
1077 Uganda National Logistics Platform	Uniting different industry stakeholders from across the logistics sector in one room. Previously, there was neither coordination nor communication, only competition

3.3 SO3 Conclusions output-level assessment

The conclusion from the output assessment of the SO3 is similar to that of SO2 – the portfolio of projects has generally performed well and the results are contributing to the outcomes of greater market access and trade. However, there are some key caveats on relevance and learning and sustainability.

The projects designed are broadly **relevant**, although some projects, whilst falling within the TMEA mandate of improving business competitiveness, appear outside TMEA's core area of expertise and mandate. As such the SO3 portfolio scored lower in relevance than SO2. There are projects that are more akin to typical value-chain development projects, in which it is questionable whether TMEA should be the implementing body. The mandate of TMEA with regards to this strategic objective is very broad and some consideration should be given to having a narrower focus. Some projects working at the bottom of the pyramid have also expanded into developing access to finance, which is outside of TMEA's ToC. Considering how central access to finance is for informal cross-border traders, however, that may be unavoidable.

Projects have been **effective** in delivering expected outputs noting that many have been subject to significant delay. The portfolio of projects scored well across all the DAC criteria with no major concerns on the projects reviewed.

SO3 projects have delivered a range of different outputs to support business competitiveness including technical assistance to support traders and organisational strengthening of civil society and professional service organisations. These institutions are beginning to use **their voice effectively** to influence changes in NTB notification and economic integration issues.

TMEA has had an emphasis on undertaking a number of **small scale catalytic** and innovative projects including cross border trading projects which affect a large number of low income women and men who have been excluded from formal markets. These projects are addressing exclusion in trade including harassment and access to markets.

As with SO2, project activities have **generally experienced** delays in implementation and this is often due to the lack of absorption capacity of the recipient organisation. As an outsourced model for

procurement, TMEA staff are tasked with having a close control over the financial and reputational risks in procurement processes, and need to play a key role in quality assurance of the project activities as well as facilitating implementation with stakeholders.

The issue of data quality highlighted in SO2 also applies as there is a general lack of consistency in the **monitoring and results frameworks**, definitions of terms, specification of indicators and quality of reporting. This has a knock-on effect on the ability to learn from projects and understand their long-term legacy. Several SO3 projects were also deemed to have few plans to find alternative sources of financing following TMEA funding coming to an end, thus calling into question their long-term sustainability.

4 Programme Level Assessment

4.1 Introduction

This section takes the project level assessment presented in sections 2 and 3 one step further by analysing how widely the projects have contributed to the expected TMEA strategic objectives, sometimes referred to as the corporate level objectives. This is a preliminary programme level assessment: what can we say about the contribution of the TMEA portfolio of projects at a macro level towards the strategic objectives of TMEA. We have conducted this assessment against the outcome indicators defined in the latest available revised corporate **TMEA Results Framework (RF) of 05 October 2016**, and achieved results reported by TMEA as of 30 June 2016. However, the Performance Evaluation in phase 2 will take these preliminary analysis and findings further and analyse the role of TMEA in contributing to these outcomes with greater rigour.

One of the key challenges in using the RF as a management tool and measuring the contribution of TMEA at the strategic level is to be able to track the performance of each project (or cluster of projects) and show how it is contributing to one (or more) of the key strategic outputs and in turn to one of the five strategic outcomes indicators. This will enable TMEA to be show how the aggregation of project results is contributing to the macro level improvement in trade performance and competitiveness at a national and regional level. This has been discussed in Deliverable 6A in understanding the political economic drivers of (i) structural, institutional and stakeholder issues; (ii) incentives; and (iii) power relationships.

As discussed in section 1.6 there are limitations on the overall quality of evidence, especially from some of the desk-based reviews where there has been a reliance on self-reported data from the project recipients. This issue was partly compensated for by interviews with TMEA staff, partner organisations, and, in some cases, project beneficiaries. As such, the assessment of outcomes presented here is a judgement based on the evidence from all these multiple sources, and should be treated as provisional. The Performance Evaluation in Phase 2 will include additional analysis in terms of TMEA's contribution towards the achievement of programme-level intermediate and strategic outcomes, and will draw in other perspectives such as corporates and private business exporters to strengthen triangulation in final evaluation conclusions. It will examine the main transmission pathways as set out in Annex 6 and test the hypothetical results chains posited by the TMEA Strategy 1 framework.

For a programme the size of TMEA, it is important that there is some measurable improvement in trade performance and the impact pathways shown in Box 2 and Box 4. A key here will be the ability to justify the plausible contribution at macro level as set out below in Table 26 and Table 27.

4.2 Programme level performance

DEQ1.6: *To what extent has TMEA been able to achieve expected outcomes (for finalised projects) and what is the general likelihood of ongoing projects achieving their outcomes?*

Under SO2 and SO3, TMEA has defined different levels of programme outcomes at strategic output level or programme level, together with their related indicators. This is sometimes referred to as the corporate level outcomes. These expected outcomes at programme level are defined separately for SO2 and SO3. The following table summarises the different outcomes and expected results, and reports on their levels of achievement.

Table 26 shows that SO2 outcomes have already been achieved or are likely to be achieved, per TMEA's own results reporting, with exception of the efforts regarding the harmonisation of standards, for which no information was available regarding the progress towards the expected approval of

Mutual Recognition Agreements. The overall trade integration trend indicator provided by the World Bank Doing Business Study, regarding *Trading Across Borders* improved for all TMEA beneficiary countries but Tanzania. Overall five out of six SO2 targets have been achieved, showing thus a satisfactory progress towards expected outcomes.

Table 27 further below shows for SO3 that all expected outcome targets have been achieved already in 2016 or are likely to be achieved still during TMEA I, with exception of the gender targets. The TMEA results framework does not provide information regarding income increase of small traders (since this has not been measured) but anecdotal evidence from the qualitative field work for this evaluation suggests that such an increase does exist. The impact evaluation of TMEA's effects on trade growth and poverty reduction, to be conducted in 2018, will provide additional information.

As the tables below (Table 26 and 27), indicate plausible contribution based on the more detailed project level results chains, the indicators are moving in a positive direction and 14 of the 16 outcomes only two of the defined targets are unlikely to be achieved. Regarding the two outcomes which have not yet been measured, another one is likely to be achieved. This would bring the overall corporate success rate of accomplishment of outcome targets to 13 targets already achieved or likely to be achieved, out of 16, a success rate of 81%

Table 26: Overview of Progress towards SO2 Outcomes

SO2 – Enhanced Trade Environment				
Intermediate Outcome: Improving regional and national coordination through developing capacities of the EAC organs and institutions and Ministries of EAC in each Partner State				
Expected results	Indicator	Target (to be achieved during FY 2016/17)	Progress (according to latest available data)	Likelihood of goal being achieved
Increased ease of trading across borders	Doing Business indicator on ease of Trading Across Borders	TMEA selected the EAC country ranks at the Doing Business sub indicators Trading Across Borders to track performance improvement in EAC trade environment. TMEA does not set targets with the World Bank or national Countries on the improvements in trading across borders ranking. Observed improvements between 2010 and 2017 are: Kenya +39 positions (144 to 105), Burundi +16 positions (176 to 160), Rwanda +72 positions (159 to 87), Uganda +12 positions (148 to 136), Tanzania -71 positions (109 to 180). ¹⁰		
Strengthened EAC regional trade integration capacity	Increase in the number of Common Market Protocol and Customs Union commitments (related to trade in goods and TMEA funded) annually implemented	30% of outstanding commitments as identified in the CMS implemented	19% (2015/16) ¹¹	Likely
Effective trade systems, agencies & procedures	Reduction in overall average customs clearance time (including inspections)	On average, 50% compared to baseline	2015/16 data only available for 3 countries (out of 6): South Sudan already over-achieved, Uganda already achieved, Rwanda off-track.	Likely as an average number but not for all countries


¹⁰ Source: TMEA Results Framework and World Bank Doing Business reports.

¹¹ This and all remaining indicators in this table report following TMEA Results Framework.

SO2 – Enhanced Trade Environment				
	Efficient implementation of national and regional Non-Tariff Barriers reduction mechanisms	Increase of 15% of processes to be assisted per year	Until 2015/16 processes increased by 27%	Already overachieved
Effective regional and national framework for managing trading standards across the EAC	Increase in the total number of product standards technically harmonised at regional level	Increase of 3.5 times until 2016/17	57% of accomplishment by 2015/16	Unlikely
	Number of additional tests performed by National Bureaux of Standards	Increase of 15% in average	For Kenya already achieved and other countries on track	Likely
	Reduced testing time (selected ones)	Reduction by 75% (average) by 2016/17	80% in average by 2015/16	Already overachieved
	Number of SMEs certified by NBS	70 companies by 2016/17	91 (2015/16)	Already overachieved
	Number of Mutual Recognition Agreements approved and implemented (regional and bilateral)	5 by 2016/17	No progress reported	N/A

Source: Self-compiled, based on TMEA documentation and project evaluation fieldwork (see footnotes).

Figure 14: Doing Business “Trade across borders” rank for selected EAC countries



Source: World Bank Doing Business reports (countries ranked 2010: 183; 2017: 190)

Observation: Please be aware that in the case of ranking position a decrease of the rank represents an improvement (which is the case for Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda).

Figure 14 shows the improvement of *Trade Across Border* ranking for Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda. Rwanda shows the biggest relative improvement in country ranking. In turn Tanzania shows a significant deterioration. The improvement in the overall doing business score for Kenya is 27.1%, Burundi 9.1%, Rwanda 45.2% and Uganda 8.1%, Tanzania deteriorated by 65.1%. The average improvement of countries witnessing a positive trend is 22.3%.

Figure 15 provides the insights regarding the drivers of these observed changes. All five countries reduced time required for import and export, Tanzania showing the smallest improvement. For


Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda the time reduction goes hand in hand with a cost reduction. Meanwhile in Tanzania import and export cost even increased between 2010 and 2017, in spite of the time reduction.

As TMEA states correctly in its Results Framework, the *Trading Across Borders* indicator is used to track performance improvement in the EAC trade environment. TMEA does not set targets with the World Bank or national Countries on the improvements in trading across borders ranking. The observed indicator shows a clear improvement for all countries but Tanzania. This negative trend in Tanzania reported by the World Bank is fully in line with findings from this evaluation.

Naturally TMEA does not contribute equally to all possible drivers of import and export time and cost reduction in all countries. Nevertheless, the Doing Business reports refer specifically to the following list of measures taken by the countries, which have been supported by TMEA.

- 2017: Rwanda made trading across borders easier by removing the mandatory pre-shipment inspection for imported products.
- 2017: Uganda made trading across borders easier by constructing the Malaba One-Stop Border Post which reduced border compliance time for exports.
- 2015: Tanzania made trading across borders easier by upgrading infrastructure at the port of Dar es Salaam.
- 2015: Uganda made trading across borders easier by implementing the ASYCUDA World electronic system for the submission of export and import documents.
- 2014: Burundi made trading across borders easier by eliminating the requirement for a pre-shipment inspection clean report of findings.
- 2014: Rwanda made trading across borders easier by introducing an electronic single-window system at the border.
- 2012: Tanzania made trading across borders faster by implementing the Pre-Arrival Declaration (PAD) system and electronic submission of customs declaration.

Figure 15: Doing Business external trade time and cost changes



Source: World Bank Doing Business reports (countries ranked 2010: 183; 2017: 190)

Table 27: Overview of Progress Towards SO3 Outcomes

SO3 – Improved Business Competitiveness				
Intermediate Outcome: Enhancing business regulations for trade, improving export capability and developing efficient trade logistics services				
Expected results	Indicator¹²	Target (to be achieved during FY 2016/17)	Progress (according to latest available data)	Likelihood of target being achieved
3.1. Enhanced business environment for trade	Number of new/revised policies adopted	28 policies	52 policies (2015/16)	Already overachieved
	Number of new/revised policies adopted that address gender specific issues	19 policies	6 policy reviews finalized and 5 more in process (2015/16)	Unlikely
3.1.1 Private sector/ civil society-led policy formulation	Number of PSO/CSO recommendations adopted	95 recommendations	89 (2015/16)	Likely
	Number of recommendations specific to women traders adopted	22 recommendations	3 (2015/16)	Unlikely
3.1.2 Improved processes for traders, especially women	Reduction of time spent crossing the border for small traders, women traders etc.	75% reduction	75% reduction achieved at 5 borders (2015/16)	Accomplished
	Increase in number of women traders facilitated to trade formally across borders	At least 2,000	11,750 (2015/16)	Widely overachieved
	Increase in number of traders knowledgeable of the key trade processes across the EAC	8,300	14,675 (2015/16)	Widely overachieved
	Average increase in annual income recorded by targeted women traders	No baseline. Sample of Women traders recorded increase in X border trade from \$620 to \$1247 from TMEA survey		
3.2 Improved Export Capability	Increase in export revenue on TMEA supported interventions	at least 15% increase- regional; 40%-Rwanda; 60%-Kenya	Evidence of increases in each country but data from Kenya not yet available.	Target cannot be assessed
	No of entities certified, disaggregated by gender	at least 16 (10 coffee washing stations/ 6 grain warehouses) Total 37- regional; 20- Rwanda; 1750-Kenya	5 farmer groups certified by TRAC 12 Coffee farming groups certified by TWIN	Unlikely

¹² All indicators and progress of achievement reported according to TMEA Results Framework.

SO3 – Improved Business Competitiveness				
	No of direct and indirect jobs created by TMEA export capability interventions	45 permanent jobs TRAC. Remaining 13 projects to increase in volume	Cumulative jobs-Regional 1247 (345 permanent)	Achieved
3.2.1 Improved quality& standards of goods and services	% reduction in total number of metric tonnes of export cargo rejected at select borders and warehouse facilities	10% Year 1 Overall Target: 15% decrease in post-harvest losses in warehouses = 9,000 MT- regional; 30% reduction- Uganda	Rwanda: n/a Uganda: 75% reduction (135kg)	Partially achieved (Uganda)
	No of entities (companies, farmer groups) implementing trading standards disaggregated by gender	TBD - Regional; 3- Rwanda; 100- Burundi; 60-100- Uganda;	Regional 17 entities received certification, Rwanda- 37 companies Burundi-116 companies Uganda 13210 farmers trained on EAC Maize standards. Cumulatively 17,575 trained.	Not assessable
3.2.2 Increased Trade in Services	No of mutual recognition mechanisms operational	2 new MRA (Tourism sector for 3 partner states (Northern corridor) and implementation of agreed modality for services	Regional: Cumulative 2: -. Hotel classification harmonised and Joint marketing services-tourism campaigns harmonised.	achieved
	No of business partnerships and multi country products established and sold on TMEA supported interventions	Regional (landlocked countries)- 6 EATP- 150 Burundi-5	Regional cumulative:53; 44 companies established partnerships Burundi- no progress	Partly achieved
	No of entities accessing new markets disaggregated by country	at least 5 CWS and 50 cooperatives- Regional; 8- Rwanda; 20- Burundi; 100- Kenya	Regional Cumulative:4 famer groups; 3 Associations 150 women owned SMEs in coffee. Kenya 140 farmer groups Rwanda 21 agri companies Burundi 10 companies exporting Uganda 24 tourism companies	Partly achieved

SO3 – Improved Business Competitiveness

3.3.1 Effective and Innovative logistics service	Increased compliance to road regulations amongst trained truck drivers	50% increase in level of knowledge.	Project suspended. 53 drivers changed	Not achieved
	Fuel consumption reduction rate	saving of 1500 litres /annum/truck for trained drivers		
	No of new innovations in logistic supported through the LIFT grant fund.	5		

Source: Self-compiled, based on TMEA documentation and project evaluation fieldwork (see footnotes).

DEQ1.1: To what extent are TMEA projects' intended outputs generally consistent with the programme ToC?

Section 2 concluded that SO2 project outcomes are consistent with the TMEA ToC. The criteria for assessing consistency used here is the question of whether TMEA is doing the right thing with the adequate beneficiaries to ensure that project outcomes contribute to the wider strategic outcomes. Consistency in this sense is not 100% achieved, since there are some capacity building activities that are less relevant to the 2014 ToC. However, the emphasis of TMEA priorities and the ToC has changed over time and these projects were consistent with the ToC at the time.

ToC consistency is less obvious for SO3. This however does not mean that it does not exist or that it should be considered as unsatisfactory. There is an implicit underlying rationale mainly under the civil society and small trader work done by TMEA, which so far has not yet been sufficiently appreciated in discussions around the TMEA approach. SO1 and SO2 covers infrastructure and other work mostly related with public sector institutions, to improve the overall conditions for trade and trade integration. Strong and modern private sector companies have sufficient capacity to take advantage of these improving external conditions. Small traders have limited access to institutional networks and therefore require capacity building to take advantage and make productive use out of the improving external conditions.

Given that TMEA has a mandate to pay attention to overall social well-being and vulnerable groups, reaching out with capacity building at the grass roots seems to be appropriate in bringing people from the bottom of the trade pyramid and are trying to bridge the gap between the strong and the weak player. In this sense SO3 activities should be understood as enabling an important part of the trade community.

Of course, the capacity of players and stakeholders at the bottom of the trade pyramid is considerable as there are many different small groups and there is a much wider range of appropriate activities TMEA compared to SO1 and SO2. This fact makes the relevance and consistency of SO3 activities with the TMEA strategic objectives less obvious. To the opinion of this evaluation, the overall relevance and consistency however does exist. It could be made more visible by explicitly stating in the TMEA objectives that SO3 not only seeks to improve business competitiveness but has a specific mandate to improve business competitiveness at the bottom level of the trade pyramid.

DEQ1.2: Were outputs achieved in accordance with plans/expectations and within budget? For ongoing projects, what is the likelihood of achieving the output targets within the project time-span?

Section 2 and 3 concluded that finalized projects have been able to deliver (accomplish their planned provision of outputs) but the time frames envisaged by TMEA and the partners in the programme design documents for the delivery were unrealistic.

DEQ1.3: What constraints were/are encountered in achieving the outputs? What are the reasons for non-achievement of the outputs?

In addition to the political constraints (fragile situations in Burundi and South Sudan and Government change on Tanzania) highlighted in sections 2 and 3. At a programme level the weakest progress has been achieved in areas of harmonisation of standards and in the achievement of formal government commitments for gender equity.

These findings (together with responses provided to DEQ 1.6) suggest that TMEA is most successful in working with the private sector (being able to induce change), successful in providing capacity to national institutions and inducing (trade sector) related changes there (if the overall political context is stable) However, it has a lower success rate when trying to induce changes which include more than one country (e.g. cross-border binding or regional decisions). The findings also suggest that there is a higher resistance of national government to accept change in gender related issues than in trade related issues.

This evaluation has not reviewed in detail the strategies TMEA is using to approach all these problems. Thus, different levels of progress and success could just reflect different levels of complexity of problems and processes of (individual or collective) institutional decision making. They could also reflect more or less adequate or successful strategies for inducing change at different levels of trade related decision making.

DEQ1.4: Who were/are the main beneficiaries of the outputs? Are there organisations or groups of people who are negatively affected by the outputs?

The main beneficiaries of SO2 and SO3 projects are national ministries, standards agencies and parastatals, as well as the East African Community Secretariat. Looking at the progress levels observed at a programme level it can clearly be said that main beneficiaries are exporters and transporters as well as small-scale cross border traders, since their general procedures became faster and quicker.

Regarding SO3, project outputs have proved that a huge share of direct project benefits went to small female traders, strengthening their ability to become part of a formalised trade system and thus benefit from the improved external trade conditions. However, there has been a limited progress towards the gender related programme outcomes. At the same time, other beneficiaries included civil society and private sector or business membership organisations, including logistics industry actors, who were supported to strengthen their industry participation in dialogue with government on trade issues. Further, cooperatives in certain value chains were supported in market access.

DEQ1.5: To what extent have the supported organisations (i.e. the implementing partners) built capacity and capability on relevant trade-related matters?

Section 2 and 3 confirmed that at the project level technical capacities in beneficiary institutions were, in general built effectively but the operational continuity of benefits provided so far by TMEA, is uncertain.

5 Conclusions and recommendations for SO2 and SO3

This evaluation of the outputs of the SO2 and SO3 projects suggests that there have been good results at a project level which are contributing to achieving the wider strategic objectives of TMEA. The preliminary results show that over 80% of corporate SO2 and SO3 outcomes have already been achieved or are likely to be achieved under TMEA Strategy 1. Furthermore, TMEA project activities are consistent with the ToC under SO2 and SO3, even if under SO3 this is less evident, reflecting the broad scope of this strategic objective.

The scope of contribution and the pathways of change through which project outcomes contribute to impact of TMEA will be analysed in phase 2, under the Performance Evaluation. Deliverable 2C had already concluded that under SO1, TMEA has already been able to achieve (or goals are likely to be achieved in the near future) all strategic objectives which are under TMEA's control. Only the expected increase in trade volumes (not under TMEA's control) falls short.

TMEA has reached the stage where it should now have a critical mass of learning from the experience of institution building with trade enabling organisations as well as direct experience from working with business and civil society. It should now be working towards ensuring that the critical mass of projects that have been undertaken is translated into some evidence-based learning in supporting its future activities. In order to achieve this transition, TMEA needs to improve the accuracy and thoroughness of its data collection and monitoring processes and to have greater validation of the self-reported data. As TMEA becomes more of a learning organisation and less of a project facility, greater attention will need to be given to addressing the sustainability of the interventions undertaken, to prevent institutions- especially under SO2- becoming dependent on TMEA.

The following recommendations are all addressed at TMEA to be considered by the Board and implemented by the Secretariat.

1. Programme Documentation for Project Selection

- 1.1 TMEA has refined and improved the facility's strategy for engagement including review to the theory of change. To ensure that its projects remain relevant to country needs, there should be a regular review of the country strategy documentation especially in the case of Tanzania, a change in Government in 2015.
- 1.2 The programme documents to support TMEA interventions (PAR) were often incomplete in a number of respects. The business case for TMEA's intervention should include a value for money or cost-benefit calculation which sets out the justification for the TMEA budget and demonstrates the validity of the preferred option compared to other options. The budget should be supplemented by some preliminary indicators on how value for money will be assessed in terms of cost effectiveness, efficiency and economy.
- 1.3 There were many differences between budgets and indicators contained in the PARs and the quarterly/monitoring reports. It was sometimes unclear whether these differences were due to an inconsistency or that changes had been made to the programme. There needs to be a clear anchor and traceability for monitoring reports and explanation on changes to budgets, activities and indicators.

2. Addressing Sustainability

- 2.1 While TMEA should continue to fund small scale catalytic interventions, greater attention should be given to addressing the absorption capacity of the institution being supported. Further due diligence activity could have prevented TMEA having to undertake financial management changes during the course of the project. This has happened in both SO2 and SO3 projects.

- 2.2 Many interventions have led to follow on assistance and no cost extensions. While TMEA must set an ambitious scope and schedule for its interventions, greater attention should be given to setting the ambition and timelines for achieving success by setting more realistic indicators and timelines.
- 2.3 The sustainability of the institution supported may be recognised as being weak from the outset and whilst this should not be a barrier for TMEA engagement, there should be a greater ex ante understanding of the consequences on TMEA exit. This should be established in the programme document.

3. Monitoring Reports - Process and Validation

- 3.1 The quality of the monitoring reports presented varied between countries. Many of the reports supplied by the beneficiary contained information that was out of date or inaccurate. There are clear lessons for improvements in TMEA processes including ensuring that the reports received by the TMEA country office have been verified, fact checked and quality assured before they are sent to Nairobi.
- 3.2 For an external reader, the TMEA monitoring reports were thin and did not provide sufficient evidence of progress. There was generally insufficient narrative to describe the key issues addressed during the reporting period, reasons for the performance being behind schedule and key issues to be addressed in the following quarter.
- 3.3 Quarterly and annual reports should show the means of verification of the indicators reported against. Likewise, the monitoring plans should show the means of verification that would be required against each output or activity indicator.
- 3.4 Many of the monitoring frameworks had an uncomfortable inconsistency between **outputs**- the direct results of the key TMEA activity, and the wider **outcomes** which were partly outside of the TMEA project's control.
- 3.5 Consideration should be given to producing a TMEA monitoring strategy submitted to the TMEA Board and then supported by summary regular output performance updates presented to the TMEA Board.

4. Value for Money

- 4.1 The VFM should start with the project design (PAR documents) which currently pays insufficient attention to this. For example, there should be much analysis on how and what will be measured to track cost efficiency rather than a statement of intent which is little more than a platitude.
- 4.2 The VFM analysis in terms of efficiency should be tied to the results framework and activity costs which would then be able to track the unit costs of capacity building per individual trained or departments. VFM could then be reported on periodically.
- 4.3 Measuring overall cost effectiveness of SO2 projects in terms of their value is challenging. For example, the SCT project has as indicator at outcome level: The observed reduction in clearance and transit time (days): Northern Corridor -Mombasa to Kigali. (Baseline in 2010 - 21 days). Such Cost-Benefit calculations could be included in a VFM framework.
- 4.4 For SO3 project unit costs of support to individuals and/or institutions should also be analysed, but given that many of the SO3 projects have outcomes that are measurable in terms of value, more attention could be given to including some systematic reporting on cost effectiveness. For example, the cross-border trader projects should measure efficiency in terms of the unit cost of each trader supported but also measure cost effectiveness in terms of the estimated value of trade (and net income) generated by the informal traders.

5. Strategic Focus of SO3

- 5.1 TMEA projects scored very well on relevance for both SO2 and SO3. The range of possible intervention for both SO2 and SO3 remains very wide and as an institution TMEA's support is welcome, needed and the facility model is appropriate. However, given that the canvas of possible interventions in SO3 is so wide, there is a strong case to be made that there would be greater influence and achievement from TMEA actions if SO3 has a more narrow and strategic focus on export competitiveness. For example, TMEA could restrict its focus to trade standards, SCT and NTBs and then become a centre of excellence in the core areas of TMEA's mandate

Annexes

- Annex 1: Survey Questionnaire
- Annex 2(a): Output activity Mapping SO2
- Annex 2(b): Output activity Mapping SO3
- Annex 3: Interviewees and other information sources consulted
- Annex 4: Complete HEQ and DEQ responses from Deliverable 2D/E
- Annex 5: Completed Questionnaires for 40 projects (separate attachment)
- Annex 6: Description of Pathway Mapping
- Annex 7: Terms of Reference

Annex 1: Survey Questionnaire

TMEA effectiveness and outcome assessment (WS2) - questionnaire

Project title	
Project no	
Country	
Duration	
Status	
Total budget (committed)	
Strategic pillar	
Key objectives	

Number	Question	RAG	Notes for interviewer	Comments from site visit/project interviews
Relevance				
DEQ1.1 To what extent are TMEA projects' intended outputs generally consistent with the programme ToC?				
DEQ1.6 To what extent has TMEA been able to achieve expected outcomes (for finalised projects) and what is the general likelihood of ongoing projects achieving their outcomes?				
1.1.1	Are the intended objectives of the project consistent with the TMEA ToC?	Green	This is likely to be the same as the desk analysis unless the interlocutors feel otherwise. What matters here is the degree to which it is meeting the specific needs of the country/region.	
1.1.2	Are the intended objectives of the project consistent with the TMEA Country Strategy?	Amber	Leave blank if it is a regional programme	
1.1.3	Is the project meeting the priority trade enabling needs of the country as identified by project stakeholders?	Green	This is a judgement of the evaluators. It is very unlikely that the project will not be relevant but the stakeholders may have comments on the extent to which it was a priority of the trade enabling needs of the country (and these may differ from those identified in the TMEA Country Strategy). This question touches upon the Paris Declaration Principles.	
DEQ1.4 Who were/are the main beneficiaries of the outputs? Are there organisations or groups of people who are negatively affected by the outputs?				
1.4.1	Was an adequate assessment of the potential negative impacts of the intervention on specific target groups conducted ex ante?	Green	Was adequate consideration given to considering pro-poor/inclusion issues and or the potential negative consequences on key group.	
SECTION RATING		Amber	Red, Amber, Amber-Red, Green	
Effectiveness				
DEQ1.2 Were outputs achieved in accordance with plans/expectations and within budget? For ongoing projects, what is the likelihood of achieving the outputs targets within the project time-span?				
1.2.1	Are the intervention's outputs as designed likely to be achieved?		Note this is not about the satisfaction of the stakeholder, it is about the extent to which the intervention as designed was achieved: Exceed expectations; Met expectations; Partially achieved; Not achieved.	
1.2.1a		Exceeded expectations	Insert the key outputs from the results chain	
1.2.1b		Exceeded expectations	Insert the key outputs from the results chain	
1.2.1c		Met expectations	Insert the key outputs from the results chain	
1.2.1	Overall Achievement	Met expectations	This should be a summative assessment based on relative weighting and importance of outputs	
1.2.2	Have there been some achievements by the projects which were not expected or designed?	N/A	Note this is about any unintended consequences of the project. Yes, No, N/A	
DEQ1.3 What constraints were/are encountered in achieving the outputs? What are the main reasons for non-achievement of the outputs (if any)?				
1.3.1	Have the major expected external constraints in achieving the outputs been addressed effectively?		Constraints should be assessed in terms of the preparedness of the project to deal with known constraints and the extent to which there was an adequate risk mitigation strategy to deal with unexpected constraints. Exceed expectations; Met expectations; Partially achieved; Not achieved.	
Constraint 1		Met expectations	Populate from desk phase and risk management matrix	
1.3.2	Have the major unexpected external constraints in achieving the outputs been addressed effectively?		Constraints should be assessed in terms of the preparedness of the project to deal with known constraints and the extent to which there was an adequate risk mitigation strategy to deal with unexpected constraints. Exceed expectations; Met expectations; Partially achieved; Not achieved.	
Constraint 1		Met expectations	Populate from desk phase	
1.3.3	Have the major internal constraints been effectively managed in achieving the outputs?		Effectiveness of the management of the project. Exceed expectations; Meet expectations; Partially achieved; not achieved. Note if there were no internal constraints then this is green but we need to be forensic here to find out what is being hidden from us!	
Constraint 1		Met expectations		
1.3.4	Overall assessment of effectiveness in managing constraints	Partially achieved		
DEQ1.4 Who were/are the main beneficiaries of the outputs? Are there organisations or groups of people who are negatively affected by the outputs?				
1.4.1	Were potential negative impacts on key target groups adequately assessed in the design of the intervention?	No	Yes/No N/A. Note this question is not really relevant to projects such as support to standards or where there no identifiable beneficiaries	
1.4.2	How well were the negative consequences on target beneficiaries addressed by the intervention?		Very well managed; effectively managed (according to expectations); partially managed; Not managed	
Target Group 1		Effectively managed		
1.4.3	Were there any negative impacts on key target groups that should have been identified and addressed in the intervention but were not?	N/A	Yes/No/NA.. If Yes Comment	
DEQ1.5 To what extent have supported organisations (i.e. the implementing partners) built capacity and capability on relevant trade-related matters?				

DEQ1.5 To what extent have supported organisations (i.e. the implementing partners) built capacity and capability on relevant trade-related matters?				
1.5.1	Did capacity building a feature in the design of the intervention?		To a major extent, To a minor extent, No, N/A	
Capacity building 1		Exceeded expectations	Description of capacity building undertaken. Note we may categorise this into different types of training, coaching, technical transfer etc. Assess effectiveness according to whether it: Exceeded expectations; met expectations, partially met expectations, was inadequate.	
Capacity building 2		Exceeded expectations	Description of capacity building undertaken. Note we may categorise this into different types of training, coaching, technical transfer etc. Assess effectiveness according to whether it: Exceeded expectations; met expectations, partially met expectations, was inadequate.	
DEQ1.6 To what extent has TMEA been able to achieve expected outcomes (for finalised projects) and what is the general likelihood of ongoing projects achieving their outcomes?				
1.6.1	Are the outcomes as expected by the design of the intervention likely to be achieved?		Note this is not about the satisfaction of the stakeholder, it is about the extent to which the intervention as designed was achieved; Exceed expectations; Met expectations; Partially achieved; Not achieved.	
1.6.1b		Partially achieved	Insert the key outcomes from the results chain. N.B there should not be more than two	
1.6.2	Are there any unexpected outcomes as a result of the intervention?		Free text - note distinction from 1.2.2	
SECTION RATING		Green	Red, Amber, Amber-Red, Green	
Efficiency				
DEQ1.7 To what extent does TMEA have the management arrangements, systems, processes and human resources appropriate for carrying out its mission (i.e. how suitable are these for the purposes of carrying out its activities)?				
1.7.1	How well has TMEA support been managed? How would you describe your relationship with TMEA? What works best in your relationship with TMEA? What works less well in your relationship with TMEA? Are TMEA good communicators?	Managed according to expectations	Very well managed; managed according to expectations; some issues of concern; major concerns. N/A. Provide comments taking into account perspective of TMEA support to key project stakeholders.	
DEQ1.8 To what extent do TMEA's financial (including procurement), human resource and risk management processes enable it to efficiently and effectively manage its contractual relationships with implementing partners?				
1.8.1	How well has TMEA procurement been managed? What is your opinion of the TMEA processes and procedures relating to your project? Do they add value? Why?	Managed according to expectations	Very well managed; managed according to expectations; some issues of concern; major concerns. N/A. Provide comments taking into account perspective of TMEA procurement support to key project stakeholders.	
SECTION RATING		Green	Red, Amber, Amber-Red, Green	
Gender				
1.8.2	Are gender-sensitive strategies and implementation plans incorporated and reflected in the activity budget of the project?	Green		
1.8.3	Have gender-sensitive indicators, including impact indicators, been developed for monitoring and evaluation of the project? If not, will they be?	Amber	Specific means have been included to help ensure equitable control by women and men over the activity output. This should be completed as part of the desk phase and then validated in the field. Potential questions include: Do you monitor by gender? Do you have a gender policy?	
1.8.4	Have gender-sensitive consultation been carried out at all levels and stages of the project?	Green		
SECTION RATING		Green	Red, Amber, Amber-Red, Green	
Learning and Sustainability				
DEQ1.9 To what extent do the processes TMEA have in place promote organisational learning and sharing of good practices?				
What is the legacy? How will the project be managed after the TMEA project ends?				
DEQ1.10 Are the M&E tools and processes in place appropriate, both in regard to results and in regard to finances? How could they be strengthened?				
Comments				
SECTION RATING		Amber-Red	Red, Amber, Amber-Red, Green	
WS2B - Institutional assessment questions				
Q3: What is your opinion of TMEA as a regional trade agency? What does it do well? What could it do better? In your opinion, is TMEA perceived to be a credible and effective trade facilitator in east Africa and in your country? Why?				
Comments				
CONCLUSION AND OVERALL ASSESSMENT				
Summative rating of project	Green			
Comments				

Annex 2 (a): Output Activity per TMEA strategic impact and strategic outcome – SO2

This table shows the mapping of the number of project activities in each of the key areas within the strategic pillar. Note that each project will have a number of activities. See Deliverable 2A for more detail

SO2 – Trade Environment			OUTPUT ACTIVITY										
			Advocacy and policy advice – private sector-led	Advocacy and policy advice – public sector-led	Knowledge generation and studies	Institutional strengthening (soft)	Institutional strengthening (hardware)	Training and awareness creation	Provision of infrastructure	Direct services to final users	Explicit focus on gender	Explicit focus on environment	TOTAL
Nat.	Strategic Impacts	Efficient trade facilitation	0	4	1	95	11	63	0	46	0	0	220
		Improved EAC trade policy	0	21	26	111	11	68	0	6	0	0	243
		Reduced non-tariff barriers to trade	3	16	16	93	17	65	0	5	0	0	215
		Enabling	0	23	27	114	11	74	0	6	2	0	257
		Direct	3	20	18	194	29	131	0	53	0	0	448
	SUB-TOTAL		3	48	46	323	42	218	0	61	2	0	743
	Strategic Outcomes	Effective trade systems and procedures	0	4	1	95	11	63	0	46	0	0	220
		Improved national–regional implementation & coordination (movement of goods)	0	11	11	57	7	37	0	3	0	0	126
		Efficient national & regional NTB and standards mechanisms	3	16	16	93	17	65	0	5	0	0	215
		SUB-TOTAL		3	35	28	257	37	178	0	56	0	0
Reg.	Strategic Impacts	Efficient trade facilitation	0	2	17	33	0	23	0	25	0	0	100
		Improved EAC trade policy	0	10	19	47	11	27	1	12	0	0	127
		Enabling	0	9	16	40	11	23	1	12	0	0	112
		Direct	1	4	22	45	0	31	0	26	0	0	129
	SUB-TOTAL		1	13	38	85	11	54	1	38	0	0	241
	Strategic Outcomes	Effective trade systems and procedures	0	2	17	33	0	23	0	25	0	0	100
		Improved national–regional implementation and coordination (movement of goods)	0	10	19	47	11	27	1	12	0	0	127
SUB-TOTAL		1	13	38	85	11	54	1	38	0	0	241	

SO2 – Trade Environment			OUTPUT ACTIVITY										
			Advocacy and policy advice – private sector-led	Advocacy and policy advice – public sector-led	Knowledge generation and studies	Institutional strengthening (soft)	Institutional strengthening (hardware)	Training and awareness creation	Provision of infrastructure	Direct services to final users	Explicit focus on gender	Explicit focus on environment	TOTAL
Tot.	Strategic Impacts	Efficient trade facilitation	0	6	18	128	11	86	0	71	0	0	320
		Improved EAC trade policy	0	31	45	158	22	95	1	18	0	0	370
		Reduced non-tariff barriers to trade	4	17	18	98	17	69	0	6	0	0	229
		Enabling	0	32	43	154	22	97	1	18	2	0	369
		Direct	4	24	40	239	29	162	0	79	0	0	577
	SUB-TOTAL		4	61	84	408	53	272	1	99	2	0	984
	Strategic Outcomes	Effective trade systems and procedures	0	6	18	128	11	86	0	71	0	0	320
		Improved national–regional implementation and coordination (movement of goods)	0	21	30	104	18	64	1	15	0	0	253
		Efficient national and regional NTB and standards mechanisms	4	17	18	98	17	69	0	6	0	0	229
	SUB-TOTAL		4	48	66	342	48	232	1	94	0	0	835

Source: Compiled by the Evaluation Team based on TMEA MIS data as at 31 December 2016

Annex 2 (b): Output Activity per TMEA strategic impact and strategic outcome – SO3

SO3 – Business Competitiveness			OUTPUT ACTIVITY										TOTAL
			Advocacy and policy advice – Private Sector led	Advocacy and policy advice – Public Sector led	Knowledge generation and studies	Institutional strengthening (soft)	Institutional strengthening (hardware)	Training and awareness creation	Provision of infrastructure	Direct services to final users	Explicit focus on gender	Explicit focus on environment	
Nat.	Strategic Impacts	Enhanced business regulation for trade	93	1	6	64	2	61	0	11	40	0	278
		Improved export capability	14	1	1	28	1	42	0	20	4	0	111
		Enabling	93	1	6	64	2	61	0	11	40	0	278
		Direct	27	1	4	36	1	48	0	22	4	0	143
	SUB-TOTAL		123	4	10	109	4	109	0	33	47	0	439
	Strategic Outcomes	Private sector/Civil society-led policy formulation	67	1	1	44	0	31	0	4	2	0	150
		Strengthen export capabilities	8	1	0	25	1	31	0	15	3	0	84
		Improved processes for traders, esp. for women	26	1	5	20	2	30	0	7	38	0	129
	SUB-TOTAL		120	10	10	101	3	109	0	33	44	0	430
	Reg.	Strategic Impacts	Enhanced business regulation for trade	18	2	11	15	1	17	0	3	9	0
Improved export capability			28	0	0	15	0	10	0	7	3	0	63
Enabling			18	2	11	15	1	17	0	3	9	0	76
Direct			29	0	4	16	0	15	0	10	3	0	77
SUB-TOTAL		49	2	15	36	1	34	0	13	12	0	162	
Strategic Outcomes		Private sector/Civil society-led policy formulation	11	1	9	10	0	3	0	0	0	0	34
		Increased trade in service	13	0	0	11	0	6	0	0	2	0	32
		Improved processes for traders, esp. for women	2	0	1	1	0	6	0	3	2	0	15
SUB-TOTAL		49	2	15	36	1	34	0	13	12	0	162	

TMEA evaluation – Deliverable 2D/2E

Tot.	Strategic Impacts	Enhanced business regulation for trade	111	3	17	79	3	78	0	14	49	0	354
		Improved export capability	42	1	1	43	1	52	0	27	7	0	174
		Enabling	111	3	17	79	3	78	0	14	49	0	354
		Direct	56	1	8	52	1	63	0	32	7	0	220
	SUB-TOTAL		172	6	25	145	5	143	0	46	59	0	601
	Strategic Outcomes	Private sector/Civil society-led policy formulation	78	2	10	54	0	34	0	4	2	0	184
		Strengthen export capabilities	15	1	0	27	1	34	0	22	4	0	104
		Improved processes for traders, esp. for women	28	1	6	21	2	36	0	10	40	0	144
	SUB-TOTAL		169	12	25	137	4	143	0	46	56	0	592

Source: Compiled by the Evaluation Team based on TMEA MIS data as at 31 December 2016

Annex 3: Stakeholders Consulted

No.	Resp Centre / Programme		Project Title	Partner	Contact Person	Position / Title	Other Stakeholders / Project Beneficiaries and Contact Person
1	SO 2 Regional Programme	SO2	Northern Corridor Transport Observatory	Northern Corridor Transit and Transport Coordination Authority (NCTTCA)	Aloys Rusagara	Head of Programme Transport Policy & Planning	Kenya Revenue Authority (KRA) Kenya Maritime Authority (KMA) Shippers Council of East Africa (SCEA)
2	TMEA EAC Partnership Programme	SO2	EAC Secretariat VC equipment	EAC Secretariat	Jesca Eriyo	DSG, F&A	Ministry East African Community - Edith Mwanje (Permanent Secretary, MEAC Uganda) ICT Policy Center - George Okado (Independent Consultant)
3	TMEA EAC Partnership Programme	SO2	EAC financial, audit and procurement systems and processes	EAC Secretariat	Jesca Eriyo	DSG, F&A	ICT Policy Center - George Okado (Independent Consultant)
4&5	SO 3 Regional Programme	SO3	EABC institutional and advocacy support & EABC Phase II	East Africa Business Council (EABC)	Lilian Awinja	Executive Director	Tanzania Private Sector Foundation (TPSF) - Godfrey Simbeye (Executive Director) Rwanda Private Sector Federation (RPSF) - Gerard Mkubu (Head of Policy Advocacy) Uganda Clearing Industry and forwarding Association - Kassim Omar (Chairman) Burundi Federal Chamber of Commerce and Industry - Niyutunga Salvator (Ag. Secretary General)

No.	Resp Centre / Programme		Project Title	Partner	Contact Person	Position / Title	Other Stakeholders / Project Beneficiaries and Contact Person
6&7	Kenya Country Programme	SO3	Kenya trade logistics & investment climate - KEPSA 2 & Kenya trade logistics and investment climate	Kenya Private Sector Alliance (KEPSA)	Victor Ogalo	Programme Manager - Advocacy	Kenya Association of Manufacturers (KAM) - Dalmas Okendo (Head of Operations) Shippers Council of East Africa (SCEA) - Gilbert Langat (CEO) Fresh Produce Exporters Association of Kenya (FPEAK) - Boniface Mulandi (Programme Manager)
8	SO 3 Regional Programme	SO3	Consolidating Gains for Women Traders in EAC	East African Sub-regional Support Initiative for the Advancement of Women (EASSI)	Christine Nankubuge	Program Director	Cereal Trader at Busia Kenya - Lucy Anyango Cross Border Association for Women at Mutukula - Benouza Jane (Chairperson) Taveta Women Crossborder Association - Rachael Mutuku (Chairperson)
9	Uganda Country Programme	SO3	National Logistics platform	National Logistics Platform (NLP)	Chairperson	Merian Sebunya	Uganda Freight Forwarders Association - Jennifer Mwijukye (Chairperson)
10&11	Rwanda & Tanzania Country Programme	all SO3	PROFEMME- women ICBT empowerment & Capacity Building to Women Cross Border Traders in Tanzania	Profemmes (Rwanda), Tanzania Women Chamber of Commerce (Tanzania)	Chantal Umuhoza Mwajuma Hamza	Project coordinator - Profemme Programme Manager	Chamber of Women Entrepreneurs (Rwanda) - Agnes Samputu (Director)
12	Burundi Country Programme	SO3	Enhancing Private Sector Capability to Influence Trade Policy Formulation and Implementation	Burundi Federal Chamber of Commerce (CFCIB)	Salvator Niyitunga	Secretary General	
13&14	Uganda Country Programme	all SO3	Strengthening SEATINI'S institutional capacity for enhancing CSO'S strategic engagement on the EAC Regional Integration Process & SEATTINI-upgrading quality standards	Southern and Eastern African Trade, Information and Negotiations Institute (SEATINI)	Jane Nalunga	Country Director	Nakaseke Maize Farmer - Kirabira George Amuru Sesame Farmer - Santa Joyce Laker

No.	Resp Centre / Programme		Project Title	Partner	Contact Person	Position / Title	Other Stakeholders / Project Beneficiaries and Contact Person
15	TMEA EAC Partnership Programme	SO2	Single customs territory	EAC Secretariat	Kenneth Bagamuhunda	Director, Customs	EAC Revenue Authorities (Uganda, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania & Burundi)
16	Tanzania Country Programme	SO2	MEAC coordination and leadership	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and East African Cooperation	Amb. Dr Aziz Mlima	Permanent Secretary	Ministry of Industry, Trade and Investment - Prof. Adolf Mkenda (PS, Trade and Investment) Tanzania Private Sector Foundation (TPSF) - Godfrey Simbeye (Executive Director) Foundation for Civil Society (FCS) - Francis Kiwanga (Executive Director)
17&18	Rwanda Country Programme	SO2 and SO3	RBS institutional capacity strengthened & Direct support to SMEs for product certification (RBS)	Rwanda Standards Board	Raymond Murenzi	Director General RSB	British Standard Institute - Shyam Kumar Gujadhur (Team Leader RSB project) Bakhressa Grain Milling - Julius Ndunga (Milling Manager) Blessed Diaries - Milton Ngirent (Managing Director)
19	Burundi Country Programme	SO2	OBR: Long term technical advisers, incl. security costs	Office Burundais des Recettes (OBR)			
20	Kenya Country Programme	SO2	Kenya Revenue Authority - customs management systems	Kenya Revenue Authority	Susan Wanjohi	Chief Manager - Customs Reforms and Modernisation	

Annex 4: Full HEQ and DEQ responses for output-level assessment (SO2 & SO3)

Criterion	DEQ	SO2 Enhanced Trade Environment - Full Deliverable 2D/E responses	SO2 Quality of contribution RAG score	SO3 Improved Business Competitiveness - Full Deliverable 2D/E responses	SO3 Quality of contribution RAG score
Relevance	1.1	<p>To what extent are TMEA projects' intended outputs generally consistent with the programme TOC?</p> <p>16 out of 20 projects received green for relevance. Broadly, programmes were consistent with the TMEA ToC. In cases where they were not, it included non-relevant capacity-building to a trade institution (i.e. the EAC), or was a result of the re-examination of the TMEA ToC in 2014. There is a question mark over the extent to which TMEA should provide non-relevant capacity-building to trade institutions, which should be assessed going into the new phase.</p> <p>16 out of 20 projects received green for relevance. Broadly, programmes were consistent with the TMEA ToC. In cases where they were not, it included non-relevant capacity-building to a trade institution (i.e. the EAC), or was a result of the re-examination of the TMEA ToC in 2014. There is a question mark over the extent to which TMEA should provide non-relevant capacity-building to trade institutions, which should be assessed going into the new phase.</p>	GREEN	<p>The SO3 portfolio covers a wide spectrum of activities from advocacy on trade and economic integration to supporting companies meet trading standards. There has also been a major emphasis on working with lower income and often informal women traders. However, some projects had questionable relevance for TMEA, primarily because they appeared to be market-development projects concentrating on a single industry without a particularly concentrated trade focus. Other projects expanded into access to finance, which is not relevant for TMEA. This is partly a result of the broad range of activities which fall under the mandate of improving business competitiveness, and TMEA's status as a demand-led institution, which means there is, to a certain extent, a lack of coherence in TMEA SO3 projects. Clarifying further what specifically does not fall under the TMEA mandate (as was previously done with access to finance) would lend further coherence. That should be a goal for TMEA, as it allows for greater evaluability and specialisation. This is perhaps particularly the case with SO3 projects, which sometimes branch out into projects more akin to traditional market-systems-development projects. There are many institutions which carry out market-systems-development projects, and much fewer who focus on trade-enabling activities. TMEA should operate in its area of expertise and aim to further build specialisation there.</p>	AMBER
	1.4	<p>Who were/are the main beneficiaries of the outputs? Are there organisations or groups of people who are negatively affected by the outputs?</p> <p>The main beneficiaries or recipients of assistance of SO2 projects were national ministries, standards agencies and parastatals. In some cases, the beneficiaries were arguably not relevant to TMEA's mandate e.g. MEAC in Tanzania. There was very little assessment of potential negative impacts on specific target groups, although in projects which mainly focused on technical assistance to public institutions the groups which could lose out are less readily apparent. TMEA is, in intentional design, partly demand-led, responding to requests from partner organisations for assistance. This has resulted in cases where the partner organisation or recipient of assistance was not the most relevant possible body.</p>	GREEN	<p>From the projects reviewed there is a very good portfolio mix of meeting industry sector needs and trade associations. Few negative impacts of the projects were recorded and the inclusivity of a number of projects should be commended. For example, the cross-border trader project in Tanzania (1138) brought the women's husbands into the training to address wider gender issues of asset control.</p>	GREEN

Criterion	DEQ	SO2 Enhanced Trade Environment - Full Deliverable 2D/E responses	SO2 Quality of contribution RAG score	SO3 Improved Business Competitiveness - Full Deliverable 2D/E responses	SO3 Quality of contribution RAG score	
Effectiveness	1.2	<p>Were outputs achieved in accordance with plans/expectations and within budget? For ongoing projects, what is the likelihood of achieving the output targets within the project timespan?</p>	<p>Most projects will achieve their outputs though a key issue across most SO2 projects has been a lack of institutional capacity and general delays in the completion of activities caused by the multi-stakeholder, multi-country aspect of the projects.</p> <p>There were very few cases of achievements that were not expected which again reflects the activities undertaken under SO2. In a number of cases the capacity building initiatives had to be changed during the course of implementation</p> <p>Across all projects, extending timelines and allowing more room for inevitable delays would, if not directly lead to more effective projects, at least allow for more realistic project management.</p>	<p>GREEN</p>	<p>Projects have generally scored well on effectiveness with 14 out of 20 scoring good and only 6 scoring amber. There are no projects with any major concerns on outputs achieved. The evaluators have recognised that most outputs were not achieved on schedule but have not marked the projects down for delayed completion. Most of the stakeholders have reported that the projects had a very strong and successful capacity building component and are achieving successful outcomes.</p> <p>As with SO2, this may be a case of setting more realistic timelines, which would enable more effective project and portfolio management.</p>	<p>GREEN</p>
	1.3	<p>What constraints were/are encountered in achieving the outputs? What are the main reasons for non-achievement of the outputs (if any)?</p>	<p>There were major political constraints encountered in the implementation of project activities related to the fragile state status of two of the countries (Burundi and South Sudan). While the timing of events is unexpected, TMEA is cognisant of the political landscape of the region and persevered with activities in South Sudan in spite of the fragile situation. In other countries, political constraints continued to have an effect, if not as severe.</p> <p>Other key issues delaying project implementation was the change in Government in Tanzania which put on hold most of the SO2 activities as MEAC merged with the Department of Foreign Affairs.</p> <p>TMEA has been very wary of using any of their political influence to try and resolve political constraints, and has maintained a strict policy of neutrality and non-interference. It is possible that they could do more to try and lift political constraints on projects without compromising their position as an independent body.</p>	<p>AMBER</p>	<p>There were major political constraints encountered in the implementation of project activities related to the fragile state status of two of the countries (Burundi and South Sudan).</p> <p>Other key issues delaying project implementation was the change in Government in Tanzania which put on hold a number of SO2 activities but also affected SO3. Internal capacity constraints also hindered project implementation and, in some cases, TMEA had to provide extensive additional support.</p>	<p>AMBER</p>
	1.5	<p>To what extent have supported organisations (i.e. the implementing partners) built capacity and capability on relevant trade-related matters?</p>	<p>Many of the SO2 projects had the ambition to take on ambitious trade enabling activities which required multiple government and stakeholder engagement (e.g. 223 Single Customs Territory).</p> <p>A typical feature of these projects is the multiplicity of technical and ICT tasks undertaken involving a range of stakeholders, and while capacity building was a major feature of these projects, it was typically conducted to accompany a range of other activities.</p>	<p>GREEN</p>	<p>There has been a very strong component of capacity building in the SO3 portfolio and the results have been effective though the key question remains on the overall sustainability of some of the partners supported (e.g. with UWEA, as described above).</p>	<p>GREEN</p>
	1.6	<p>To what extent has TMEA been able to achieve expected outcomes (for finalised</p>	<p>SO2 outcomes have already been achieved or are likely to be achieved, with exception of the efforts regarding the harmonisation of standards. No information is available regarding the progress towards the expected approval of</p>	<p>GREEN</p>	<p>All expected outcome targets have been achieved already in 2016 or are likely to be achieved still during TMEA I, with exception of the gender targets. The TMEA results framework does not provide information regarding</p>	<p>AMBER</p>

Criterion	DEQ	SO2 Enhanced Trade Environment - Full Deliverable 2D/E responses	SO2 Quality of contribution RAG score	SO3 Improved Business Competitiveness - Full Deliverable 2D/E responses	SO3 Quality of contribution RAG score
		projects) and what is the general likelihood of ongoing projects achieving their outcomes?		income increase of small traders (since this has not been measured) but anecdotal evidence from the qualitative field work for this evaluation suggests that such an increase does exist. The impact evaluation of TMEA's effects on trade growth and poverty reduction, to be conducted in 2018, will provide additional information.	
Efficiency	1.7	To what extent does TMEA have the management arrangements, systems, processes and human resources appropriate for carrying out its mission (i.e. how suitable are these for the purposes of carrying out its activities)?	GREEN	TMEA was able to step and provide expertise on internal risk and financial management, which in several cases was necessary. In some cases, activities were outsourced to TMEA, an arrangement which appeared to work well. These arrangements and continued support enabled TMEA to work with smaller and more specialised institutions, which was a positive outcome. However, as with SO2, the high level of support did raise question marks over sustainability and independence.	GREEN
	1.8	To what extent do TMEA's financial (including procurement), human resource and risk management processes enable it to efficiently and effectively manage its contractual relationships with implementing partners?	GREEN	TMEA managed procurement for most SO3 projects. There was a mixed reaction to this – some projects appreciated the assistance in managing large procurement contracts, but others were less positive based on TMEA's heightened risk and quality assurance procedures.	GREEN
Sustainability and learning	1.9	To what extent do the processes TMEA has in place promote organisational learning and sharing of good practices?	AMBER	TMEA had appeared to help build relationships between small organisations performing similar activities in different countries, and had helped organise conferences bringing together beneficiaries. However, monitoring systems were weak and reports contained little useful information. This is partly a result of working with smaller institutions in SO3 with limited experience in monitoring. TMEA has developed guidelines to help partners, but they appear to be limited in effectiveness.	AMBER

Criterion	DEQ	SO2 Enhanced Trade Environment - Full Deliverable 2D/E responses	SO2 Quality of contribution RAG score	SO3 Improved Business Competitiveness - Full Deliverable 2D/E responses	SO3 Quality of contribution RAG score
		would be easier to share information and best practices amongst similar projects, as well as accurately see what best practices actually consist of – given that monitoring is so weak at the moment, it is difficult to tell what is working and what isn't.			
	1.10	Are the M&E tools and processes in place appropriate, both in regard to results and in regard finances? How could they be strengthened?	Projects frequently had very poor monitoring reports, with inadequate indicators and limited narrative explanation. These reports did not appear to have undergone quality assurance by TMEA.	AMBER	Monitoring was weak, with reports offering little value or indication of project implementation. Partners also appeared to struggle with setting up monitoring frameworks, and indicated that they took too much time and resources.
Gender	4.5	To what extent has the programme benefited women and girls (noting that the programme design did not purport to benefit them equally)? Have there been any negative consequences for women and girls? Has the programme had an impact on relations, including power and influence, between girls/women and boys/men? How could the programme increase benefits to women and girls within its trade focus?	To start answering this question, TMEA projects need to start collecting gender-disaggregated data in a much more systematic way. Although there is now centralised data collection by the Gender Unit on training participation by gender, on an individual basis projects rarely make any attempt to gather any kind of gender-disaggregated data. Gender is also rarely mentioned in project design documents. TMEA could also attempt to use their influence to mainstream gender within the partner organisations where they work. As a starting point, that means collecting data on the number of women at each position.	AMBER	The comments made with reference to SO3 and gender are broadly valid here; TMEA projects need to start collecting gender-disaggregated data to answer this question. For projects which do actively target women, there is clear evidence of major benefits for women that are helping to increase their influence and power and help address gender imbalances. However, in those projects the lack of data on men for outcome and impact indicators makes it difficult to evaluate the extent of continuing gender discrimination.

Annex 5: Completed Questionnaires for 40 projects

See separate attachment.


Annex 6: Description of Pathway Mapping

In addition to mapping outputs (Deliverable 2A) and results (this report, with detail in Annex 5), the evaluation team also worked to trace the transmission pathways along which TMEA’s intervention logic was designed to work. That logic is contained to some extent in the TMEA ToC, but this document was under-specified; the TMEA RF went a long way to detailing how the projects were expected to combine to achieve those intermediate programme goals. Using the RF and the evaluation field data, the evaluation team began to trace the finer-grained results chains leading to the programme’s intermediate outcomes. These were dubbed pathways, as a metaphor for the causal logic implied in each: taking well-planned steps towards intermediate outcomes but also, ultimately, towards the programme’s strategic outcomes. What sits at the apex of each of these pathways are intermediate outcomes, which are measured by a set of indicators that have largely been met. What is yet to be tested is the degree to which those indicators were achieved as a result of TMEA efforts.

The evaluation team examined this “missing middle” by reconstructing the actual achievements of the intervention logic, and to the extent possible with the available data, to begin to examine whether the main transmission pathways resulted as planned. This initial analysis will be fleshed out in the Performance Evaluation in 2018-2019, following additional fieldwork to test the hypothetical results chains posited by the TMEA Strategy 1 framework.¹³

As is common in international development programming, TMEA projects are structured in logic models or frameworks that include inputs, outputs and outcomes. Each project has direct control over its inputs (e.g., training curricula and transportation funds for participants), and controls its own outputs to a high degree (e.g., numbers of participants trained). Outcomes are higher-order results that the project seeks, over which the project does not have complete control (e.g., participants’ use of their learning in their work). However, TMEA attempts to influence these outcomes by designing projects with the outcomes clearly in mind, and complementary activities (within one project, or across a set or cluster of projects) designed to ensure outcomes are achieved. In the training example above, this might mean following-up with trainees to provide mentorship, advocacy for the adoption of favourable policy and incentives for desired behaviours, or parallel activities in individual and institutional reform. The simple diagram that follows shows that flow.

Figure 16: Project level framework



The TMEA programme is similarly structured, but from a macro viewpoint, and with a greater number of levels,¹⁴ as detailed in its Results Framework (RF). TMEA has greater control at the lower levels of their logic model, which is the level of inputs. Individual projects are aggregated in clusters (which might be called Programme Inputs, in the mirrored structure) that are designed to lead towards common aims, known as Programme Outputs, for which TMEA has a good measure of control. These


¹³ Further description of the efforts used for this initial pathway mapping are contained in Annex 6.

¹⁴ The number of levels is also somewhat variable across the three Strategic Objectives.

Programme Outputs, in turn, lead to Programme Intermediate Outcomes, which are only partly under the control of the Programme: exogenous factors will affect the degree to which these are achieved.

The following figure shows how projects are clustered as Programme Inputs, leading to Outputs, and, per the intervention logic, the Programme Intermediate Outcome.


Figure 17: TMEA programme-level framework



This structure is repeated for the different TMEA Strategic Objectives, and multiplied for the country and regional programmes, which feed the shared goals of the corporate TMEA framework, while also remaining accountable at national levels to country stakeholders.


This evaluation examines this framework by what we call pathways: clusters of projects designed to achieve programme outputs that in turn lead to one Programme Intermediate Outcome as shown in Figure 18.

Figure 18: A pathway within the framework



Some pathways are divided into sub-pathways when there is more than one programme output, and projects are designed to meet different programme outputs. Figure 19 shows this relationship.

Figure 19: Sub-pathways as part of a pathway



If all the Programme Intermediate Outcomes are achieved, these will aggregate to reach each of TMEA’s Strategic Objectives, though it should be said that at this level, outcomes are increasingly affected by factors external to TMEA and outside their direct control. Still, marked progress towards the Strategic Objectives would demonstrate that, to some extent, the assumptions underpinning the programme logic have been upheld. If TMEA achieves its three Strategic Objectives, these will combine in the desired Impact of Increased Trade.

Looking at each Strategic Objective, for which TMEA’s work is evaluated, we see that each one is slightly different in the number of levels it employs. The pathways analysis conducted for this evaluation is based on the overarching intervention logic from the RF. Each Strategic Objective is defined in the RF and a structure shows which projects contribute to which Programme Intermediate Outcomes, which in turn contribute to the Strategic Objective. The first SO is shown in Figure 20, below.

SO1 is increased physical access to markets. This objective has one Programme Intermediate Outcome, and a set of programme outputs that contribute to that outcome. The inputs to the Programme, as detailed above, are clusters of relevant projects. Figure 20 below shows the set of

projects that add up to achieve the programme outputs in SO1, which are in turn designed to reach the Programme Intermediate Outcome. (Similar tables are included at the end of this annex for SO2 and SO3.)

Figure 20: Intervention Logic for Strategic Objective 1: Increased physical access to markets

Intervention logic		
IMPACT		Increased trade
Strategic Objective 1		Increased physical access to markets
PROGRAMME INTERMEDIATE OUTCOME		1.1 Improved implementation of transport laws and enhanced capacity and efficiency of transport infrastructure
PROGRAMME OUTPUTS		PROGRAMME INPUTS (PROJECTS)
1.1.1	One Stop Border Posts constructed with integrated one stop border processes operational	OSBP construction: 1511 Kagitumba, 1512 Mirama Hills, 1513 Mutukula, 1514 Mutukula, 1515 Holili, 1516 Taveta, 1517 Busia, 1518 Busia, 1111 Tunduma, 1112 Kabanga, 1311 Kobero, 1412 Nimule, 1041 Elegu, Kagitumba bridge construction, Mirama Road construction OSBP IBM: 1113 Holili, 1120 Mutukula, 1124 Tunduma, 1125 Kabanga, 0913 Taveta, 0928 Busia, 0938 Malaba, 1219 Kagitumba, 1053 Mirama, 1060 Mutukula, 1062 Busia, 1059 Elegu, 1061 Malaba, 1338 Kobero, 1417 Nimule 0911 Mombasa Port, 0931 Mombasa Port Reform Dialogue, 0939 Mombasa port productivity improvements, 0940 Mombasa port legal and regulatory reform, 0942 Port Reitz road improvement 1127 Dar es Salaam Port, 1115 Dar Port Productivity Improvements and Reforms, 1127 Dar es Salaam port infrastructure works, 1139 Dar Port Productivity and reforms - Phase 2, 1140 Dar port infrastructure works - Phase 2
1.1.2	Gender action plans with budgets developed for selected/targeted OSBPs	
1.1.3	Infrastructure upgrading completed	
1.1.4	Resilient Infrastructure Project delivered	
1.1.5	Productivity improvements completed	
1.1.6	Institutional Reform projects implemented	
1.1.7	Single Window System developed and operational	
1.1.8	Infrastructure upgrading completed	
1.1.9	Environment improvements delivered	
1.1.10	Support towards institutional reforms delivered	
1.1.11	Productivity Program delivered	

The analysis carried out for Phase I of the evaluation follows this logic, from the Programme Inputs (cluster of projects) to Programme Outputs, and their aggregation to reach the Programme Intermediate Outcome. This pattern, which OPM called a pathway for the purposes of this exercise, involves two important steps: one from Programme Inputs to Programme Outputs, and another from Programme Outputs to one Programme Intermediate Outcome.¹⁵

Project outputs and outcomes are much more under TMEA’s control. TMEA selects and contracts implementers for the projects, oversees them, and can monitor, measure, and redirect the efforts of the cluster of projects, including redirecting resources, based on the evidence of success, challenges, and emerging entry points in the projects. In fact, it is their responsibility to do so, with the goal of ensuring the achievement of their Programme Outputs.

The pathway analysis examined the cluster of projects designed to achieve each Programme Output,¹⁶ and their indicators at project and aggregate levels, as available. The evaluation team has the detailed data on a set of site visit projects (40 in total), a set of desk review projects (an additional 20), TMEA’s RF data, and trade expertise of the team on which to base its judgements on the necessity and sufficiency of the clusters of projects, how well the indicators measure progress, and

¹⁵ Each Programme Intermediate Outcome has its own pathway in this evaluation. Some pathways are simple, with one project cluster leading to one Programme Output. Others have what we call here “sub-pathways”, which means that there are two or more clusters of projects, designed to achieve two or more distinct Programme Outputs.

¹⁶ Where there were multiple Programme Outputs in a given pathway, these are divided into sub-pathways and analysed first separately and then taken together. In these cases, sub-pathways were described and analysed in a narrative.

other activities that TMEA might well have included, and why. The pathway narratives discussed how programme inputs (i.e., projects) were intended to combine to produce the programme outputs.

The pathway documents go on to provide tables of the project outcome expectations and progress (per the TMEA RF and the evaluation case study data, as available). Then, the pathway analysis discusses evidence around the degree of achievement of programme outputs according to the TMEA RF. This table sums the achievements by country and regionally against TMEA's own set of outputs and related indicators.

The accompanying narrative then discusses the necessity¹⁷ of the set of projects within the TMEA country and regional context, and the extent to which the cluster of projects is sufficient to achieve the programme outputs. Necessity is used in this context to estimate the degree to which a cluster of projects (in a sub-pathway or pathway) was necessary for reaching the expected outputs. Where some projects are deemed not necessary, their inputs and outputs would be removed from the analysis. Sufficiency is the evaluation team's determination of whether the cluster of projects undertaken in a given pathway or sub-pathway were sufficient to reach the Programme Intermediate Outcome to which the project cluster was to have contributed. This is discussed narratively but not rated. The evaluation team, in conjunction with DFID and TMEA, found that more data collection would be necessary to make clear judgements. For this reason, the pathways analysis is to be used as an input to the 2018-2019 Performance Evaluation.

Evaluating the next step,¹⁸ from Programme Outputs to the Programme Intermediate Outcome, was even more challenging. There are a greater number of assumptions underlying the progress along that part of the pathway – collaboration from government and private sector, for example, or stable economic conditions. Weather, building materials availability and cost, and relevant legislation are factors over which TMEA has little or no control, but which can easily affect the completion of port infrastructure upgrading or border post integration, for example.

The pathway analysis looked at this step and its attendant indicators with more in-depth input from the evaluation team's trade expertise. The next level higher in TMEA's RF includes intermediate outcomes that are also measured with a set of indicators. These are arrayed in a table in the pathway analysis to show the range of data from different countries and the regional programme.

The pathway analysis continues with a narrative discussion of necessity and sufficiency parallel to that discussed above, but at one higher level of the TMEA RF.

Employing contextual expertise at this step allows the team to unpack and study the underlying assumptions, in some degree, and compare the actual situation to the plan as part of the analysis. In this way, the team's judgement was incorporated into a model not unlike contribution analysis, to put forth reasonable conclusions on the degree to which the results have materialised on the basis of TMEA's interventions, and any unintended consequences that should be brought to light. Where there was more than one Programme Output in a given pathway, these steps were repeated for each Programme Output (sub-pathway) and then summarized at the end of the pathway analysis.

There are difficulties in the data used for this evaluation. First, TMEA indicator quality is variable: some are appropriate and complete in terms of measuring progress towards Programme Intermediate

¹⁷ Necessity and sufficiency are first discussed in T. Delahais and J. Toulemonde (2012) Applying contribution analysis: Lessons from five years of practice, *Evaluation* 18: 281-293. The authors later describe application in T. Delahais and J. Toulemonde (2017): *Making rigorous causal claims in a real-life context*. *Evaluation*, 23(4) 370 –388

¹⁸ The evaluation team also call these "arrows," referring to the implicit transmission mechanism from a box in the RF at one level, connected by an arrow to the box in the RF at the next higher level. The use of the word "arrow" in the pathway documents reflects the idea brought to the fore by E. Jane Davidson, leading evaluation theorist and practitioner, who reminds evaluators to *beware the unexplained arrow* (paraphrased from conference proceedings).

Outcomes. Others are less so.¹⁹ Second, OPM evaluation and/or TMEA RF data are not uniformly strong in each pathway: for example, there may be fewer projects in a given pathway or sub-pathway that fell within the evaluation sample, giving less detailed information. TMEA's data are also more complete in some pathways and sub-pathways than in others, where targets or other comparators, updated or cumulative data are missing; indicators do not tie directly or comprehensively to the activities they are supposed to measure; indicators are numeric to show progress on highly context-dependent and subjective subjects (like "numbers of laws or rules passed").²⁰ Third, the evaluation data lack information about the full range of stakeholders potentially affected by the TMEA interventions. As a result of any or a combination of these difficulties, the confidence the evaluation team could have in a given pathway analysis was affected.

As an exercise, pathway mapping was useful for the evaluation team to plot out the projects against the RF design, and begin to compare that to best practices and industry expertise in the various content areas of TMEA. The original intention – to use this exercise to estimate TMEA contribution to outcomes – was not possible.

Figure 21: Intervention Logic for SO2: Facilitating trade

Intervention logic		
IMPACT		Increased trade
Strategic Objective 2		Enhanced regulatory trade environment
STRATEGIC OUTCOME		2 Increased ease of trading across borders
PROGRAMME INTERMEDIATE OUTCOMES	2.1	Strengthened EAC regional trade integration capacity
	2.2	Effective trade systems, agencies & procedures
	2.3	Efficient implementation of national and regional NTB mechanisms
	2.4	Effective regional and national framework for managing trading standards across the EAC
PROGRAMME OUTPUTS		PROGRAMME INPUT (PROJECTS)
2.1.1	Support towards the EAC Partner State compliance with EAC Common Market Legislation Programmes developed and delivered	0223 Single customs territory
2.1.2	Support for EAC Strategy for negotiating & implementing the Tripartite Free Trade Agreement delivered	0917 MEAC coordination and leadership, 1048 MEACA coordination and leadership, 1119 MEAC coordination and leadership, 1215 MINEAC coordination and leadership, 1321 MDAs RI implementation
2.1.3	Support towards the development and operationalisation of the EAC implementation online monitoring and reporting systems delivered	
2.1.4	Support towards the development and implementation of the SCT Framework delivered	0223 Single customs territory
2.2.1	Single Window Information for Trade Systems (SWIFTs) for key trade processes and procedures developed and support towards operationalisation delivered	SWIFT Portals: 0132 FEAFFA, 0133 KSC, 0134 Kenya Transporters Association, 0135 Uganda Min Agriculture, 0136 Uganda National Bureau of Standards, 0137 Uganda National Drug Authority, 0138 Tanzania Food & Drug Authority, 1114a Tanzania Min Agriculture, Rwanda Min Agriculture
2.2.2	National Customs Management System developed and support towards operationalisation delivered	1312 OBR ASYCUDA roll out, 1044a URA ASYCUDA World implementation, 1411 Customs management reforms, 0927 Kenya Revenue Authority - customs management systems
2.2.3	National Electronic Trade Single Window Systems developed and operationalisation support delivered	1237 ESW and upgrade of CMS, 1312 OBR Asycuda roll out, 1044 URA Customs Business Systems Enhancement Project
2.2.4	Electronic Cargo Tracking System (ECTs) installed and support towards operationalisation delivered	1056 Uganda electronic cargo tracking system
2.3.1	National and regional NTB reporting and monitoring mechanisms/systems established and support towards operationalisation delivered	1045 Uganda NTB National Monitoring Committee (Ug), 1319 - Burundi NTB National Monitoring Committee (Br), 1118 - NTB National Monitoring Committee (Tz), 0930 - Trade facilitation,

¹⁹ The DfID Annual Reviews in 2016 and 2017 provide detail on problems in the Results Framework.

²⁰ These data challenges parallel those highlighted in great detail in the 2017 DfID Annual Review.

Intervention logic		
2.3.2	Technical support towards development and dissemination of Research and Position papers on removal of outstanding NTBs delivered	including NTBs and NMCs (Ke), 1213 - Rwanda NTB national monitoring committee established, 1414 - NTB national monitoring committee
2.4.1	Technical support towards the development of the SQMT policy, review of the Standards Act & development of the Technical regulations framework delivered	0916 Kenya Reform of standards regulatory framework and SQMT 0919 Kenya Fresh produce small holders EAGAP certification, 1212 Rwanda RBS institutional capacity strengthened, 1247 Rwanda
2.4.2	National Bureau of Standards testing facilities upgraded	Improved Quality Standards-RALIS/MINAGRI, 1413 South Sudan Bureau of Standards established, 1071 Uganda SEATTINI-upgrading quality standards, 1117 Tanzania TBS testing, 1317 Burundi BBN Standards testing, 0923 Regional EATTA tea quality standards, 0127 Regional Standards harmonization, 0428 Regional EA standards platform, 0451 Regional Support EA Standards Platform
2.4.3	Support towards the development and operationalisation of Mutual Recognition Agreements/framework of Product Standards and conformity testing delivered	

Figure 22: Intervention Logic for SO3: Enhanced business competitiveness

Intervention logic		
IMPACT		Increased trade
Strategic Objective 3		Improved business competitiveness
STRATEGIC OUTCOME		3.1 Enhanced business environment for trade
		3.2 Improved export capability
		3.3 Efficient trade logistics services
PROGRAMME INTERMEDIATE OUTCOMES		3.1.1 Private sector/civil society-led policy formulation
		3.1.2 Improved processes for traders, especially women
		3.2.1 Improved quality and standards of goods and services
		3.2.2 Increased trade in services
		3.2.3 Strengthened export capabilities
		3.3.1 Effective and innovative logistics services
PROGRAMME OUTPUTS		PROGRAMME INPUTS (PROJECTS)
3.1.1.1	Private sector advocacy plans for prioritisation of regional standards and the content of the planned technical regulations framework developed	0428 & 0451 East Africa standards platform 0424 and 0448 EABC institutional and advocacy support 0426 East Africa tourism platform/ 0450 Enhancing East African Community's Tourism Competitiveness
3.1.1.2	Evidence-based proposals on (the EAC Common External Tariffs, Domestic Tax Harmonisation and NTBs, Competition and Tourism) developed	CUTS, EASP, EATP; Rwanda CDF, PSF-R, EACSOFR; Profemmes; FORSC; CFIB; Burundi Tourism Export Capability; USC; SEATINI; Tango, FCS, TPF; SCEA, KEPSA, Mombasa Port
3.1.2.1	Gender responsive frameworks for cross border trade developed	0416 EAC gender protocol WICBTs, 0449 Consolidating Gains for Women Traders in EAC (EASSI; Profemme reports; CFIB; TANGO, FCS and TPSF)
3.1.2.2	Targeted women traders trained on key trade processes and procedures	1229 PROFEMME- women ICBT empowerment, 0416 EAC gender protocol WICBTs, 0449 Consolidating Gains for Women Traders in EAC, 1345 Search for Common Ground, 1343 Forum for Strengthening Civil Society, Uganda - UWEAL/ICON, EASSI reports
3.2.1	3.2.1 Improved quality & standards of goods and services	Regional Export Capability project (coffee, staples)
3.2.2	3.2.2 Increased Trade in Services	0424 EABC institutional and advocacy support
3.2.1.1	Targeted farmer groups trained on warehouse standards and on harmonised CWS Standards	RBS; Traidlinks- Burundi; Burundi Tourism Export Capability; Burundi Export Niche projects
3.2.1.2	Targeted EA CWS, Warehouses and Tourist Site staff trained on international certification, multi-country packages, and good practice	KE-EATTA; UG-TGCU; BR-Traidlinks, RW- EAX

Intervention logic		
3.2.1.3	Warehouses/coffee washing stations/tourism sites upgraded	TGCU, EAX and Twin; BR- Burundi Tourism export capability project
3.2.2.1	Tourism Business to business linkages developed (disaggregated by programme)	Tourism platform- Regional, KE-KTA Project; UG-UTA and UTB Projects; RW-Chamber of Tourism Project; RW-Burundi Tourism export capability project
3.3.1.1	Truck drivers curriculum and training manual developed	0140 Road transport sector operators training project 0122 Shippers' knowledge programme 0121 Freight logistics FEAFFA Report, EAC report, ISCOS reports, PSF
3.3.1.2	Training of truck drivers & fleet managers piloted	
3.3.1.3	National Freight Logistics Platform comprising of logistics players (government and customers/shippers) operational	0447 Logistics Innovation for Trade - LIFT LIFT reports, e-frightex

Annex 7: Terms of References



Independent Evaluation of TradeMark East Africa PO 7024

Terms of Reference Revised for Contract Amendment 1

Independent Evaluation of Trade Mark East Africa Terms of Reference

Introduction

1. The TradeMark East Africa (TMEA) programme aims to improve trade competitiveness in East Africa by reducing transport time/costs and improving the trade environment. It targets an increase in trade of 10% (above trend 2010-2016), contributing to sustained economic growth and poverty reduction. The TMEA agency was officially launched in February 2011 as a specialist not-for-profit agency to implement the TMEA programme. TMEA is currently funded by the UK, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Netherlands, Sweden and USA. TMEA's secured budget to date totals about £400 million (\$640m). The first phase of the programme officially runs to July 2017, but funding is likely to continue over a second phase up to 2020.
2. This is a large, high-profile programme in an area of great interest for continued development work, which calls for a robust and independent evaluation. DFID is commissioning this key evaluation as acting Evaluation Manager on behalf of all TMEA donors.

Purpose and Objectives

Purpose

3. The evaluation has 2 equally important purposes:
 - (a) To identify and feed lessons learnt into the management to (i) adapt the early implementation of Strategy 2, where there are findings which are useful; and (ii) inform the design of future trade programmes which donors may undertake.(driver: improving trade development programmes and enhancing the global evidence basis);
 - (b) To account for progress at outcome and impact level in an internationally recognised independent and impartial manner (driver: oversight and accountability requirements).

Objectives

4. This is an evaluation to assess the impact of the TMEA programme on trade, inclusive economic growth, and poverty reduction, and understand causal pathways and the mechanisms at work. As an impact evaluation, it emphasises causality and where possible attribution or at least contribution to outcomes and impacts.
5. Growth and poverty reduction are high level goals. It may not be possible to measure an attributable impact of TMEA on these goals. However, the evaluation will need to analyse pathways and understand the way in which the TMEA programme has affected poor people, and the way in which it has contributed to growth.
6. The core objectives of the evaluation are:
 - 1) Test the **Theory of Change (TOC)**, assessing all causal links and the robustness of underlying assumptions (including links between trade, growth and poverty reduction), and adjusting the TOC to serve as a reliable guide to interpret the programme and to make programme improvements.
 - 2) Analyse and, to the extent possible measure: the regional integration programmes' **impact** on regional trade, growth and poverty (and on the various stakeholders, in particular on men and women separately, poor and vulnerable groups, as well as traders and consumers); and **sustainability**.

- 3) Assess the **effectiveness** of the TMEA programme, including organisational effectiveness, and whether the programme represents **Value For Money**.
- 4) Throughout, identify **lessons learnt relevant beyond TMEA**, i.e. insights on enabling and constraining factors, critical actions and gaps which would be generalizable to future programmes or to other contexts.

Recipients

7. The primary recipients of the services comprise TMEA's Council and Board alongside the National Oversight Committees which exist in five of the six countries with active TMEA interventions.
8. The evaluation will provide evidence on trade and development of interest more widely. In particular, outputs of the evaluation are likely to attract significant attention from many actors, including the East African Community (EAC), regional governments, regional institutions such as the EAC Secretariat, multilateral and bilateral partners, business and civil society
9. The ultimate beneficiaries are the citizens of partner countries, whose lives should be improved through improved projects and programmes.

Background

Context

10. Despite significant growth, East Africa's share of world exports is below 0.1% - around half the global average on a per capita basis. It costs East African countries twice as much to trade than it does East Asian and developed countries. Transport costs are excessive and especially for landlocked countries – freight costs are more than 50% higher than in the United States and Europe and add nearly 75% to the price of exports from Uganda, Burundi and Rwanda. [*Nathan Associates, 2011*] The problem is not just one of distances – inefficient customs and port processes, excessive bureaucracy and poor infrastructure all impose substantial transport delays and significantly increase costs. These problems are both national and regional and advocate for a regional approach to solutions, focused on developing East Africa's transit corridors to open up its economic opportunities and reduce the high costs of doing business and trade.
11. The East African Community (EAC) was re-established in 1999 by Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. Burundi and Rwanda subsequently joined in 2007. The Customs Union formed in 2005 has led to a 67% increase in trade between EAC countries, but considerable work remains to make it fully effective, such as removing non-tariff barriers, implementing a first point of entry system for the clearance of goods and collection of import duties and implementation of a common trade policy. The Common Market is scheduled to be fully implemented by 2014, although this timing is likely to slip. The EAC is also part of the Tripartite (COMESA-EAC-SADC) initiative, which it chaired from July 2013 to June 2014. The EAC has made the most progress on economic integration of any of the regional economic communities in Africa, and represents a major opportunity for lesson learning across the broader Tripartite through creating a larger market; allowing producers and traders across the region to exploit economies of scale; increasing investment and accelerating the introduction of new technologies. EAC integration is also expected to increase political stability and provide a focus for shared legislative and regulatory reform.
12. Evidence from a range of studies points to improvements in the business environment associated with trade competitiveness leading to improved growth, jobs, incomes and social effects. While the relationship between trade, growth and poverty reduction is complex, very few countries have grown

over long periods of time or secured a sustained reduction in poverty without a significant change in competitiveness and a large expansion of their trade. Poverty reduction in broad terms has followed as a consequence of increases in income, employment and government social expenditures. However, there are risks and opportunities in the short and longer term for particular poor groups (and regions) as increased trade transforms livelihood possibilities.

TMEA


13. TMEA is a multi-donor funded programme, which was officially launched in February 2011 as a specialist not-for-profit agency to implement programmes to promote trade growth in East Africa. TMEA aims to increase exports (by 10% above trend 2010-2016) through cutting the costs of trade, especially through reduced transport time (by 15%), and a focus on the national implementation of regional trade agreements. This national focus is innovative for a regional programme, and as a result, TMEA has presence in all EAC countries (plus South Sudan, which has applied to join the EAC) with its headquarters in Kenya. TMEA seeks to deploy a wide range of instruments quickly, including financial aid, output-based aid and technical assistance, to tailor interventions to the needs of partners, and to manage fiduciary risk.


Theory of Change (TOC)

14. Figure 1 illustrates the TOC for the TMEA programme. A detailed description is available in the business cases and a separate TOC document. There are several layers to TMEA's TOC. The TOC can be viewed as a hierarchy where various sub-theories link up and across the programme's focus areas.
15. At the higher end of the TOC it is proposed that three necessary key 'trade competitiveness' elements contribute to increasing trade. These elements are increased physical access to markets, enhanced trade environment and improved business competitiveness.
16. Correspondingly, TMEA's 3 Strategic Objectives are articulated as follows:
 - SO1 - Increased Physical Access to Markets (around 44% of the budget)
 - SO2 - Enhanced Trade Environment (around 42% budget)
 - SO3 - Improved Business Competitiveness (around 14% budget)
17. Increased trade is believed to contribute to increased economic growth and subsequently reduce poverty. Precise effects depend on the nature of trade reforms and how the poor make their living [Winters & Martuscelli, April 2014]. Thus examining localised situations and the pathways to growth and poverty is a key part of this evaluation. Economic growth and poverty reduction do not appear explicitly in TMEA's overarching TOC since they are very high in the logic hierarchy; however they are captured in some of the donor programme documents.
18. Each of the boxes in Figure 1 is expected to contribute to increased trade, but no one element is sufficient by itself. A number of assumptions underpin the relationship between the black boxes and each strategic objective.
19. These include, on the expected result of "increased trade", that:
 - There are sufficient buyers who are willing to pay for East Africa's improved quality products and services;
 - The private sector uses the opportunities of increased affordable market access to increase and/or expand the number and size of exporting firms;
 - The private sector increases the sophistication of exports;

- The private sector has the capacity and will to utilise opportunities presented by an enhanced trade environment.
20. On the simplified logic on the relationship between “increased market access” and “trade”, that:
- Current trade costs in East Africa are a deterrent for exporters and importers;
 - Reducing trade costs will make a significant contribution to increasing market access for East African importers and exporters;
 - Transport prices are a major contributor to trade costs;
 - Indirect costs caused by delays are a major contributor to total transport prices;
 - TMEA has greater ability to influence the reduction of indirect costs as opposed to direct costs, e.g. fuel, labour, truck operating costs;
 - East African transport logistics service providers will pass on costs savings brought about by reducing delays to consumers of logistics services’;
 - The East African logistics industry is competitive;
 - TMEA interventions will contribute to reducing transportation costs as will other organisations’ interventions, i.e. World Bank, JICA, USAID;
 - Increases in other costs will not be more than any reduced indirect costs.
21. A number of assumptions underpin the simplified logic on the relationship between “enhanced trade environment” and “trade”:
- Implementing the EAC regional trade agreements will contribute to enhancing the trade environment in the region;
 - There is sufficient demand by partner state parliaments, public sector, private sector and civil society organisations to drive the regional economic community agenda forward;
 - Regional trade policies will be prioritised by partner states over national trade policies and priorities.
22. Within this complicated picture of factors that are necessary to achieve increased trade, TMEA has a more specific focus driven by practical reasons, as indicated through the colour coding (see legend at bottom right of Figure 1). All current projects now fall in either the ‘direct’ or ‘enabling’ category.

Figure 1





23. Each of the strategic objectives is unpacked a bit more in the TOC document, which describes the expected causality chains and key assumptions.

24. Just as one example, the cost of access is seen as a component of the cost of the goods. One key factor contributing to high transport costs is inadequate infrastructure that does not meet current and future traffic needs, resulting in congestion and delay. This delay has a cost. Even where the transport infrastructure is adequate, delay can result from inefficient use of assets. Key causes of unnecessary delay include low labour productivity, bureaucratic inefficiency, poor transport regulation, and corruption. For these reasons, most of TMEA’s activities in this area are designed to reduce unnecessary delay. Yet for activities to have the intended outcome, certain assumptions must hold:

- The activities must actually result in time savings (delay reductions);
- The value of those time savings must be greater than the cost required to achieve those savings;
- The net savings must be passed along from transport services providers to consumers via the price of transported goods;
- The resulting price reductions must induce additional trade in those goods (that is, the demand curve must be elastic).

Governance

25. The TMEA Board supervises the activities of TMEA and the TMEA Council provides strategic direction to TMEA to ensure that it achieves its developmental goals. The Board and Council are supported by a regional (EAC) Programme Coordinating Committee (chaired by a Deputy Secretary General at the EAC Secretariat) and a National Oversight Committee (NOC) for each country²¹

²¹ Processes for setting up a NOC in South Sudan are still underway.

programme. The scope of authority of the Council and Board are set out in their Constitutions and entrenched in the Articles of Association of TMEA.

26. A unique feature of the TMEA governance structure is the delegation of oversight roles at the national level. Although these National Oversight Committees (NOCs) are mainly advisory bodies to the Board, they play an immensely important role in supervising and monitoring the national level programmes. The NOCs are chaired by Permanent Secretaries (the Ministry of EAC) and membership includes all key donors, government agencies, private sector and civil society representatives.

Monitoring and evaluation architecture

27. In August 2013, a revised monitoring, evaluation, and learning (MEL) approach paper was reviewed by the TMEA PIC²². It was agreed to incorporate plans for an independent external evaluation into the MEL to ensure complementarity of the internal and external evaluation work and to avoid duplication. An Evaluation Committee (DFID is a member) was established as a sub-committee to the Board to oversee the evaluation work. The revised MEL approach paper was approved at the PIC meeting in May 2014 and is attached in the Annexes.

28. As set out in the MEL, TMEA's monitoring and evaluation system is comprised of the following components:

- Overall results framework, a sub-set of outputs from individual project monitoring plan, which serves as an important accountability tool for TMEA donors;
- Individual project monitoring plans;
- Quarterly external progress reports;
- Quarterly internal programme performance review meetings (QuORTs);
- A Management Information System (MIS) that requires TMEA project managers to input and update project work plans and monitoring plans;
- A "Results Meter" has been developed to serve as an aggregate score card to show progress towards targets in the results framework (this Results Meter is likely to be subject to an external quality assurance early 2015);
- An Annual Review commissioned by investors to assess progress against the TMEA results framework;
- An evaluation plan, outlining the division of labour between internal TMEA evaluation work (mainly formative evaluations) and the independent external evaluation work (commissioned here).

29. TMEA also has a research programme (previously involving a call down contract with the Institute of Development Studies (IDS). This has examined the literature on linkages between trade, growth and poverty reduction, as well as simulated modelling on the impact of the EAC customs union. However, it has not conducted any primary data collection on TMEA projects.

30. TMEA organises its information management on the basis of around 200+ project budget lines, of which around 165 were active at August 2014. In some instances, several project budget lines could be seen as sub-components of one 'intervention' (e.g. support to the revenue authority in Burundi is broken down by categories of expenditure).

Key stakeholders

²² Programme Investment Committee (PIC) which supervised the activities of TMEA and provided strategic direction to TMEA to ensure that it achieves its developmental goals before the Board and Council were established.

31. Key stakeholders for the evaluation include:

- TMEA donors, who are represented on the Council);
- The East African Community Secretariat (a Programme Coordinating Committee in Arusha manages the TMEA-EAC partnership);
- National Oversight Committee (NOC) members (including government, private sector, civil society and donor representatives at the national level);
- Staff involved in oversight and implementation of TMEA projects;
- Implementing partners at regional and national level;
- Ultimate beneficiaries (producers, transporters, clearing and forwarding agents, consumers) of TMEA's programme support.

Key questions

32. The key evaluation questions below reflect the 4 core objectives of the evaluation (see section B), which can be summarised as: test the Theory of Change; impact and sustainability; value for money and effectiveness; and lessons learnt relevant beyond TMEA. These are outlined below.

33. In addition, for each of the key evaluation questions, a set of sub-questions is provided in Annex 1.

Question 1. Has the programme been effective in delivering its outputs and outcomes? How has this been affected by the programme’s organisational performance and how could this be improved?

Question 2. Have the port and OSBP projects been effective in delivering their outputs and achieving their trade outcome objectives?

This question will assess effectiveness, economy and efficiency, including whether TMEA activities have produced the outputs anticipated in the results framework, organisational effectiveness whether and where the TMEA programme has provided value for money. This will also require an assessment of the operational model and of the M&E system

Question 3. What is the likely impact on trade outcomes and growth, and what is critical in order to ensure sustainability of positive impacts?

Question 4. What is the likely impact on poverty and gender, and what is critical in order to ensure sustainability of positive impacts?

These questions cover the key issue of TMEA’s current and likely impact on regional trade, the links to growth and poverty reduction, and the sustainability of their interventions. Of particular interest will be to understand the *mechanisms* at work, to identify why and how things worked, who benefited and how, and any potential negative impact. There is a specific interest in understanding how TMEA activities to reduce transport time have impacted on poor people, and how the programme has benefited or harmed women and girls. Of particular interest also is the issue of sustainability, and of identifying the essential components of a future exit strategy.

Analysing and understanding the pathways through which the TMEA programme is likely to have affected poor people (positive and negative, intended and unintended impacts) is a crucial question for the evaluation. As noted above however, measuring TMEA’s impact on regional poverty as a whole programme is not expected to be possible. However, analyses of pathways and measuring localised impact for selected interventions should be feasible. On the other hand, impact on trade is expected to be quantifiable with reasonable attribution, and the evaluation should also verify the programme’s claims to impact on trade.

Question 5. How robust and verified are the causal links and assumptions in the Theory of Change (TOC)? What does this imply for the relevance, coherence and sustainability of the programmes, and what are the lessons that are relevant beyond TMEA?

As a premise for the evaluation, the full TOC will need to be re-examined. This question will require an analysis of constraints to trade/growth/poverty reduction, an assessment of the robustness of the assumptions underpinning the TOC, and an assessment of whether the logframes, targets and milestones are appropriate and realistic.

This will need to consider carefully the political economy around the programme and trade in the region, economic contextual changes, policy changes, and TMEA's relationship with related initiatives (both government and private sector). It will also need to consider the relevance of the instruments and mechanisms used.

All sections above should contribute to understanding what lessons have been learnt that are relevant beyond TMEA. Throughout the evaluation, lessons learnt should be identified that may be relevant beyond TMEA in order to inform future programming as well as contribute evidence towards comparative effectiveness of regional programming. This question is separated out to emphasize the importance of generating learning that is transferable to other programmes (by TMEA donors and others) and which contributes to the global evidence basis, and of capturing this in a way which promotes uptake.

34. OECD-DAC evaluation criteria map onto the questions structure presented in the Annex to a large extent, but are not of equal interest and the evaluation will focus on **effectiveness, efficiency** and **impact** criteria.
35. Sub-questions of particularly high importance to the primary recipients (i.e. Council and NOCs) are marked with an asterix. Not all questions will apply in equal depth at all evaluation stages. Some questions are for consideration early with more of a formative angle, others only at the end but the evidence needs gathering from the outset. Note also that the sub-questions in the Annex may contribute to more than one objective.
36. The Evaluator will need to ensure the questions asked meet the 4 objectives.

Scope

37. The independent evaluation commissioned through these TORS consists of one single evaluation. This will include a Theory Based approach located within the TMEA TOC and which includes the pathways to trade and growth and to poverty reduction for the whole portfolio, as well as similar documentation (sub-theories) for individual projects (projects of particular importance would be large investments, those of a catalytic nature, and those targeted to provide livelihood gains to particular groups e.g. small holder farmers and traders).
38. Nonetheless, it is expected that to meet its objectives the evaluation will need to be carefully structured, and comprise various components. As an indication, the evaluation is expected to require the following components to address the objectives and key questions:
- *A study of impact on poverty*, examining the pathways to poverty across the programme, who is benefiting and who is losing out, and providing a sense of the likely scale of benefits or losses where feasible for example in selected localised areas/interventions.
 - *A study of impact on trade*, establishing how trade changed as a result of the TMEA programme, how an increase in trade resulted (if confirmed by the evaluation) or why it did not, key enabling factors and constraints - contextual and programmatic.
 - *An institutional assessment of TMEA as an organisation* covering organisational capacity, organisational effectiveness and delivery performance, factors in the wider enabling environment, and partnership analysis across the different partners.
 - *A formal evidence synthesis* approach covering the work of the Evaluator, the monitoring, internal evaluations and learning conducted by TMEA, and evidence from other research activities around trade and poverty reduction in East Africa.

39. The following interventions are of particular interest: Mombasa port, Dar es Salaam port, and the One Stop Border Posts (OSBPs). In particular, the evaluation should look at pathways to poverty on the Mombasa port and at least 3 of the OSBPs, and set out baselines and design for looking at impact of work on the Dar port in due time.
40. The evaluation will need to balance of breadth (e.g. to deliver a programme, portfolio level evaluation) and depth (e.g. to understand pathways to poverty impact).
41. Given the project timelines it is expected that the first reports will encompass a substantial formative element.
42. TMEA comprises a number of infrastructure projects. As per key questions, this evaluation examines the effect of the projects, and would exclude engineering inspection type of activities.

Roles and responsibilities of the independent Evaluator vs TMEA

43. During inception the Evaluator will need to work with TMEA to determine respective responsibilities monitoring and evaluation activities, particularly for collecting data, for agreement with the Board and Council. The evaluator should be clear about how they will manage the interface with the TMEA organisation and its work and how they will refine this during inception.
44. Broadly speaking, TMEA is responsible for monitoring against the results framework (including outcome level and impact on trade), for project monitoring, and for internal evaluations as indicated in the Joint Evaluation Plan (JEP). The Evaluator is responsible for quality assuring monitoring data, for quality assuring and triangulating any evidence they use, providing recommendations and guidance to strengthen data quality, and identify and carry out new data collection required specifically for the purposes of the independent evaluation.

On monitoring data:

45. Data for monitoring the results framework is the responsibility of TMEA, including both underlying and aggregate data. The Evaluator is expected to review periodically the monitoring data gathered by TMEA (result framework data and other data to be used in the evaluation) and to make prompt recommendations to improve the quality of these data and ensure their suitability for evaluation, and where appropriate to propose complementary data collection measures.
46. The Evaluator will be responsible for the identification and provision of any new primary data needed for the purposes of the independent evaluation – whether as an area not covered by the existing M&E or for triangulation purposes. The Evaluator will need to determine which arrangements would be most cost-effective overall and least burdensome on beneficiaries or programme implementers. If additional data needs to be added to existing TMEA monitoring processes for the purposes of the evaluation, the Evaluator will provide support on methodological development for indicators and data collection.

On evaluations:

47. A Joint Evaluation Plan (JEP) has been agreed by the PIC. Proposed evaluation work has been divided between “internal” (TMEA’s internal evaluation programme, based on learning priorities) and “external” (this independent evaluation).
48. Aside from the overall independent evaluation, the JEP identifies selected key projects under each of TMEA’s three strategic objective (SO) pillars. This independent evaluation will encompass the overall impact evaluation, summative evaluation reports of all three pillars, Mombasa port, Dar es

Salaam port, and OSBPs. TMEA will manage internal formative evaluations of selected projects under SO2 and SO3, plus two ex-ante evaluations and summative evaluations needed urgently.

49. For effective learning and consistency of approach, the independent Evaluator and TMEA will need to discuss the internal formative evaluations, to ensure that pertinent issues relevant to the independent evaluation are taken into account such as agreement on indicators, issues to be covered, or exploring relevant challenges.

Links to other programme evaluations

50. The Evaluator will need to consider other evaluations underway in the region, by the TMEA donors or by others, for any substantial overlap or synergies or lesson learning. In particular, the evaluation should consider risks and opportunities faced by the TMEA programme, by learning from evaluative exercises of other trade or integration programmes, such as any IMF or WB regional programme in Africa, DFID's TMSA, DFID's AgDevCo, or others.
51. There is also a higher-level evidence question related to the comparative effectiveness of regional programming, which DFID in particular aims to investigate across DFID-funded wealth creation programmes in East Africa. The TMEA evaluation will contribute to this thematic evidence basis (see evaluation questions in Annex 1). This will require flexibility to use a common framework appropriate for future synthesis, while preserving the integrity of the TMEA programme evaluation.

Extensions

52. Should there be a new programming phase beyond 2017, it is possible that this Evaluation contract may be extended to cover part or all of the new phase. It is likely that any extension would be for up to 30 months.

Methodology

Evaluation approach and methods

53. The evaluator should provide a clear description of the design and methodology they will use to answer the key questions, including recognised evaluation methods to be used, proposed counterfactuals if/where appropriate, proposed data collection methods, analytical methods, and approach to synthesis. Ideally this would be supported by an illustrative evaluation matrix.
54. This is a complex programme, with multiple countries, multiple multi-layered projects with different stakeholders and beneficiaries. It is critical for bids to explain how the complexity of the programme and of the evaluation will be managed.
55. In particular, careful attention will need to be given to how the evaluation is approached and designed as a coherent whole, anchored on the overarching TOC. It is expected that a range of quantitative and qualitative methods might be necessary. Bids should take care to articulate clearly how the overall design and specific methods and tools fit together. Bids should explain how a potentially large range of elements will fit together to answer the overarching questions, how the synthesis will manage disparate data sources with variable quality and availability, and where and/or how information might be aggregated.
56. The evaluator should pay particular attention to demonstrating how rigour and credibility will be upheld at all stages throughout the evaluation.

57. In 2012 TMEA commissioned Upper Quartile to undertake a review of options for evaluating the Impact and Value for Money of its activities, to help TMEA decide on options on structuring and implementing its evaluation activity. This identified a selection of projects, which is different from the more recent selection in the JEP. Bidders should note that the context has evolved and the scale of TMEA has increased since the 2012 paper, and that the approach to the independent evaluation is expected to present major differences.
58. Secondary data, including TMEA's own monitoring and evaluation data, should be quality assured. More generally, triangulation of data and/or findings is essential.
59. The evaluator should set out clearly the extent to which the proposed approach will answer the questions, and limitations.
60. The evaluator is strongly encouraged to be as specific as possible in their proposals, including in terms of coverage of any method to be used, the quality level that would be achieved, number of projects covered, sample sizes, etc.

Principles and standards

61. As per DFID evaluation policy, the evaluation should adhere to international best practice standards in evaluation, including the OECD DAC International Quality Standards for Development Evaluation, the OECD DAC principles Standards for Development Evaluation, and DFID's Ethics Principles for Research and Evaluation. Bids should demonstrate how they will achieve this.
62. In line with Paris Declaration principles, the Evaluator - and TMEA M&E approaches - should take account of national M&E systems, draw on existing data where available, ensure new data collection is complementary to existing systems and that new data are made available to national stakeholders as far as possible.
63. Care should be taken to avoid duplication with TMEA's own monitoring and evaluation work, while also ensuring the independence and impartiality of the overall independent evaluation.
64. Given the importance both of the relationship with TMEA, and of the need for independence, bids should take particular care to explain how they propose to manage relationships, and propose suitable management approaches to ensure the success of the evaluation.
65. Disaggregation of data, including by sex, geographical location and income status will be important throughout the evaluation.
66. The Evaluator will need to comply with DFID's policies on fraud and anti-corruption and cooperate with any checks required from them for the duration of the evaluation e.g. annual audited statements, policies on management of funds, etc.

Lesson learning and adaptive management

67. To meet the evaluation's purpose of identifying and feeding lessons learnt into the programme, it is critical that the Evaluator works with stakeholders to cycle ongoing evaluation results back into the evolution of the programme, through regular feedback and reflective activities. This should include building linkages with the programme management.

68. In particular, to facilitate this, specific points for reflection and decision-making may be identified in addition to programme annual reviews. An element of flexibility from the Evaluator will be essential to maximise evaluation utility and use of the evaluation findings.
69. The evaluator should demonstrate a good understanding and experience of maximising evaluation utility, and outline a convincing approach.

Stakeholders

70. More generally, the evaluator should demonstrate robust thinking as to how stakeholders would be engaged throughout the evaluation.

Existing information sources

71. Data are expected to become available in line with TMEA's Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning (MEL) strategy.

Results frameworks

72. The TMEA results framework indicates key data collected for monitoring purposes. The mapping of the theory of change in the first section of the Results Framework allows the overall programme logic to be scrutinised. The Results Framework contains (or could contain) all necessary information to track all relevant programme results. The TMEA Knowledge and Results team has been working with project teams to set up project level results chains and monitoring plans.
73. Further improvements are in progress. The line of sight between project and the programme TOC is being strengthened. Where missing, appropriate measurable indicators are being designed at impact and Strategic Outcome level and at lower levels, together with targets and collated baseline data. The results framework is also currently being updated to show progress against expected results. This work is expected to be completed by early 2015. The Evaluator will need to assess the sufficiency and quality of the results framework data.
74. TMEA prioritises monitoring efforts according to the importance of different projects (following an A/B/C classification where for A projects the target is to ensure that monitoring is in line the DCED guidelines and C only attempts to monitor at output level), and also within projects.

Baseline data at outcome level

75. Primary data collection on baseline data on outcomes at project level undertaken by TMEA includes: time and traffic surveys for one stop border posts (OSBPs), on cost and time savings for Single Window Information for Trade (SWIFT) programmes, and baselines for ports.
76. OSBP time and traffic surveys have been undertaken to establish both queuing time and time taken to clear customs at the border post, as well as the number of vehicles passing through the border post. Baseline surveys were undertaken before the start of the construction of each border post, and end-line surveys are planned to be undertaken on a consistent basis three months after completion of construction at each border and six months after the initial survey is undertaken. Surveys are undertaken for a period of seven days, including day and night time traffic, and provide an estimate of average time for (a) customs processing and (b) queuing for trucks (either specific types of trucks, or all trucks, on a consistent basis for each border). A timetable is available on request.

77. Cost and time savings surveys are planned for all SWIFTs. Intermediate outcome indicators include average processing time for applications, transactions volume rates (per day), average processing costs, and average compliance costs incurred by traders to submit applications. Output level indicators include the number of trade agencies integrated within the SWIFT system and/or other agencies as well as percentages of training and communications plans implemented. Data collection will vary dependent on when the system goes live. Baseline data should be completed by the end of October 2014. Time data will then be collected on a quarterly basis while cost data will be collected bi-annually. A timetable is available on request.
78. Both ports annually (June/July) publish usage and performance statistics that include most or all of TMEA's top-line indicators. Currently Kenya Airports Authority (KPA) publishes an "Annual Review and Bulletin of Statistics" which includes ship turnaround time, ship waiting time, and berth occupancy, all of which are in TMEA's monitoring plan. The port monitoring plans also include many smaller-scope operational indicators. TMEA has just launched a consultancy at Mombasa port that will (among other things) determine which of these detailed indicators is most important to understanding the overall performance of the port, and assessing the port's capacity to collect this data. Based on the outcome of this work (first phase due by February 2015) TMEA will consider any revisions of its monitoring plans.

TMEA Management Information System (TMIS)

79. TMEA's on-line Management Information System captures data on financial management, and results performance, while the contracts management system has the detailed information on procurement. TMIS is a programme management tool that requires TMEA project managers to input and update project work plans and monitoring plans. Other functionality includes: summary project descriptions, with key contact details of partners; contact reports e.g. recording discussions; attaching key documentation; developing and maintaining project risk matrices; quarterly reporting; list of upcoming planned outputs and outcomes to assist the communications team plan communication activities. TMIS assists TMEA to analyse progress against plans across the portfolio of projects and disaggregate according to such categories as strategic outcomes, type of partners and location. TMIS also includes a results page with all the outcomes and outputs that are to set be achieved within different calendar days, and an outcomes page which lists all the outcomes and how they contribute to the TMEA Theory of Change.
80. TMIS Project data is to a great extent already available in TMIS, and by end Dec-14, 90% of all information including monitoring plans and risk plans for all projects should be available on the MIS, populated with targets/milestones, baselines and actual progress data. By June 2015, all projects will have their monitoring plans completed. The Annexes provide an illustrative snapshot of a project monitoring plan as per TMIS. The Evaluator will need to assess the sufficiency and quality of the TMIS data to be used for evaluation purposes.
81. Monitoring procedures are defined in the manual 'TMEA Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning Procedures: how to measure what you are doing, and whether it is working'.

Progress reports

82. Quarterly progress reports for projects and responsibility centres have been produced through the MIS, as well as annual project performance reports. While quarterly reports include expenditure versus budget and actual progress against planned progress traffic lights, annual project performance reports require implementers to reflect on changes in assumptions, articulate lessons

and outline how future implementation may change as a result. The PIC has since agreed that TMEA will present progress reports every six months from July 2014.

Results meter

83. TMEA has developed a results-meter which aggregates project performance results for key projects to estimate programme results.

Research on poverty impact

84. TMEA has recently commissioned a research paper which explores and maps out direct and indirect linkages between TMEA activities and poverty, together with an analytical framework linking the programme TOC to poverty. The research is expected to be completed by Dec-14.

85. TMEA's toolkit on mainstreaming poverty outlines how poverty issues will be explored throughout projects and baseline studies. To date this has fed into 3 studies, related to: women cross-border traders, SWIFT, standards and non-tariff barriers. In the first instance the tool kit will be applied to priority projects in 6 key areas: OSBPs, ports, railways, standards, customs modernization and ICTs, private sector and civil society / advocacy.

Deliverables and timeframe

86. This contract is expected to run from August 2015 and end in March 2019. There is a possibility of a 30-month extension depending on supplier performance, on-going programme needs and availability of funds. The scheduling of deliverables takes into account 'critical moments'. These however may change and new ones may arise. It is possible that this schedule will be reviewed during inception, timing the trade and poverty impact reports and final synthesis for a later date so as to allow for a longer reference period. In order to maximise usefulness of the findings, the evaluator will need to be flexible to ensure that the evaluation reports come in time to feed into key decision or knowledge sharing opportunities.

Critical moments

87. At present it is anticipated that evaluation findings may feed in the following:

- Annual Reviews: yearly by mid-Nov.
- DFID Design of any phase 2 programming: early 2017.
- Project Completion Report: (date depending on phase 1 completion date, but likely to be due in 2017).

Overview of deliverables

88. The evaluator will need to provide the following key outputs, outlined here under and further detailed thereafter:

- At Annex 2 is the Performance Management Report, which DFID will use to help evaluate each deliverable received.

(a) Inception, design and evaluation reports

- Initial Inception Plan
- Inception Report to include QA of existing data and baseline

- Impact Evaluation Report 1 (interim synthesis report): draft by 19th January 2018, approved report 6 weeks later.
- Impact Evaluation Report 2 (final synthesis report): draft by January 2019, approved report 6 weeks later.
- Interim reports drafts by (approved reports 6 weeks later), :
 - Communication and stakeholders engagement plan, updated regularly (1 May 2017)
 - Deliverable 5A: Preliminary poverty assessment (30th September 2017)
 - Deliverable 2A: Preliminary output assessment (15th December 2017)
 - Deliverable 3A Consolidated formative evaluation of the priority SO1 interventions (Mombasa port, Dar port and three OSBPs) (19th December 2017)
 - Deliverables 2C, 2D, 2E: Effectiveness and Outcome assessments of SO1, SO2 and SO3 (19th December 2017). This will incorporate the assessment TMEA M&E systems and of the quality of the data²³.
 - Deliverable 2B: Institutional assessment of TMEA (8th December 2017)
 - Deliverable 6A: Preliminary relevance and sustainability study (trade policy, PEA, pathway mapping) (12th January 2018)
 - Deliverable 2F: Synthesis of effectiveness and outcome of overall TMEA programme (19th January 2018))
 - Deliverables 3B, 3C, 3D: Summative evaluations of Mombasa port, Dar es Salaam port and the OSBPs (Q3 2018 date to be confirmed)
 - Deliverables 4A, 5B: Design report for impact studies WS4 and WS5, drafts by 15 March 2018
 - VfM study (approx. Q4 2018)
 - Poverty impact study (Q4 2018)
 - Trade impact study (Q4 2017)
 - Final relevance and sustainability study (Q4 2018)

(b) Support to TMEA on specific M&E issues

- Fully developed indicators methodology manual or guidance notes for data that are needed to undertake the independent evaluation but are not yet collected through TMEA's own monitoring and evaluation systems.
- Quality Assurance of TMEA data as required for evaluation purposes, and implementable guidance on any improvements required.

(c) Communication products

These will need to be defined in the communications plans and would include at a minimum, for each Impact Evaluation Report:

- A workshop for the key stakeholders, including the Joint Evaluation Group, explaining the recommendations and agreeing how they can be implemented.
- A 'key findings' communication product presenting evidence relevant to development actors beyond the TMEA programme.
- Separate reports on selected interventions or issues (notably Dar, Mombasa, OSBPs)

(d) Instruments and data

- An electronic copy of all the instruments used, including research protocols, questionnaires, guidance notes, etc.

²³ The M&E system review and the Data Quality Assessment were due in the inception phase but completion to DFID reporting standards has been deferred to the implementation phase.

- Database(s) with all the qualitative and quantitative data in a commonly used format, together with clear metadata, and which is anonymised and safeguards confidentiality. Copies should be provided at least yearly.

Instruments and data should be shared with DFID by December 2017 for work on deliverables due before or by December 2017, and by Q4 2018 for all those following and due before or by Q4 2018.

(e) Management reports

- Brief quarterly reports on the ongoing evaluation process including any support provided to TMEA. Submission of these reports will be aligned to Board and Council meetings as far as possible.

Specific requirements

89. The **Inception Plan** serves as an intermediate product no longer than 20 pages and should include:
- a. an initial review, validation and adjustment of the Theory of Change;
 - b. an initial stakeholders engagement approach;
 - c. revised evaluation questions;
 - d. discussion of design issues and approach to completion of the inception phase, particularly to assessing data quality and developing the full evaluation framework:
 - i. Including a recommendation whether a single design will be presented that provides confidence all key questions and issues will be addressed, or whether two options will be proposed for consideration.
90. The **Inception Report** should be no longer than 30 pages excluding annexes and include:
- a. a review, validation and/or adjustment of the Theory of Change (including links to growth and poverty reduction);
 - i. If revisions to the TOC were necessary This should clearly present a revised TOC, and indicate the changes (which should have largely been agreed with the implementer before submission of the report, with any area of contention clearly marked, and which will need to be endorsed by the JEG and the Board on the basis of the report)
 - ii. clearly mark for each linkage and each assumption, whether it is already strongly evidenced (with supporting references), whether it will be investigated through the independent evaluation (cross-referencing to the relevant questions), whether evidence is likely to arise from other sources, or whether it will remain unsupported by evidence.
 - b. a stakeholders engagement approach, supported by a stakeholders mapping;
 - i. a communication and dissemination plan;
 - ii. this should list stakeholders, their specific interest in the evaluation, proposed means and timing of communication (which should be considered both ways)
 - c. an agreed set of finalised questions and evaluation framework - based on evidence gaps in the Theory of Change, stock-take on the programme to date and requirements of stakeholders of the evaluation;
 - i. the inception report should list people consulted and in what form, as well as their affiliation
 - d. the refined evaluation design or design options, a detailed explanation of evaluation methods to be used, exploration and justification of methodological issues, project selection, proposed counterfactuals where appropriate, and proposed data collection methods;
 - i. any selection process should be fully transparent, with a list of criteria and a mapping of how all the units (selected and non-selected) against these criteria

- ii. in the case of more than one option, related scope of findings, costs and risks (points 11, 13, 14)
 - iii. a framework for synthesis should be provided and particular care taken to demonstrate how the information will be brought together
 - iv. an articulation of other designs that have been considered but rejected, and why
 - v. a discussion of potential ethical issues arising and how they will be addressed
- e. an evaluation matrix, which maps the proposed evaluation design, methods and analytical plan against the evaluation questions;
 - i. the evaluation matrix should provide clearly the following details (which could be thought of as column headings):
 1. Evaluation stage or report
 2. Evaluation question to be answered
 3. Methodology
 4. Indicators or analytical plan
 5. Data required to answer the question using the proposed method
 6. Data source, including quality (robustness) assessment
 7. Type of data source: including whether to be collected by the Evaluator, available from TMEA monitoring systems, TMEA internal evaluations, or available from other sources (which should be specified)
 8. Report to be included
 9. When it will be received
- f. identification of programme monitoring data required from the PMU to meet evaluation needs and timings for this, particularly baseline data;
 - i. identification should be down at indicator level and indicative coverage
 - ii. including a timeline for the preparation of guidance and any other support
- g. full quality assurance of all data to be used from TMEA's own monitoring and evaluation;
 - i. appropriateness of the overall TMEA monitoring and evaluation system for the purposes of the independent evaluation;
 - ii. for each full dataset or indicator, a definitive statement of the quality of the data, of what the data can be used for and what they cannot be used for;
 - iii. the conclusion should be fully supported by evidence in the quality assurance review against the DQAF or other recognised quality assurance framework as agreed with DFID (including in depth assessment of specific components and of at least 15 projects; ground truthing project level data; and triangulation and/or replication of estimates);
- h. proposal on collection of new primary data – including new baseline data and triangulation data;
 - i. proposals should clearly delineate the scope of the data collection, including in particular but not exclusively the proposed coverage (e.g. sectoral, geographical, demographic if relevant, frequency), and sample size
- i. an agreed division of labour between TMEA and the Evaluator, specific and detailed, down to activity level;
 - i. for each M&E activity, the description of the division of labour needs to detail the responsibilities of TMEA, of the evaluator, and of any other party such as the EC.
- j. a description of the scope of findings to be available in the reports, particularly the first report, and a clear delineation of the depth of information to be provided in each of the impact evaluation reports;
 - i. an overarching table or narrative which provides, against each purpose and key question, a clear sense of the type of answers which the evaluation will provided at specific reporting times.
 - ii. Ideally this would be accompanied (in inception discussion or in report annexes) by made-up conclusions to ensure key users have a clear understanding of what the evaluation will and will not provide.

- iii. in particular but not exclusively: whether the findings would provide a tentative, plausible or definite answer to each of the relevant questions, the level of disaggregation;
 - iv. a detailed specification of the contents of each report.
 - k. a detailed workplan;
 - i. including an output specification for all deliverables including evaluation reports
 - ii. detailing the activities that will take place under each output, the inputs for each activity and budget by month.
 - l. a final costing for the implementation phase;
 - i. This should provide estimated costs broken down at activity level, for example in particular:
 - 1. for a specific new data collection, to provide breakdown by data collection exercise (e.g. baseline/mid-term/end-term) by country, cost of sub-contractor (enumeration, data entry, analysis), cost of supervision, of translation, etc.
 - 2. of Quality Assuring TMEA data, and of providing guidance
 - 3. of each field visit by international staff
 - m. a review of challenges and risks, mitigating actions and fall-back options.
 - i. A comprehensive risk matrix assessing the likelihood and impact of each risk.
 - ii. Covering all areas of risk to the programme, including but not limited to: stakeholder, political economy, data quality, complexity, attribution, synthesis, security etc.
 - iii. Thoughtful mitigation and a residual risk rating applied.
 - n. Initial baseline assessment:
 - i. description of the methodology;
 - ii. baseline for all indicators using secondary data (TMEA monitoring data and other data);
 - iii. highlighting where the gaps are;
 - iv. methodologies, instruments and protocols for data collection;
 - v. summary of the analysis, focusing on what is considered to be of direct relevance to adjust the programme or to decisions on future funding, including in particular results to date, impact to date and expected impact, efficiency and effectiveness (details can be annexed);
 - vi. confirmation of the extent for all primary data collection (including the freight forwarding survey) and when this baseline data will be presented.
 - vii. evaluation findings to date.

91. Completion of some of these requirements has been deferred to the implementation phase, and absorbed in other deliverables or contract amendments deliverables specification , notably sections a, b, d ,g ,h, j, k, l, n.

92. **The Impact Evaluation Reports** should be no longer than 60 pages for the overall evaluation and 40 pages for pillar or project evaluation, excluding annexes and include: an executive summary (self-contained and with diagrams as needed so that it can also serve as a user-friendly standalone document), summary of the methodology, a full analysis of findings and recommendations tailored to the evaluation questions, and a set of actionable recommendations. [Please confirm proposed length for this and add for other, intermediate reports.]

93. All reports should communicate overall approach findings in an accessible way for non-technical readers, including presentation of data in visually appealing ways, highly structured and rigorous summaries of findings and robust and accessible syntheses of key lessons. It is acceptable for the technical details to be held within the main part of the reports. Recommendations should be timely,

realistic, prioritised, evidenced-based, targeted, accessible and clear, in accordance with OECD-DAC and UN guidelines.

94. Annexes should include: terms of reference, list of people consulted and interviewed at different stages of the evaluation, list of documents reviewed, any analyses, methodology, data and supporting evidence that is considered to be too detailed for the core section.
95. Draft reports will be subject to an external quality review, managed in accordance with standard DFID procedures for Quality Assurance. The evaluator should note this is subject to a 2-week turnaround once submitted by DFID for review. The evaluator should ensure they assess the draft report against the EQUALS checklist prior to submission.
96. A final more detailed product specification for all forthcoming reports is still to be agreed. Both parties (DFID +OPM) must be in agreement of the final specification of all deliverables prior to the deliverable due date. Further detail on the individual product specification for deliverables up to August 2017 has been agreed separately.

Break clauses

97. In line with the unknowns associated with development programming, break clauses will be put in place related to continuation and scope of the programme as well as satisfactory delivery and value for money of future workplans.
98. The break clauses will be at the end of the inception phase, after deliverables 6B in August 2017 and 3C, D & E (summative evaluations) in 2018.
99. DFID reserves the right to not proceed with the impact studies if the design identifies the studies would not be of benefit to the programme.

Challenges and Risks

100. Bids should clearly identify challenges, risks, and propose mitigating actions.
101. Key risks and challenges are likely to relate to:
 - Complexity of the programme, including conceptual complexity, scale of the programme across multiple countries and multi-layered projects, complex strategic context;
 - Reconciling the need for programme-level conclusion with the fact that causal relationships are typically more easily 'proved' at the lower level of the causal chain;
 - Managing trade-offs between breadth and causal identification in order to secure both feasibility and credibility/rigour/usefulness of the evaluation;
 - Examining impact – pathways to poverty reduction and the difficulties in attributing impact to TMEA;
 - Uncertainty about the availability and quality of monitoring data;
 - The programme and some projects having already started, without collecting all the baseline data that would ideally be used for evaluation;
 - The full impact of certain programme components is likely to occur after the current programme end date and even after the current evaluation reporting dates;
 - Differences in the interests of stakeholders;
 - Changing political economy.

Abilities & Expertise to Deliver This Requirement

102. The team will require a broad set of skills to design and manage a complex evaluation of the TMEA programme. For example, private sector development and advocacy assessments will be very different to infrastructure assessments so a diverse range of expertise will be required.
103. Consortia are strongly encouraged as it is expected that this would be necessary to provide the relevant expertise and presence. They may encompass a range of actors including private companies and/or research organisations and/or evaluation institutes, at local or international level.
104. It is also expected that local expertise, knowledge and access will be essential.
105. Bidders will need to complete a conflict of interest declaration. It is expected that organisations or individuals which have had a major involvement with TMEA would be conflicted out for this independent evaluation. However, given the wide scope and size of work to date on the TMEA programme, it is also expected that a large number of organisations well qualified to contribute to this evaluation assignment may have had prior involvement. Therefore minor implementation involvement or impartial engagement in the area of evaluation or monitoring is unlikely to conflict out a bidder. Bidders should state clearly how they will manage any potential conflict of interest. Potential bidders are welcome to seek informal views from DFID early on.
106. Regarding future TMEA activities it is expected that the successful bidder would be conflicted out of future direct implementation activities that could sway the programme during the lifetime of the evaluation. It is unlikely they would be conflicted out of future monitoring or evaluation TMEA contracts, though it will be important to put in place procedures in case of any potential conflict of interest.
107. The Evaluator should combine the following expertise and experience:

Management expertise

Strong understanding and demonstrated experience of:

- designing and undertaking large and complex evaluations, at portfolio level with expertise of rigorous impact evaluations at intervention level; using mixed methods approaches that meet recognised standards for credibility and rigor;
- stakeholders management skills and ability to work flexibly with donors, partner countries, private sector entities; demonstrated ability to manage sensitive relationships tactfully and productively;
- communication skills - being strategic as well as able to communicate complex studies and findings in an accessible way for non-technical people;
- using evaluations as a tool for lesson-learning both during programme implementation and beyond;
- Knowledge management expertise.

Evaluation expertise

Strong understanding and demonstrated experience of:

- the strengths and limitations of different designs and how to interpret and present findings accurately to both researchers and non-researchers;
- various quantitative and qualitative evaluation methodologies for demonstrating impact;
- undertaking VfM analysis of complex multi-level programmes, combining quantitative and qualitative techniques;

Sectoral expertise

Strong understanding and demonstrated experience of:

- trade issues, including political economy particularly in East Africa, and experience of working on evaluations of trade policies and programmes;
- regional integration and political economy issues in the region, particularly those related to trade, familiarity with public/private dialogue and policy advocacy issues in East Africa, and understanding of social inclusion and gender issues in programming in East Africa;
- the possible impact of trade interventions in a range of areas (e.g. revenues, poverty, vulnerability) on different segments of the population, and ability to generate data to analyse programme effects for these (e.g. women vs. men, low income vs. middle income, rural vs. urban, etc.);

Logistics and procedures

108. The Evaluator will be responsible for all logistic arrangements required to conduct the evaluation work. TMEA will facilitate convening of meetings and site visits where necessary. All relevant expenses should be covered by the evaluation contract budget.

Reporting and contracting arrangements

Contact points

109. The Evaluator will report to DFID Management Group which consists of: Senior Evaluation Adviser, Senior Growth Adviser and the Prosperity Deputy Programme Manager in DFID's Africa Regional Department.

Governance

110. An Evaluation Committee (EC) is in place to steer and advise the monitoring and evaluation of the TMEA programme at key strategic points. It provides strategic direction on the independent evaluation, and has a strong coordination and facilitation role across the evaluative exercises and to ensure lessons learnt are taken forward. The EC comprises two Council members, one TMEA Board member, one senior TMEA staff member, and one member from the wider stakeholder constituency.

111. The EC is an advisory sub-committee of the Council. For the independent evaluation, the Evaluation Manager (i.e. the person responsible for managing the contract for the independent evaluation) receives advice from the EC but formally reports to the Council, in order to preserve a minimum level of independence.

112. Governance and quality assurance is further strengthened by an Independent Peer Reviewer and a Donor Reference Group comprising 5 to 6 relevant DFID or other donor evaluation and growth advisers. The role of the Reference Group and Independent Peer Reviewers is to review the scientific and technical quality of the independent evaluation; to ensure that the design and implementation of the evaluation is robust and credible and that the evaluation is independent and stands up to external scrutiny. The Donor Reference Group will be coordinated by the Evaluation Manager within the donor agency (DFID) responsible for contracting the independent evaluation on behalf of the Council.

113. Further details about the governance structure for the evaluation can be found in the TORs for the governance of the evaluation.

Meetings

114. Meetings between DFID (acting as Evaluation Manager) and the Evaluator will be held monthly during the inception phase and then as required.

115. The frequency and broad timing of meetings between the Evaluator, the Evaluation Manager, the EC, the Council, and Reference Group will be agreed between DFID and the Evaluator during the Inception Phase. As an indication, we expect the DRG and the Council to engage at the key report stages ie inception, baseline, some interim findings reports, impact 1 and impact 2. The EC in its facilitation role might meet more frequently.

Management

116. The costed workplan should be shared with DFID's Deputy Programme Manager by the 25th of every month, confirming actual work undertaken that month and updating forecasts for future periods.

Budget

117. The budget for this evaluation is £2,445,054.20. If a phase 2 TMEA programme is agreed this contract could be extended to evaluate phase 2 to a maximum total value of £3.5m.

118. Bidders are strongly encouraged to compete on the basis of their commercial proposal, demonstrating value for money, as well as technical proposal.

119. Bidders should set out a separate budget for each of the activities outlined above along with an approach and methodology for each. In addition, bidders are requested to be very clear about methodology providing a detailed breakdown of costs for the different significant activities to be undertaken during the evaluation.

120. Bids should provide fully detailed costing for the inception phase, and as detailed as possible for the implementation phase. Parameters used for costing both phases should be very clear, and any assumption used for costing the implementation phase should be verifiable during the inception phase.

121. It is expected that some adjustment and refinement to budget allocation for the implementation phase may be required based on the inception work. Although the budget allocation across components of evaluation will be flexible to a reasonable extent, it will not be possible to increase the total envelope agreed for the contract (other than to extend the scope beyond the current phase, as indicated above).

122. Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) are included in the Contract Management Plan. Bidders are encouraged to make provisions in their commercial tenders to ensure that their fees are linked and subject to performance.

Duty of care

123. The Supplier is responsible for the safety and well-being of their Personnel (as defined in Section 2 of the Contract) and Third Parties affected by their activities under this contract, including appropriate security arrangements. They will also be responsible for the provision of suitable security arrangements for their domestic and business property.
124. DFID will share available information with the Supplier on security status and developments in-country where appropriate. DFID will provide the following: A copy of the DFID visitor notes (and a further copy each time these are updated), which the Supplier may use to brief their Personnel on arrival.
125. The Supplier is responsible for ensuring that appropriate arrangements, processes and procedures are in place for their Personnel, taking into account the environment they will be working in and the level of risk involved in delivery of the Contract (such as working in dangerous, fragile and hostile environments etc.). The Supplier must ensure their Personnel receive the required level of training and complete a UK government approved hostile environment training course (SAFE)²⁴ or safety in the field training prior to deployment.
126. The Supplier is responsible for ensuring appropriate safety and security briefings for all of their Personnel working under this contract and ensuring that their Personnel register and receive briefing as outlined above. Travel advice is also available on the FCO website and the Supplier must ensure they (and their Personnel) are up to date with the latest position.
127. Tenderers must develop their tender on the basis of being fully responsible for Duty of Care in line with the details provided above and the initial risk assessment matrix prepared by DFID. They must confirm in their tender response that:
- a. They fully accept responsibility for Security and Duty of Care.
 - b. They understand the potential risk and have the knowledge and experience to develop an effective risk plan.
 - c. They have the capability to manage their Duty of Care responsibilities throughout the life of the contract.
128. If you are unwilling or unable to accept responsibility for Security and Duty of Care as detailed above, your tender will be viewed as non-compliant and excluded from further evaluation.
129. Acceptance of responsibility must be supported with evidence of Duty of Care capability and DFID reserves the right to clarify any aspect of this evidence. In providing evidence, interested Suppliers should respond in line with the Duty of Care section in the ITT Volume 2.

References

Indicative sub-questions for Key Questions in Section E
Duty of Care risk assessment

Programme information

TMEA strategy 2013-2016

Propositions underpinning TMEA's strategy, May 2014 [TMEA Theory of Change & explanatory note]

TMEA constitution

TMEA Business Plan 2014/15

Programme monitoring and evaluation information

²⁴ UK Government approved hostile environment training course is known as SAFE (Security Awareness in Fragile Environments). The course should be booked through DFID and factored into the commercial tender.

JEG TORS * Paragraphs 113 and 114 above reflect the updated position on JEG (now EC) membership and Reference Group (previously Peer Reviewers)

MEL approach paper

TMEA Joint Evaluation Plan

TMEA Results Framework

Annual Review 2013

TMEA quarter 1 2014-2015 (Jul-Sep) progress report

2012 Upper Quartile report

Project list

TMEA Poverty research

Briefing paper; TMEA's approach to mainstreaming the poverty issue

Research concept paper

Evaluation policies

DFID Evaluation Policy ([on web](#))

DFID Ethics principles for evaluation and research ([on web](#))

Further supportive documents for information

DFID Business cases ([on web](#))

DFID Elliot Stern paper ([on web](#))

TMEA Business Plan 2013/14

TMEA quarterly progress reports

OSBP survey timetable

SWIFT surveys timetable

TMIS Overview note

Snapshot of a project monitoring plan as per TMIS

Dar Project Appraisal report

Dar MIS quarterly report

Dar monitoring plan

Mombasa Project Appraisal report

Mombasa MIS quarterly report

Mombasa monitoring plan

OSBPs – sample Project Appraisal report (Kagitumba/Mirama)

OSBPs MIS quarterly report

OSBPs monitoring plan

ANNEX 1 – Detailed Evaluation Questions (DEQ) for High level Evaluation Questions (HEQ) in Section E

DEQs	Deliverable(s) addressing this question
HEQ1: Has the programme been effective in delivering its outputs and outcomes? How has this been affected by the programme's organisational performance and how could this be improved?	
Effectiveness: programme-level outputs and outcomes	
DEQ1.1 To what extent are TMEA projects' intended outputs generally consistent with the programme TOC?	SO1-3 effectiveness and outcome-level evaluations (Deliverables 2C, 2D, 2E, 2F)
DEQ1.2 Were outputs achieved in accordance with plans/expectations and within budget? For ongoing projects, what is the likelihood of achieving the output targets within the project time-span?	
DEQ1.3 What constraints were/are encountered in achieving the outputs? What are the reasons for non-achievement of the outputs?	
DEQ1.4 Who were/are the main beneficiaries of the outputs? Are there organisations or groups of people who are negatively affected by the outputs?	
DEQ1.5 To what extent have supported organisations (i.e. the implementing partners) built capacity and capability on relevant trade-related matters?	
DEQ1.6 To what extent has TMEA been able to achieve expected outcomes (for finalised projects) and what is the general likelihood of ongoing projects achieving their outcomes?	
Operational model: programme setup	
DEQ1.7 To what extent does TMEA have the management arrangements, systems, processes and human resources appropriate for carrying out its mission (i.e. how suitable are these for the purposes of carrying out its activities)?	Institutional assessment (Deliverable 2B)
DEQ1.8 To what extent do TMEA's financial (including procurement), human resource and risk management processes enable it to efficiently and effectively manage its contractual relationships with implementing partners?	
DEQ1.9 To what extent do the processes TMEA has in place promote organisational learning and sharing of good practices?	
DEQ1.10 Are the M&E tools and processes in place appropriate, both in terms of results and in terms of finances? How could they be strengthened?	M&E systems review (part of Deliverable 1B) Institutional assessment (Deliverable 2B)
DEQs	Deliverable(s) addressing this question
HEQ2: Have the port and OSBP projects been effective in delivering their outputs and achieving their trade outcome objectives?	
Effectiveness: ports projects outputs and outcomes	
DEQ2.1 Have the ports projects delivered their output objectives?	Formative and summative evaluation of the ports projects (Deliverables 3A, 3B, 3C)
DEQ2.2 Have the ports projects achieved their objectives in reducing trade time and costs?	
DEQ2.3 Have the ports projects achieved their objectives in increasing market access?	
DEQ2.4 What is the anticipated additional capacity arising from the ports projects investments?	
DEQ2.5 What contribution does improved ports efficiency make to the logistical chain?	
Effectiveness: OSBP projects outputs and outcomes	
DEQ2.6 Have the OSBP projects delivered their outputs?	Formative and summative
DEQ2.7 Have the OSBP projects achieved their objectives in reducing trade time and costs?	

DEQ2.8 Have the OSBP projects achieved their objectives in increasing market access?	evaluation of the OSBP projects (Deliverables 3A, 3B)
DEQ2.9 To what extent is trade impeded by outmoded customs, immigration and other administrative practices at the border?	
DEQs	Deliverable(s) addressing this question
HEQ3: What is the likely impact of TMEA on trade outcomes and growth, and what factors are critical in order to ensure the sustainability of positive impacts?	
Effectiveness: programme-level trade outcomes	
DEQ3.1 To what extent have interventions led to a reduction in trade times, trade costs and trade risks?	Trade and growth impact study (Deliverable 4A)
DEQ3.2 Has an improved policy environment led to reducing trade costs?	
Trade impact*	
DEQ3.3 What is the impact of any achieved trade cost reductions on increased trade (both intra-regional and extra-regional)?	Trade and growth impact study (Deliverable 4A)
DEQ3.4 How has any improved trade policy environment led to increased trade?	
Economic growth impact	
DEQ3.5 To what extent has any increased trade resulting from TMEA interventions contributed to economic growth?	Trade and growth impact study (Deliverable 4A)
DEQs	Deliverable(s) addressing this question
HEQ4: What is the likely impact of TMEA on poverty and gender, and what factors are critical in order to ensure the sustainability of positive impacts?	
Poverty impact*	
DEQ4.1 What is the nature – and, where possible, scale – of the likely impact of the overall programme and of key TMEA projects in the portfolio on the poor—direct and indirect? Who is affected by potential short- or long-term impacts, both positive and negative, how, and how is the causality working?	Preliminary poverty assessment (PPA) (Deliverable 5A)
DEQ4.2 In particular, who has benefited from reduced trade costs? How are the benefits in reduced transport time and cost being passed on to poor people through lower prices or lower price increases?	
DEQ4.3 Are complementary policies being adopted to translate the benefits of increased trade into poverty reduction?	Final poverty and gender impact study (Deliverable 5B)
DEQ4.4 Are measures being taken, and are they successful, in mitigating potential negative impacts on any sub-groups – in particular poor people in localised areas?	
Cross-cutting issues	
DEQ4.5 To what extent has the programme benefited <u>women and girls</u> (noting that the programme design did not purport to benefit them equally)? Have there been any negative consequences for women and girls? Has the programme had an impact on relations, including power and influence, between girls/women and boys/men? How could the programme increase benefits to women and girls within its trade focus?*	PPA (Deliverable 5A) Final poverty and gender impact study (Deliverable 5B)
DEQs	Deliverable(s) addressing this question
HEQ5: How robust and verified are the causal links and assumptions in the TOC? What does this imply for the relevance, coherence and sustainability of the programme, and what are the lessons learnt that are relevant beyond TMEA?	
Programme relevance: TOC causal links and assumptions	
DEQ5.1 To what extent are the causal links and assumptions underpinning the TOC evidence-based or verified?	

DEQ5.2 Are the logframe targets and milestones relevant and realistic?	Preliminary relevance and sustainability study (Deliverable 6A)
DEQ5.3 To what extent does the programme support EAC regional trade development priorities?	
DEQ5.4 How have changes in policy and in the political economy in the region impacted on the programme or on its relevance?	
DEQ5.5 Do TMEA interventions complement other ongoing initiatives (both government and private)	
Coherence and coordination	
DEQ5.6 What are the strengths and weaknesses of the working model observed to date?*	As above
DEQ5.7 Is the complementarity and coordination between national and regional levels optimal throughout all programme components and activities?*	
DEQ5.8 To what extent does the TMEA model bring greater results than the sum of its parts? How could this be strengthened?*	
DEQ5.9 Is using one organisation – a not-for-profit company – the best vehicle for impact on trade, and on poverty reduction through trade? What are the strengths and weaknesses of this approach?	
DEQ5.10 To what extent are the programme's governance arrangements leading to the delivery of high quality and timely outputs?	
DEQ5.11 Is the operational model at donor level appropriate and efficient for delivering TMEA? What are the key enablers which need to be preserved, and what are the remaining constraints arising from donors' systems?	
DEQ5.12 Did TMEA align with country systems and agencies in an effective manner for ownership, and for impact? How could this be strengthened?	
DEQ5.13 Are the focus and activities of TMEA consistent with, and additional to, those of others' development programmes in the region? To what extent has the programme facilitated improved coordination?	
DEQ5.14 What sorts of approaches have been more successful in working with regional institutions in Africa?	
Cross-cutting impacts	
DEQ5.15 What has the impact been on corruption across the various components, notably at border crossings?	As above
DEQ5.16 What impact has the programme had on other issues, such as extractives and environment/climate?	
Sustainability	
DEQ5.17 What benefits (both social and financial) of the programme are likely to be sustainable and would continue with or without TMEA (staffing and funding)?	As above
DEQ5.18 What should be the essential components of a future exit strategy in order to sustain impact? *	
DEQ5.19 What is the likelihood that individual results and overall impact will be sustained after existing donors stop funding, and will there be a lasting positive impact on the poor?	
DEQ5.20 How are stakeholders engaged through the programme and beyond its life, and how do they take TMEA lessons learnt into account?	
VFM	
DEQ5.21 Is the programme providing VFM?	VFM assessment (Deliverable 2B and 6C)
DEQ5.22 In which activities/components and countries does the programme achieve higher VFM than others and what are the lessons learnt for driving greater VFM across the board?	

Annex 8: About TMEA

TMEA was established as an independent organisation. It is a not for profit company limited by guarantee which is owned by its Members who are the Donors. The TMEA Council, through the Members, appoints the TMEA Board which is the key decision making body. An illustration of the governance structure which shows the relationship between the Members and Council to the executive Board which oversees the staff and Senior Leadership Team (SLT) is shown below. The operational model for TMEA is to have both a regional presence, with offices in each of the EAC countries, and regional governance structures, with National Oversight Committees (NOCs) in each of the Member countries and regionally through the EAC.

The multidonor model currently includes the bilateral aid programmes from: the UK, the Netherlands, Finland, Denmark, Belgium, Canada, Norway and the USA. The current model enables the programme to be run as a multi-donor programme with the donors agreeing common approaches to engagement with the TMEA management and reporting of results. The Qualifying Donors, i.e. those contributing a minimum of USD 5 million to TMEA, may nominate one person, institution or government body to represent their interests as a TMEA Member to the TMEA Council who appoint the TMEA Board

Current leadership and management structure

